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Traumatic brain injury (TBI) affects 450-700/100,000 people annually. Qualitative 
research has highlighted that change in self-identity might be important to survivors 
and potentially linked with adverse rehabilitation outcomes, yet there are no outcome 
measures addressing these issues. This thesis utilised contemporary principles of 
measurement construction in psychological sciences to established and test a measure 
of problems with self-identity. A key feature in this approach is the development of a 
clear conceptual definition of the construct for measurement before proceeding with 
instrument development and validation. 
Aim		
To develop and validate a tool for measuring self-reported change in sense of self for 
survivors of TBI.  
Methods:		
Concept analysis methodology by critical review of the literature was used to provide 
a definition of self-identity change following TBI. This was then amalgamated with 
the conceptual framework and draft Personal Identity Questionnaire that had been 
developed from prior qualitative work (Levack, Boland, et al., 2014)(Levack, Boland, 
et al., 2014)(Levack, Boland, et al., 2014)(Levack, Boland, et al., 2014)(Levack, 
Boland, et al., 2014)(Levack, Boland, et al., 2014)(Levack, Boland, et al., 
2014)(Levack, Boland, et al., 2014). A second draft questionnaire was tested via two 
rounds of cognitive interviews to produce a final draft version of a Brain Injury Sense 
of Self (BISOSS) questionnaire for validity testing. 
Face-to-face interviews were used for data collection. Participants in New Zealand and 
the UK were asked to complete the draft BISOSS questionnaire, a demographic sheet, 
the Glasgow Outcome Scale-extended (GOS-E) and Sense of Coherence Scale (SOC-
13). Responses were analysed with factor analysis, using SPSS software and Rasch 





The concept analysis provided a definition of self-identity change after TBI, drawing a 
clear distinction between the changes reported and an evaluation of those changes. 
Changes were identified in three broad categories: egocentric self, sociocentric self 
and self-as-shared. The items in the Personal Identity Questionnaire were amended 
and added to in light of the concept analysis findings to form a comprehensive item 
bank for further testing.  
One hundred and thirty-six community-dwelling participants were recruited. The age 
range at injury was 17-75 years, 68.4% male; median time since TBI was 84 months. 
Severity of injury was mild in 31 and moderate/severe in 105. Forty per cent of 
participants reported experiencing problems with their self-identity.  
Initial Rasch analysis of all 45 items confirmed multidimensionality in the data. Factor 
analysis suggested a valid three factor solution with significant overlap with the three 
theoretical domains. These three factors underwent Rasch analysis separately to 
develop three separate, valid, unidimensional subscales. These subscales address 
egocentric aspects of sense of self- (BISOSS-E), sociocentric aspects (BISOSS-S), and 
relational aspects (BISOSS-R). 
Discussion	and	conclusion:		
Three interlinked but conceptually separate components of self-identity affected by 
TBI were identified and scales to measure them developed. The Egocentric and 
Sociocentric subscales both have a good spread of items, forming useful measurement 
tools. The Relational subscale had only 6 items and needs development of additional 
items to improve precision. These new scales evaluate strength of self-identity and 
could be used to evaluate, for example: impact of TBI on sense of self longitudinally, 
effectiveness of interventions on reconstructing self-identity and the relationship 
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ADL Activities of daily living 
BISOSS Brain injury sense of self scale 
BISOSS-E Egocentric subscale of BISOSS 
BISOSS-R Relational subscale of BISOSS 
BISOSS-S Sociocentric subscale of BISOSS 
CDC Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
COSMIN Consensus-based standards for the selection of health 
measurement instruments 
DIF Differential item functioning 
FIM Functional independence measure 
GCS Glasgow coma scale 
GOSe Extended Glasgow outcome scale 
HISDS Head Injury Semantic Differential Scale 
ICC Item characteristic curve 
LOC Loss of consciousness 
MDT Multi-disciplinary team 




NZ New Zealand 
PROM Patient reported outcome measure 
PROMIS Patient Reported Outcomes Measurement Information System 
PSI Person separation index 
PTA Post-traumatic amnesia 
QoL Quality of life 
SD Standard deviation 
SOC Sense of Coherence 
TBI Traumatic brain injury 
UK United Kingdom 
WHO World Health Organization 









In 1934, Kurt Goldstein – a German neurologist and psychiatrist – published his 
seminal work, The Organism, in which he proposed that human life could not be 
understood simply by examining all its parts, but instead had to be examined as a 
whole.  Likewise, from Goldstein perspective, injury or illness involving the brain 
needed to be assessed holistically. “It is impossible,” argued Goldstein (1939/1995)  
“to consider any illness – but above all, a neurological illness – without reference to 
the patient’s self” (p.11). 
Since the mid 1900’s however, the emphasis in neurorehabilitation has arguably been 
on partition and division of the brain and cognitive functions, with increasingly 
sophisticated techniques for identifying and defining problems with elements of 
cognitive functioning or neurological impairment.  Only very recently, in the last ten 
years or so, has the question of the place of ‘self’ in neurorehabilitation begun to gain 
more prominence again.  This is the subject of this thesis.  In particular, this thesis 
examines the impact of traumatic brain injury (TBI) on a person’s self-identity and 
how this might be clinically evaluated. 
TBI is the leading cause of death and disability in young adults in higher income 
countries (Fleminger & Ponsford, 2005) and is a growing problem (Center for Disease 
Control (CDC), 2016a). While some of the effects of the injury are obvious, it is often 
the cognitive, emotional and social changes that have the greatest impact on a person’s 
life – the hidden disability that accompanies TBI. This thesis takes a person-centred, 
subjective stance to examining the consequences of TBI and aims to explore the types 
of problems that people describe when they report feeling changed as a person after 
TBI.   
Change in self-identity is increasingly recognised as a common problem after TBI 
(Beadle, Ownsworth, Fleming, & Shum, 2016) and is something that appears to be of 
particular importance to people with TBI, yet there are currently no clinical 
measurement tools with which to assess it (Levack, Kayes, & Fadyl, 2010; T. L. 




(Schootman, Buchman, & Lewis, 2003) and it is important to be able to evaluate the 
impact of these rehabilitation interventions in terms that are meaningful to people with 
the injuries.  
The field of TBI care has seen huge advances in immediate and acute management, 
and while mortality from severe TBI has halved over the last 150 years, it has 
remained static for the last 20 years (Stein, Georgoff, Meghan, Mizra, & Sonnad, 
2010). Much of the research focus in recent years has therefore focused on 
classification of injuries (e.g. (Maas et al., 2010; Malec et al., 2007) and development 
of evidence-based guidelines for acute management of head trauma (Brain Trauma 
Foundation, 2007). This has led to improvements in services and the overall standard 
of care, and has enabled researchers to make more informed cross group comparisons 
of interventions based on standardised test scores. Tools like the Glasgow Outcome 
Scale have been developed to categorise recovery using functional and 
neuropsychological markers. Indeed, a whole array of neuropsychological tests is 
available to assess and record the specifics of cognitive function but these fail to 
capture the fundamental nature of the problem of TBI. As far back as 1975 Jennett and 
Bond acknowledged that ‘success [in brain injury treatment] should be measured less 
by the fact of survival and more by the quality of survival’ (p.481) but how to assess 
that quality remains a challenge. 
In contrast to the drive to categorise and standardise brain injury management, 
Goldstein’s holistic approach to rehabilitation after TBI incorporated an existential 
aspect, recognising that the effects of a TBI cannot wholly be explained by 
pathophysiology and neuroanatomy.  TBI is an event and pathology that has an impact 
on the person as a whole, affecting his or her very ‘essence’ (Goldstein, 1939/1995, 
p.107). However, such intangible, nebulous concepts such as that of a person’s 
‘essence’ are hard to study scientifically. Prigatano ( 1999) noted,  with respect to TBI 
rehabilitation, that ‘scientific investigation [had] failed to attend to patients’ subjective 
experiences and to conduct research relevant to their perceived needs’ (p. 33). 
The 1970’s heralded a growth in interest in the neuropsychiatric and behavioural 
manifestations of TBI but it was not until 1984 that Tyerman and Humphrey (1984) 
noted that ‘the head injured person’s own perspective has been sadly neglected’ 




literature looking at the subjective experience of surviving TBI and what it means to 
live with the effects of it. ‘Loss of self’ following TBI was a term introduced by Nochi 
(1998) and a metasynthesis of qualitative research looking at people’s experience of 
surviving TBI (Levack et al., 2010) found that a ‘changed sense of personal identity’ 
(p.990) was a common theme in stories of recovery from this type of injury. 
Rehabilitation is increasingly outcome driven, with outcome measures in some 
healthcare systems (e.g. USA, UK) determining levels of funding for services (NHS 
England, 2013; Turner-Stokes, Sutch, & Dredge, 2011). Measurement tools have been 
developed to categorise and assess a variety of physical and cognitive sequelae of 
neurological injury or illness with the aim of evaluating the effectiveness of 
rehabilitation, e.g. Functional Independence Measure & Functional Assessment 
Measure (Turner-Stokes, Nyein, Turner-Stokes, & Gatehouse, 1999). However, there 
is a potential pitfall: instead of providing a means of appraising the rehabilitation 
programme the outcome measures may also in fact shape and determine its content. 
The need to measure what we do means that we do what we can measure. Measuring a 
walking distance or range of movement at a joint is relatively easy and can therefore 
be utilised as measurable goal, whereas measuring the extent of loss of self-identity 
after a TBI is more challenging. For this reason there is an ongoing risk that the 
priorities of those delivering rehabilitation programmes are not always in line with the 
priorities of the people undergoing the rehabilitation – an observation made by Banja 
& Johnston (1994) two decades ago, but still very relevant today.  
Healthcare in general and rehabilitation practice in particular, is currently wrestling 
with an uneasy tension: services are increasingly expected to be person-centred and 
individualistic, yet are driven by a requirement to categorise and measure.  Of 
relevance to this thesis, there is a growing body of clinical experience and research 
which has highlighted the problems of identity change after TBI, but as of yet there 
has been a failure to incorporate attention to self-identity needs into mainstream 
rehabilitation practice.  These two demands (the need for person-centeredness and the 
need for measurement) do not need to be viewed as being mutually exclusive however. 
Patient reported outcome measures (PROMs) have been developed to enable 
assessment not just of the objective outcome of treatment, but also the subjective 




accurate measurement of unobservable latent characteristics, such as psychological 
constructs, through their observable manifestations.  These techniques make it possible 
to quantify less tangible outcomes from rehabilitation and have enabled measurement 
of diverse concepts such as impact of spasticity in multiple sclerosis (Hobart et al., 
2006), disease-specific quality of life (Tennant, McKenna, & Hagell, 2004) and 
depression (Siegert, Tennant, & Turner-Stokes, 2010). Modern measurement theory 
therefore has the potential to make the change in self-identity reported after TBI more 
accessible to scientific study. The broad aim of this thesis, therefore, was to devise a 
measurement tool address this reported change in self-identity after TBI.  However, 
prior to clarifying the specific research aims of this project, it is helpful to provide a 
few definitions of key terms. 
1.1 Some	useful	definitions:	
1.1.1 Traumatic	brain	injury	
TBI has proved difficult to define definitively over the years with different definitions 
published e.g. by the American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine (American 
Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine, 1993) and the World Health Organization 
(WHO) (L. J. Carroll, Cassidy, Holm, Kraus, & Coronado, 2004). Throughout this 
thesis we shall be using the definition put forward by the Demographics and Clinical 
Assessment  Working Group of the International and Interagency initiative toward 
common data elements for research on TBI and psychological health which defined 
TBI as  ‘an alteration in brain function, or other evidence of brain pathology caused by 
an external force’ (Menon, Schwab, Wright, & Maas, 2010, p.1637). 
Also salient to this thesis, is the further clarification they provided for the term 
‘alteration in brain function’ (Menon et al., 2010, p.1638): 
• Any period of loss or a decreased level of consciousness 
• Any loss of memory for events immediately before (retrograde amnesia) 
or after the injury (post-traumatic amnesia) 
• Neurological deficits (weakness, loss of balance, change in vision, 




• Any alteration in mental state at the time of the injury (confusion, 
disorientation, slowed thinking etc.) 
These criteria establish a distinction between a force resulting in a TBI as distinct 
entity from that resulting in an injury to the head without involvement of the brain. 
This thesis focuses solely on the spectrum of injuries covered by the definition above 
and as such head injuries without evidence of brain dysfunction are not considered.  
1.1.2 Self-identity	
Definitions of self-identity vary (and can even conflict with one another) across and 
within academic disciplines. The Oxford English Dictionary (“Identity,” 2015) 
provides two relevant definitions of identity: 
1. ‘Who or what a person or thing is; a distinct impression of a single 
person or thing presented to or perceived by others; a set of 
characteristics or a description that distinguishes a person or thing from 
others.’  
2. ‘The sameness of a person or thing at all times or in all circumstances; 
the condition of being a single individual.’ 
Further clarification of the concept of ‘identity’ was provided by Ricouer (1995) who 
drew a distinction between identity as selfhood, which he labelled ipse, and identity as 
sameness, to which he applied to term idem. One of the key tasks of this thesis was to 
provide a conceptual definition of self-identity change after TBI and this is the focus 
of Chapter 4. 
1.2 Research	Questions:	
It is important to break down the broad research aim (to devise a measurement tool 
address this reported change in self-identity after TBI) into several more specific 
research questions. Thus the main questions that this thesis attempts to answer are as 
follows: 
• What do people with TBI actually mean when they say they no longer 




• Is it possible to define clear conceptual boundaries for the loss of self-
identity that people with TBI have reported? 
• Having defined this concept is it then possible to measure it or to devise 
a tool that can be used to assess or incorporate problems with identity 
into clinical practice? 
1.3 Structure	of	the	thesis:	
This thesis chronicles the development of a tool with which to assess strength of self-
identity following TBI. A draft ‘Personal Identity Questionnaire’ was available at the 
start of this project that had arisen out of prior qualitative work (Levack, Boland, et al., 
2014). The development of the tool from this initial draft is reflected in the evolution 
of the title of the questionnaire from ‘Personal Identity Questionnaire’ to ‘Sense of 
Self Following TBI’ and culminating in the production of the ‘Brain Injury Sense of 
Self Scale (BISOSS)’. To assist the reader, instead of referring to these separate titles 
the different versions of the questionnaire will be referred to as drafts throughout the 
thesis: draft 1 (Personal Identity questionnaire), draft 2 and draft 2r (Sense of Self 
following TBI) and draft 3 (BISOSS). 
Chapter 2 reviews the current literature on TBI, looking at epidemiology studies to 
examine why TBI rehabilitation is of growing international importance and what 
current outcome measures are in use and what their limitations are. Chapter 2 also 
looks at what is known about how self-identity is constructed and what theoretical 
mechanisms might underpin the reports of change in self-identity following TBI. 
Finally, Chapter 2 considers how self-identity might be able to be incorporated into 
outcome assessment following TBI rehabilitation.  
Chapter 3 reviews the process of measurement construction and establishes two 
distinct phases to new measurement construction, namely the scientific task of 
defining the construct to be measured and the instrumental task of devising the tool. 
The benefits and limitations of using classical test theory versus modern measurement 
techniques are reviewed and the significance of the method chosen for the legitimate 




The remainder of the thesis is concerned with the process of constructing a measure to 
quantify strength of self-identity after TBI. The scientific task needed to be completed 
before the measurement task could begin because it is necessary to first define a 
concept before attempting to measure it. Chapter 4 (published as Thomas, Levack, & 
Taylor, 2014) uses a concept analysis approach to the literature to achieve this aim; the 
methods, results and implications are all presented in Chapter 4. Chapters 5 and 6 
cover the methods and results (respectively) of the instrumental task: devising and 
refining a questionnaire to measure strength of self-identity following TBI. The first 
task was reviewing the initial questionnaire to incorporate the findings from Chapter 4 
and then refining the items using cognitive interviewing. The next phase of the study 
was data collection to assess the psychometric properties of the resultant questionnaire 
and analysis using Rasch analysis. This culminated in the construction of three 
validated subscales (egocentric, sociocentric and relational) with which to measure the 
strength of sense of self following TBI.  
The implications of the study both from a conceptual and a measurement science 
standpoint are discussed in Chapter 7. The practical applications of the BISOSS for 






This chapter will review the impact of traumatic brain injury (TBI), how the effects of 
TBI can be assessed, and how the outcomes from rehabilitation programmes can be 
evaluated. The impact of TBI will be considered in global terms, exploring the scale of 
the problem, and in terms of the wider healthcare implications of these injuries. It will 
also look at the impact of TBI on a more personal level, what a brain injury means to 
the person and family affected. The effects of TBI extend well beyond the acute 
hospital stay, so when assessing the longer term consequences of TBI rehabilitation it 
is important to think of outcomes in their broadest sense.  This involves looking at the 
outcomes that are important not only to healthcare professionals but also to people and 
families living with TBI. This chapter also uses the wider health literature to begin to 
explore the impact of injury or illness on self-identity, with this concept explored in 
more depth in the TBI population in Chapter 4. 
Specific brain injury rehabilitation programmes were first widely described in Austria 
and Germany in the aftermath of World War I. Goldstein wrote extensively about his 
experiences with these brain injured veterans and his work probably provides the first 
detailed assessments of neuropsychological impairments associated with brain injuries 
– for example, in the case of patient Schn and visual agnosia (Goldstein & Gelb, 
1918). Goldstein described the use of specific strategies that could be taught to 
compensate for various impairments and suggested the use of employment as an 
important outcome to evaluation, as most of his patients were young men of working 
age. He pioneered a ‘holistic’ approach to TBI rehabilitation and described the 
‘catastrophic reaction’ (Goldstein, 1939, p.48), which Ben-Yishay further defined as ’ 
behavioural manifestation of a threat to the person’s very “existence”, due to failure to 
cope’ (2000, p. 128). 
Despite raising these important theoretical and existential issues in the early days of 
brain injury rehabilitation, to date research has predominantly focused on the more 
fundamental issues such as the aetiology of brain injury, how to measure and compare 
severity of TBI, epidemiology of TBI and the economic burden associated with TBI 




consider some of the broader literature on self and identity both from a theoretical 
perspective, but also how threats to self-identity have been reported and interpreted in 
other health conditions.  
2.2 TBI	aetiology	and	epidemiology	
2.2.1 Incidence:	
Accurate data on the true incidence of TBI is hard to obtain as not every TBI results in 
hospital assessment or admission, and because variation in the definition of TBI makes 
comparisons between studies problematic. It has been estimated that 10 million people 
globally are affected every year by a new TBI (Hyder, Wunderlich, Puvanachandra, 
Gururaj, & Kobusingye, 2007). The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, 
2016a)  estimated that there has been an increase in incidence of TBI in the US from 
521 per 100,000 people in 2001 to 824 per 100,000 in 2010. This estimate included 
data from emergency department visits for TBI as well as TBI-related hospitalisations 
and deaths. Tagliaferri (2006) published a review looking at epidemiological studies 
on TBI in Europe and found 23 studies from across different European countries. The 
aggregated incidence of hospital admissions plus fatalities across these studies was 
about 235 per 100,000, with most studies falling in the range of 150-300 per 100,000.  
However, a large part of the apparent difference in reported incidence of TBI between 
America and Europe can be accounted for by the inclusion of emergency department 
visits in the American data, which did not appear to have been captured in the 
European studies. This illustrates how differences in data collection methods can make 
it difficult to accurately compare the incidence of TBI between countries.  Indeed, two 
more recent studies, using different methods yet again, have suggested the true 
incidence of TBI may be even higher than previously estimated (Feigin et al., 2013; 
Leibson et al., 2011). Both of these studies have employed a broader approach to try to 
capture the whole spectrum of people with TBI, especially those who do not present to 
emergency departments but who instead might seek treatment within the primary care 
sector, or who present only with sequelae from the acute event. Feigin et al.’s (2013) 
New Zealand-based study reported a combined incidence of 790 per 100,000 for all 








Two studies have looked at lifetime prevalence rates for TBI. A birth-cohort study in 
Finland reported that at least 3.8% of the population had experienced at least one 
hospitalisation for TBI by the age of 35 years (Winqvist, Lehtilahti, Jokelainen, 
Luukinen, & Hillbom, 2007). A similar study in Christchurch, New Zealand reported 
that 31.6% had received medical attention for TBI by the age of 25 years, with 12.4% 
requiring hospitalisation (McKinlay et al., 2008). TBI can cause long term physical, 
cognitive and psychological changes, with around 7.7 million people in Western 
Europe (Tagliaferri et al., 2006) and around 5.3 million people in the US (Langlois, 
Rutland-Brown, & Wald, 2006) thought to be living with the TBI-related disability. 
This equates to a prevalence of 1778 per 100,000. 
 
2.2.3 Demographics:	
TBI is the leading cause of death and disability among young adults in higher income 
countries (Fleminger & Ponsford, 2005; Langlois et al., 2006). The most common 
causes of TBI worldwide are road traffic accidents, falls and interpersonal violence 
(Andriessen et al., 2011; Hyder et al., 2007; Tagliaferri et al., 2006) but the 
distribution of causes varies significantly across the age groups and when comparing 
high income countries versus low income countries. US data shows incidence of TBI-
related hospitalisation is highest in the over 65 year age group, at 294 per 
100,000.(CDC, 2016b) TBI-related emergency department visits, however, are most 
common in the very young. In every age group TBI rates are higher for males 
compared with females.  
In Western countries the average age of people with TBI is increasing (Roozenbeek, 
Maas, & Menon, 2013). Using pooled data from several observational studies 
conducted in European countries and the US the authors’ reported that the average age 




yields an average age at TBI of 45-48 years (Roozenbeek et al., 2013). This 
demographic shift was seen as both an increase in median age, but also as in increase 
in proportion of patients sustaining a TBI over 50 years of age, suggesting a true 
change in the pattern of TBI rather than just a reflection of an ageing population.  
Along with this increase in age of people with TBI is a shift in most frequent 
mechanism of injury with most TBI in the elderly  being due to falls (Maas, Stocchetti, 
& Bullock, 2008). The increasing use of motorised transport, and relatively under-
developed road safety programmes, accounts for the increase seen in developing 
countries (Roozenbeek et al., 2013) with WHO predicting that by 2020 road traffic 
accidents will have moved from ninth place to third place in the world ranking of 
burden of disease (WHO, 2006). Violence is also increasing as a mechanism of injury, 
encompassing both penetrating head trauma from gunshot wounds, but also war-
related blast injuries (Maas et al., 2008).  
Care for those sustaining moderate-severe TBI has seen many changes over the years. 
Advances in prehospital care and early resuscitation, development of intensive care 
facilities and widespread introduction of computer tomography scanning, enabling 
early identification of intracranial haematomas, probably account for a large amount of 
the progress up to 1990. Thus, mortality rates from severe TBI have fallen by nearly 
50% in the last 150 years  but this decline has not been steady, with big improvements 
noted between 1970 and 1990 and static mortality rates since then (Stein et al., 2010). 
It perhaps seems counterintuitive given the huge advances in acute care that have 
occurred over the last 20 years that mortality from severe TBI has not continued to 
decrease. Explanations for this include improvements in prehospital care which have 
meant that patients with very severe injuries who would not previously have survived 
are now included in the statistics, plus the increasing age and comorbidities of the TBI 
population, which means that despite improvements in care, improvements in survival 
have not occurred. 
2.3 Measuring	severity	of	TBI	
The term ‘TBI’ covers a heterogeneous group of injuries both in terms of their severity 
and pathophysiology. This produces many challenges when attempting to compare 
data between studies and when assessing the effectiveness of interventions. One area 




classifying TBI and for measuring outcomes from TBI, enabling valid comparisons 
between case series and treatment modalities. Various public health strategies have 
been implemented with the aim of reducing the frequency and severity of TBI – for 
example the introduction of seatbelts in motor vehicles, and crash helmets for 
motorcyclists. In order to be able to accurately gauge the impact of such interventions, 
reliable incidence data is crucial.  
Teasdale and Jennett (1974) identified the need for a reliable classification scheme that 
would describe the overall level of brain dysfunction or level of consciousness 
following a TBI. A taxonomy of TBI also provides a common language enabling 
discussion between treating teams of the patient’s condition in the acute stages (i.e. an 
objective means of identifying if there has been an unexpected deterioration in the 
patient’s condition that may necessitate intervention) and can give prognostic 
information (Teasdale & Jennett, 1974). The introduction of the Glasgow Coma Scale 
(GCS) in 1974 provided, for the first time, a means of categorising TBI and therefore 
making valid comparisons between groups. The GCS is still one of the most 
commonly used measures of severity of TBI, with duration of post-traumatic amnesia 
(PTA) being another. Both of these measures are outlined below.  
2.3.1 Glasgow	Coma	Scale	(GCS)	
The GCS was designed to be a simple, easily performed bedside assessment of 
conscious level, irrespective of aetiology of coma, and has been widely adopted since 
its inception. It assesses patient responses in three areas of functioning: 1) eye 
opening, 2) motor control and 3) verbal responses.  The motor control subscale carries 
a maximum score of 6, verbal responses 5 and eye opening 4, giving an overall 
maximum score of 15. The minimum score on each scale is 1 giving a range of scores 
from 3 (totally unresponsive, deep coma) to 15 (fully orientated with appropriate 
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4	 Withdrawing	to	pain	 Confused	conversation	 Spontaneously	Open		
5	 Localising	pain	 Orientated	 	






GCS scores have been used to classify TBI into three categories: GCS 13-15 for ‘mild 
TBI’, GCS 9-13 for ‘moderate TBI’ and GCS 3-8 for ‘severe TBI’ (Rimel, Giordani, 
Barth, & Riddoch, 1982).  However, variations in outcomes of ‘mild TBI’ have led 
some authors to argue for a sub-classification of patients with GCS of 13 into mild 
TBI and complicated mild TBI on the basis of other injury features such as depressed 
skull fracture or abnormalities on computer tomography scans (Williams, Levin, & 
Eisenberg, 1990). Neurobehavioural outcomes at six months for patients with 
complicated mild TBI are worse than uncomplicated cases and thus for prognostic 
reasons should be treated as a separate category (Williams et al., 1990). 
GCS scores have been widely shown to be useful in predicting acute outcomes like 
morbidity and mortality as well as functional outcomes (as measured with the 
Glasgow Outcome Scale) at six and 12 months in patients with severe TBI (Jennett et 
al., 1979; Levin, Gary Jr, & Eisenberg, 1990; Ono, Yamaura, & Kubota, 2001). 
However, this relationship does not hold for patients with milder injuries, in whom no 
relationship between functional outcome and GCS has been reported (Ponsford, 
Draper, & Schönberger, 2008). There are significant limitations to the usefulness of 
the GCS. One main area of debate has been around which GCS value to use, e.g. the 
initial GCS score immediately after injury, the post-resuscitation GCS score, or the 
highest GCS score in first 24 hours (Sherer, Struchen, Yablon, Wang, & Nick, 2008). 
This has been complicated by the use of modern treatment pathways, which 
recommend early sedation and intubation for TBI rendering early GCS scores 
uninterpretable. GCS also has poor inter-rater reliability (Gill, Reiley, & Green, 2004). 
These problems have led to researchers and clinicians using alternative markers of 
severity as prognostic indicators such as duration of PTA and duration of loss of 
consciousness, or a combination of these features (Malec et al., 2007).   
 
2.3.2 Post-traumatic	amnesia	(PTA)	
PTA refers to a confused state, characterised by disorientation, poor memory, reduced 
ability to respond to environmental cues, agitation and sleep disturbance that can last 




secondary to brain injury.  Duration of PTA is frequently used as a proxy measure of 








From : King & Tyerman, 2009. 
	
Traditional assessment of PTA has focused exclusively on memory and orientation – 
for example, using the Westmead PTA scale, which consists of seven orientation items 
and five memory items (Marosszeky, Ryan, Shores, Batchelor, & Marosszeky, 1998). 
However broader definitions of PTA also include assessment of behavioural profile 
and sleep-wake cycles, preferring to refer to a ‘post traumatic confusional state’ (Stuss 
et al., 1999, p. 635). Despite using various tools that have been developed to assess for 
the presence or resolution of PTA, it is very difficult to confidently identify 
prospectively exactly when people have emerged from this state (Nakase-Richardson, 
Yablon, & Sherer, 2007; Sherer et al., 2008). There is also poor correlation between 
the categories assigned using GCS criteria and those using PTA criteria, meaning the 
validity of comparisons between studies using different assessment methods is, at best, 
questionable (Sherer et al., 2008). 
Stratifying TBI into mild, moderate or severe categories using specified criteria is a 
crucial first step to being able to pool data from different centres for larger multicentre 
trials looking at the effectiveness of acute interventions (Jennett et al., 1979). 
Unfortunately, there are still issues with how TBI is defined and classified, with 
neither the GCS nor PTA duration adequately fulfilling this role. These problems must 
be borne in mind when examining the data on incidence and severity of TBI as these 






There are huge cost implications to what has been called the ‘silent epidemic’ of TBI 
(Rusnak, 2013, p. 186). However, these are also difficult to calculate for the reasons 
highlighted above and the indirect costs of TBI such as loss of earning potential and 
costs of informal carers are hard to evaluate.  Some studies have focused on the acute 
treatment costs, which are easier to identify but represent only a small part of the total 
TBI-related costs. A retrospective analysis of  acute costs of 6,474 hospital admissions 
with TBI in England and Wales found an average hospital cost (transport to hospital 
and TBI related treatment) of £15,462 (SD £16,844) (S. Morris, Ridley, Lecky, 
Munro, & Christensen, 2008). This is much higher than previously reported with 
European figures of £3,830 in Spain and £6,097 in Sweden based on average costs and 
incidence data (Berg, Tagliaferri, & Servadei, 2005). Figures from the US have 
demonstrated an expected variation in costs of in-hospital TBI care by severity of 
injury but also some variation by aetiology of injury (McGarry et al., 2002). The 
average cost of treating TBI resulting from traffic accidents was $20,522, gunshot 
wounds $20,084, blows to the head $19,949 and falls $15,860. This variation may just 
reflect a variation in the severity of injuries associated with the different mechanisms, 
with traffic accidents accounting for the majority of the critical injuries. Schootman 
(2003) retrospectively looked at hospital admission records to calculate acute care 
costs for hospitalisation with TBI in the USA and found 254,500 people with TBI 
required hospitalisation in 1996 with a total of $5.4 billion charged for treatment. This 
corresponded to a mean cost of $21,241 and a median of $8,522, which is roughly in 
line with the figures that Morris et al. (2008) reported in the UK. As expected, both 
studies also demonstrated increasing costs with increasing severity of injury. 
Extrapolation of data from studies like these has led to the assumption that it is the 
severe injuries that account for most of the costs of TBI. However, this has been 
challenged by data from Leibson et al. (2012), alongside the incidence data they 
published this subsequent study looking at medical care costs incurred over a seven-
year period. They used a case-controlled matched approach, pairing each TBI case 
with a matched control to try to ascertain the ‘additional’ medical costs associated 
with the TBI diagnosis. They looked at costs for the year prior to the TBI and for six 




addition to those incurred at the time of acute admission. As expected, people with 
severe TBI sustained significant extra medical costs in the first six months following 
their injury, but interestingly, significant incremental ongoing medical costs were not 
apparent for those that survived beyond the first year.  The mean amount of direct 
medical care costs over the study period for those with definite TBI was $35,244 
(range $0-$226,699) compared with $14,639 for controls. However, the really 
intriguing finding from this study was that less severely injured people (with only 
‘probable’ and ‘possible’ TBI) who did not show significant differences in health care 
costs in the first year, then showed a significant upward divergence from their matched 
pair for the remainder of the study period. This challenges the previous assumption 
that medical care costs increase as severity of TBI increases; whilst the severely 
injured group clearly incur greater medical costs in the first year, this is not necessarily 
the case over a longer period.  
 Leibson et al. (2012) identified escalating medical care costs for the less severely 
injured starting one year after injury. The mean medical costs incurred by the possible 
TBI patient group over the whole six-year period was $13,018, representing an excess 
cost of $2,300 (95% CI $2,190 to $2,428) compared with their matched, non-TBI 
control.  Extrapolating from their findings they estimated a total of $2,178,627 might 
have been incurred for additional medical care costs by the possible cases of TBI in 
their study (n=617), which was more than $260,000 greater than the $1,916,172 
estimated for the definite cases of TBI (n=93). The cost per capita is still clearly much 
higher in severe TBI, but the number of cases are much smaller. So, in terms of overall 
societal costs, given the much higher numbers of people sustaining milder TBI, it is 
this group of patients that is costing more, despite being often overlooked.  
Rickels et al. (2010) reported that one year after the initial accident 50% of patients 
with TBI still required treatment and this was reflected across all severities of initial 
injury. Fifty-three percent of the patients who received hospital treatment were 
classified as unable to return to their job or school on discharge. At one year only 
78.7% stated that they were doing just as well in jobs or school as they were prior to 
the accident. Fifty percent of those with ongoing subjective complaints about areas of 
everyday life had mild injuries. Fifteen of their participants required nursing home 




graded on the GCS score).  In total, the estimated societal costs to Germany for acute 
and post-acute treatment and rehabilitation were €2.8 billion per year (Rickels et al., 
2010).  
There has also been increasing recognition of the societal impact of mild TBI and the 
neuropsychiatric complications that can accompany it (Menon et al., 2010). There is a 
diverse range of neuropsychiatric sequelae associated with mild TBI ranging from 
cognitive and memory deficits to depression and sleep disorders. From this we can 
hypothesise as to the reasons for the reported high incremental care costs for the mild 
TBI population but there is little in the way of data to back this up. 
Furthermore, costs calculated in studies such as these have tended to only evaluate the 
direct medical care costs. The full financial burden of a TBI, including for instance the 
cost of adaptive equipment or housing modifications, loss of earnings for the person 
with TBI and any family carers, and ongoing costs of care, will be much greater. 
Given the population affected, i.e. predominantly young men with their whole lives 
ahead of them, this is substantial. The CDC in the US published an estimated total 
annual financial burden of $76.5 billion in 2000 when accounting for both the direct 
and indirect costs of TBI (CDC, 2010) 
Given that so much money is spent on TBI treatment and rehabilitation, it is 
imperative that this money is spent wisely. In order to evaluate the cost effectiveness 
of these services there is a strong need for robust, standardised methods of assessing 
and quantifying outcomes following TBI.  
 
2.5 Assessing	health	outcomes	following	TBI		
Changes in trauma management mean that more people are surviving the initial brain 
insult and arriving in the emergency department in a better state than previously. 
Equally, advances in neurosurgical and intensive care management are ensuring that 
more people are surviving to hospital discharge.  However, although survival rates are 
obviously important and are very easy to measure, survival alone provides a very 




As highlighted above, acute trauma care and rehabilitation is expensive, and it is thus 
important to know that resources are being used effectively. For this we need to be 
able to evaluate outcomes.  There has been a major shift in recent years towards 
demonstrating treatment effectiveness. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(2009) directed approximately $150 billion of additional funding to the health system 
of which  $1.1 billion was set aside for comparative effectiveness research, to enable 
improvements in practice and to attempt to halt spiralling costs (Steinbrook, 2009). 
Systems for purchasing health care services in the UK and elsewhere are increasingly 
basing their funding on evidence for efficiency and cost-effectiveness (Turner-Stokes, 
1999, 2007) and the last two decades have seen the widespread growth of evidence-
based medicine (Sackett, Rosenberg, Gray, Haynes, & Richardson, 1996) as best 
practice with a stronger emphasis on the use of external evidence for effectiveness of 
an intervention from systematic research. 
However, when attempting to assess the effectiveness of TBI rehabilitation or when 
monitoring health outcomes following TBI two key questions spring to mind: 1) What 
do we mean by rehabilitation? and 2) How is outcome best evaluated i.e. what are the 
benefits of a formal approach to measurement? In other words, in order to assess how 
effective rehabilitation is, we need to know what the purpose or aim of rehabilitation is 
before we can then decide or recognise what might constitute ‘success’. The second 
question is more around the function of a formal approach to quantifying the impact of 
an intervention instead of an assumption of utility or a simple impressionistic 
assessment. The obvious answer is to know whether or not the interventions employed 
have been successful, but are there actually other purposes to measuring outcomes?  
2.5.1 What	do	we	mean	by	rehabilitation?		
There are a variety of differing definitions of what is meant by rehabilitation. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines (medical) rehabilitation as follows:  ‘Restoration of 
a person to health or normal activity after injury, illness, disablement, or addiction by 
means of medical or surgical treatment, physical and occupational therapy, 
psychological counselling, etc.’(“Rehabilitation,” 2015). However, often restoration to 
a pre-injury level of functioning is not possible and other definitions recognise this by 
focusing more on functional aspects such as: ‘a set of measures that assist individuals 




functioning in interaction with their environments’(WHO, 2011, p. 96). The National 
Health Service (NHS) in England has defined the role of rehabilitation thus: ‘Patients 
(and their family / carers) are supported to achieve their maximum potential for 
physical, cognitive, social and psychological function, participation in society and 
quality of living.’(NHS England, 2013, p. 1). The emphasis on function is reflected in 
outcome measures traditionally used in neurological rehabilitation, such as the Barthel 
Index and Functional Independence Measure (FIM)- which rate people’s 
independence in a range of activities of daily living such as getting dressed and going 
to the toilet. The British Society of Rehabilitation Medicine has adopted a broader 
definition, encompassing psychological and social domains as well: ‘to produce 
sustained reductions in the impact of disease or disability on daily life’ (Royal College 
of Physicians, 2010, p. 3).  
Conceptual approaches to defining rehabilitation have examined key features such as  
person-centredness (Leplege et al., 2007) or promoting independence. Unfortunately, 
while both of these terms are widely used in definitions of rehabilitation they are 
themselves ambiguous. Leplege (2007) identifies four distinct uses of the phrase 
‘person-centredness’ in the rehabilitation literature encompassing notions of respect 
for the individual, participation and empowerment, relevant ‘real-life’ interventions 
and holism. Hammell (2006a) has highlighted the ambiguity in the aim of ‘promoting 
independence’, which can be interpreted on the one hand as referring to independence 
with self-care and not needing physical assistance from a third party, or in terms of 
being in control of decisions about one’s life and being able to act on those choices. 
This dichotomous interpretation of independence is echoed in definitions of autonomy.  
In particular, some authors have stressed the distinction between decisional autonomy 
(being ‘the ability to make decisions without external restraint or coercion’) and 
executional autonomy (being ‘the ability or freedom to act on the basis of decisional 
autonomy’)(Cardol, De Jong, & Ward, 2002, p. 972). It has been suggested that of 
these two types of autonomy, decisional autonomy is more closely linked to the ability 
to shape one’s life and one’s self-identity (Cardol et al., 2002)  and therefore is 
arguably more central to the purpose of rehabilitation.  
Hammell (2006) also contrasts the medical concept of ‘treatment’ with what she views 




is the appropriate term to use when the aim of therapy is to restore function back to its 
previous baseline level, and its efficacy can be assessed using functional outcome 
measures.  This is appropriate in the context of an acute, remediable injury, e.g. in the 
case of a torn ligament. However, in more complex conditions, with chronicity or a 
deteriorating trajectory, an approach focused on treatment is too narrow and 
inappropriate. Rehabilitation, therefore, is employed as a broader concept, 
encompassing the relevant aspects of treatment but including a focus on learning to 
live well with impairments in the context of one’s environment. There is an 
acknowledgement within this definition that conditions such as TBI or stroke entail 
not just a medical diagnosis, but rather a life event, and therefore need to be viewed in 
a wider biopsychosocial context. Assessing outcomes from rehabilitation therefore 
need to incorporate this extended remit.  
Thus, in this thesis a broader definition of rehabilitation will be used that includes the 
role of rehabilitation in empowering individuals to make decisions in their lives and an 
emphasis on the central place of autonomy and self-determination, i.e. ‘As a health-
care strategy, rehabilitation aims to enable people who experience or are at risk of 
disability to achieve optimal functioning, autonomy and self-determination in the 
interaction with the larger physical, social and economic environment’ (WHO, 2006, 
p. 17). 
2.5.2 What	are	the	benefits	of	formal,	standardised	measurement?	
There are various reasons why formal outcome measurement is useful, e.g. 
• To assess the effectiveness of the interventions (i.e. to find out what works), 
• To assess the cost-effectiveness of interventions, 
• To enable comparisons between different centres or services, or between 
different patient groups, 
• To be able to objectively monitor change, and 
• To facilitate discussion and communication within and between the treating 




An observational study of the use of commonly used outcome measures such as the 
Barthel Index, Waterlow Score, or Northwick Park Dependency Score in clinical 
practice found that actually recording outcomes was only a very small part of the 
utility of these scales. The part that the scales played in facilitating discussion both 
within the treating team and to external providers, and the framework they provided 
for treatment planning, communication and prognostication with families and service 
planning was equally important (Tyson, Greenhalgh, Long, & Flynn, 2010). Thus, the 
benefits of a good outcome measure extend well beyond the numbers. Outcome 
measures, rightly or wrongly, provide a focus for the rehabilitation team.  It is 
therefore plausible that the outcome measures used by a rehabilitation team may even 
influence the targets they select for intervention for intervention i.e. the outcome 




One of the most widely used measures of outcome following TBI is the Glasgow 
Outcome Scale (GOS) (J. T. Wilson, Pettigrew, & Teasdale, 1998).  The GOS, was 
not developed specifically for traumatic injuries, but for brain injuries of any aetiology 
in order to address the need to measure quality of survival rather than just survival 
after brain injury  (Jennett and Bond, (1975). The aim was to measure ‘overall social 
outcome’ (Jennett, Snoek, Bond, & Brooks, 1981, p. 285) by grouping  survivors into 
broad outcome categories. The original five point scale (Jennett & Bond, 1975) rated 












The GOS was originally recommended as the primary outcome measure for clinical 
trials involving patients with severe TBI, to be used in conjunction with the Disability 
Rating Scale for those with moderate brain injury (Clifton, Hayes, Levin, Michel, & 
Choi, 1992). Clifton et al. (1992) also concluded that there was a lack of instruments 
with which to measure psychosocial and emotional adjustment in clinical trials. The 
GOS was quickly and widely adopted as it allowed the outcomes from different 
groups of patients to be compared in a simple, easy-to-interpret way (J. T. Wilson et 
al., 1998). Following the widespread adoption of the GOS for reporting outcomes 
from TBI across Europe and USA the original scale was revised and extended (Jennett 
et al., 1981) – becoming the Glasgow Outcome Scale – Extended (GOS-E). The 
extended version introduced two subscales into each of the disability categories giving 
a more detailed assessment and producing an eight-point scale. The scale covers 
several broad areas of functioning starting with basic functional abilities, e.g. to obey 
simple commands and look after oneself for a 24-hour period, then also provides 
scores for extended activities of daily living activities such as shopping and travelling 
locally. It also incorporates ability to work and resume social and leisure activities, 
and finally the psychological impact of TBI in terms of relationships with friends and 
family (GOS-E form in Appendix E). The aim of the measure was to try and provide a 
summary score that incorporates levels of cognitive and emotional problems as well as 
physical difficulties. This was in response to a recognition that mental change was 
often the main determinant of disability after TBI (Jennett et al., 1981; J. T. Wilson et 
al., 1998). Other social outcome measures such as return to work or living 
accommodation have also been used.  One limitation of very reductionist measures 
like this is that they fail to account for people with severe disabilities who are well 
supported at home by an exceptional family or by sympathetic employers or work 
circumstances that facilitate a return to work even with severe disability (Jennett & 
Bond, 1975). This also serves to highlight the difference between ‘outcome’ as a 
measure that is used to assess the effectiveness of a rehabilitation programme 
compared with a personal perspective on recovery. 
Originally, the GOS-E was intended to be an interviewer administered scale but did 
not come with a specific script or format. Assessors were encouraged to utilise 
information from close family and friends in making the assessment so as to get as 




also been criticised for showing poor inter-rater reliability (Anderson, Housley, Jones, 
Slattery, & Miller, 1993) so a structured interview schedule was suggested to improve 
this (J. T. Wilson et al., 1998).  The scale was never intended to provide detailed 
information about specific areas of deficit, but to give a broad overview (J. T. Wilson 
et al., 1998). Nowadays, its utility is in providing a standardised outcome assessment 
for trials of acute interventions in severe TBI (Maas et al., 2010), alongside a range of 
other measures to capture more nuanced outcome data.  
There are different aims for the different stages of treatment as patients with TBI 
progress along their journeys from acute care to inpatient rehabilitation to eventual 
discharge into the community. Measuring mortality or GOS-E might be one 
reasonable indication of outcome for the acute phase, but as people progress further 
into rehabilitation the focus shifts from survival to questions more based around 
functional capacity or quality of life (Maas et al., 2010).  
Given that health services in the UK and other countries are required to show evidence 
of their effectiveness in order to receive funding (Turner-Stokes, 1999), measures are 
required that reflect this shift in emphasis, and which can record functional 
improvements.  The most commonly recorded outcome measures for neurological 
rehabilitation in the UK are the Barthel Index and the FIM, sometimes with an 
extension to the FIM known as the Functional Assessment Measure (FAM) (Skinner 
& Turner-Stokes, 2006). The Barthel index (Mahoney & Barthel, 1965) and FIM 
(Keith, Granger, Hamilton, & Sherwin, 1987) measure a person’s ability in activities 
of daily living and are predominantly measures of physical disability including, for 
example, items on mobility, transfers, feeding and toileting.  
The Barthel Index was recommended by Wade and Collin (1988) for wide spread use 
as a tool for communicating levels of disability within the medical profession. It was 
intended to provide a common language to facilitate discussions about disability 
between therapists and treating medical (non-rehabilitation specialists) teams.  Wade 
and Collin (1988) originally anticipated that additional tools would be required to 
monitor progress as the Barthel provided only a limited representation of ability. 
Turner-Stokes et al. (1999) identified the shortcomings of purely physical disability 
based measures like the Barthel and FIM in the brain injured population, and 




into the outcome assessment in this patient group. The UK FIM+FAM added 12 
further items to the FIM in the cognitive and psychosocial domains providing a more 
holistic assessment. Goal attainment scaling has also been suggested as a means of 
incorporating patient-derived outcomes into outcome assessment (Turner-Stokes, 
2009). 
The UK Rehabilitation Outcomes Collaborative (UKROC)  collates information from 
all specialist rehabilitation services in the UK, not just on functional outcomes but also 
measures of need and complexity, such as the Neurological Impairment Scale, the 
Rehabilitation Complexity Scale, Nursing Dependency Scale and Therapy 
Dependency Scales. This provides for a variety of tools with which to assess the 
effectiveness of a rehabilitation service: gain in FIM+FAM, reduction in care costs 
(Northwick Park Dependency Score and Care Needs Assessment) and Goal 
Attainment Scaling. They also include a measure of patient satisfaction and the option 
for adding other measures specific to the services provided.  Furthermore, community 
services are required to return data on community integration and carer burden.  
Recognition as a provider of specialist rehabilitation services in the UK is now 
dependent on reporting of data from these measures (NHS England, 2013; Turner-
Stokes, 2014). However, there is a concern that the use of these measures can narrow 
the focus and scope of rehabilitation services, contrary to the broad remit espoused in 
the National Health Service’s definition of rehabilitation. There is a danger with 
having a funding system based on functional gains and cost reduction that the things 
that people value most in their lives (perhaps including their individuality, their ability 
to express themselves, their ability to resume their roles within their families and 
society) might become marginalised. In this context, rehabilitation services could be 
reduced to doing only what can be measured in order to prove that what health 
professionals do is worthwhile.  
Functional outcome measures have been described as ‘superficial at best’ (Hammell, 
2006, p137). A person who chooses to pay for assistance with washing and dressing 
preserving cognitive and physical energies for more fulfilling activities is exerting 
their decisional autonomy to make choices in their own life, but they would score 
poorly on standardised functional rehabilitation outcome measures. Likewise, a person 




expense of severe physical and cognitive fatigue, may score highly but may suffer 
with increasing irritability, low mood and social isolation and as a result would 
probably rate their own rehabilitation outcome poorly. 
Another issue to consider with outcome measurement is the timing of assessment. 
Some epidemiological studies have demonstrated that the consequences of TBI are not 
always immediately apparent and often it is only during the sub-acute phase or after 
that problems can materialise (Rickels et al., 2010).  Outcome assessment performed 
on discharge from acute services or after one year may fail to adequately capture the 
extent of ongoing health consequences from a chronic injury or illness. 
Thus, development and selection of which outcome measures to use, when to use them 
and the purpose of collecting such data need careful consideration. These discussions 
have also highlighted the need to incorporate patient perspectives into measures of 
outcome.  
Patient-reported	measures	of	psychosocial	outcome		
Most of the tools discussed so far have been aiming to provide an objective assessment 
of the patient’s condition and are completed by a health care professional. However, 
there is a growing recognition of the fact that patient choice and patient experience are 
key variables when assessing the quality of healthcare services. Outcomes, particularly 
in chronic diseases need to be more nuanced and capture a broader range of areas that 
affect people’s health and wellbeing. This has led to the development of tools to assess 
health and illness from a patient’s perspective, so called ‘patient reported outcome 
measures’. It should be noted that the term ‘patient reported outcome measure’ can 
refer to any instrument that is completed by the patient, whether the subject of the 
measure is of importance to the patient or not (Doward & McKenna, 2004). Patient 
reported outcomes often address areas such as symptom profiles, adverse side effects 
and quality of life. 
The Patient Reported Outcomes Measurement Information System (PROMIS) is a US-
government backed initiative (PROMIS, 2016) set up to develop a dynamic system for 
assessment of patient-reported outcomes in chronic diseases based on computer 
adaptive testing using item response theory. The aim of this group has been to develop 




disease specific. A neurological item bank, called Neuro-QoL, has been devised to 
cover the areas pertinent to patients with neurological diseases. TBI was not 
nominated as one of the index neurological diseases and thus some of the unique 
problems of living with TBI are not captured in the Neuro-QoL items (Carlozzi, 
Tulsky, & Kisala, 2011). Personality change, stigma, grief, and loss over comparisons 
with pre-injury life were specific areas that are inadequately covered by the Neuro-
QoL items (Carlozzi et al., 2011). TBI presents with a unique combination of 
characteristics even when compared to other chronic neurological conditions for 
example: 
• TBI predominantly affect attentional, arousal, executive and memory systems 
creating a different constellation of cognitive problems compared to other 
neurological diseases 
• TBI patients can be young, and are predominantly male, so are often at a very 
different stage in their lives compared to populations with stroke, multiple 
sclerosis or Parkinson’s disease. 
• TBI is a sudden event, occurring out of the blue in a previously healthy 
individual and poses different challenges to an illness with a deteriorating 
trajectory. 
It is therefore unlikely that a generic instrument like the Neuro-QoL will adequately 
assess the specific problems encountered by people with TBI and specific instruments 
are required for this population (Carlozzi et al., 2011). 
What	outcomes	are	important	to	people	with	TBI?	
The priorities of people with disabilities and how they would measure success of a 
rehabilitation programme can be very different from that of the providers of those 
services (Banja & Johnston, 1994). It is essential that the outcome measures used to 
assess the effectiveness of a treatment or program reflect the priorities of the patients 
and measure outcomes of relevance to them (Fleminger & Powell, 1999).  Levack et 
al. (2010) suggested that the outcomes measures used in healthcare settings tend to 
reflect the priorities of those choosing the measures, e.g. allied health care 




In the last 30 years there has been a dramatic increase in the numbers of qualitative 
studies published looking at the personal experience of recovery from TBI and the 
relative importance of various physical, cognitive and psychological deficits from an 
insider’s perspective. Prior to this, self-reported information from people with TBI had 
been treated sceptically as it was felt that problems with self-awareness limited the 
credibility of their reports (Crisp, 1992; Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984). However, as 
Tyerman and Humphrey (1984) emphasised in their seminal paper on changes in self-
concept following head injury, ‘it is the subjective impairment that represents 
distressing reality for these patients and dictates their psychological adjustment’ (p. 
14). Their study was the first to attempt to scientifically investigate the subjective 
experience of feeling like a changed person as a result of TBI.  
Levack et al. (2010) performed a metasynthesis of qualitative studies looking at the 
experience of recovery and outcomes from TBI in order to assist in the identification 
of salient patient reported outcomes. Twenty-three studies were included in their 
analysis, representing the views of 263 people with TBI of varying severity. Findings 
across these independent studies were remarkably similar suggesting that they are 
likely to be representative of the experiences encountered by many people who survive 
TBI. A consistent finding across all studies was the reported experience of having a 
‘changed sense of personal identity’ after TBI (Levack et al., 2010, p. 990). This sense 
of loss or change seemed to be felt in three main areas: a disconnection with the ‘pre-
injury self’, a disconnection between mind and body, and a sense of disruption of 
between the person with the TBI and their social world. Another important finding to 
emerge from this metasynthesis was that reconstruction of the lost or disrupted sense 
of self was viewed as a key component in the process of recovery from the perspective 
of people with TBI. This was expressed on both a personal level as a reconstruction of 
‘self-identity’ but also on a wider scale as ‘reconstruction of a place in the world’ 
(Levack et al., 2010, p. 996). When combined together, these led to a sense of 
‘reconstructed personhood’.   
With the growing recognition of the need to incorporate patient reported outcomes into 
assessment of service provision and intervention effectiveness, problems with self-
identity would appear to be a potentially important target for such an outcome 





Reports of ‘loss of self’ or ‘change in self-identity’ are becoming increasingly 
common in research looking at the lived experience of illness or disability from a 
variety of causes, not just from TBI. These reports and the theoretical basis of self-
identity from psychology and philosophy can help to understand what people actually 
mean when they report a change in self-identity. Therefore, it is worthwhile 
considering what can be learnt about the process of identity formation and loss in the 
wider literature before focusing in on the specifics of identity change in TBI. Chapter 
4 analyses the literature on self-identity change specifically in the context of TBI.   
The loss or change of self-identity is a complex phenomenon, highly individual and 
multifactorial.  In order to try to understand what an individual might mean when they 
report that they no longer know themselves it is important to consider at the very least 
the nature of their impairments, the nature of their sense of self, and how these two 
interact.  There are many theories and models relevant to the nature of self-identity. 
Four broad concepts from these various models and theories have been selected for 
discussion below because of their particular relevance to change and reconstruction of 
self-identity after crises such as TBI. 
a) Self-identity	as	composed	of	ego-centric	and	sociocentric	components	
While the construct of ‘self’ has eluded a widely accepted definition, it is generally 
viewed as being multifaceted. Classically, James (1890) divided the ‘self’ into the ‘I-
self’ and the ‘me-self’.  Here, the ‘I-self’ is viewed as the self-as-subject, while the 
‘me-self’ is viewed as self-as-object. The ‘I-self’ is the experiencing entity; the 
position from which an individual views the world.  This facet of the self-identity 
encompasses features like continuity, volition and uniqueness.  The ‘me-self’ in 
contrast incorporates statements that a person can make about his or her self-identity, 
such as traits, beliefs and attributes.  This latter facet of self-identity can be considered 
analogous to ‘self-concept’.  Another way of considering this is to think about the 
question ‘what kind of person am I?’  In this context, the ‘answer’ to that question 
(maybe referring to one’s gender, physical characteristics, ethnicity, personal values 
and so forth) is the self-concept or ‘me-self’, while the entity that is actually doing that 




easier to study, has received much more attention and is sometimes (erroneously) used 
synonymously with ‘self-identity’ as a whole, neglecting the more elusive ‘I’ aspects. 
Another useful distinction between the various facets of self-identity is that they can, 
broadly speaking, be divided into ‘egocentric’ (or private components) and 
‘sociocentric’ (or public components). Historically, psychological research has 
focused on the egocentric self (i.e. the features of a person considered to make them 
unique as an individual) yet there is growing recognition of the contribution of social 
factors into one’s self-identity.  Social Identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and 
Self-Categorization theory (J. C. Turner, 1985; J. C. Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987) consider social identity as being the sense of self that people derive 
from their membership in social groups (e.g. family, work, community groups). These 
are combined in the ‘social identity approach’, which incorporates the view that ‘we 
can all define ourselves not just as an I and a Me but also as a We and an Us’ (Jetten, 
Haslam, & Haslam, 2012, Ch 1).   
From this perspective, cultural differences in views on the concept of self-identity 
might be explained in part by the varying emphasis placed on its egocentric and 
sociocentric elements. We might recognize the Western view as being more 
individualistic, thus emphasizing the contribution of egocentric aspects to the 
construction of self-identity (e.g. uniqueness from others). In contrast, we might view 
Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Pacific Island and Māori cultures (to name a few) as being 
more collectivist; placing more emphasis on the sociocentric element of self-identity. 
Within these cultures, in comparison to Western cultures, individuals might view 
themselves more in relation to their position in a group rather than on an individual 
level. Current literature on social identity in Western societies however shows us that 
this distinction is not fixed and our perspective (‘me’ versus ‘we’) can shift according 
to the situation we are in (Oyserman & Lee, 2008). In fact, there is increasing 
recognition in Western literature on the role that social markers of identity play in 
health-related outcomes ( Jetten et al., 2012). Social identities may be particularly 
pertinent in times of stress as this may involve a change in our relationships with 
others and an increased need for social support. 
Social constructionist views of self-identity, such as that proposed by Mead (1934), 




person and society. From this perspective, the self is entirely social in origin, and 
therefore individual self-identity cannot exist without a social context.  
The key idea here is that both internal and external factors contribute to one’s self-
identity. This notion is of central importance when considering how self-identity may 
be affected by TBI and how rehabilitation might assist people in reconstructing their 
identities after injury. This perspective also gives further weight to the application of a 
biopsychosocial framework (Engel, 1977) in rehabilitation, which would require 
acknowledgement of the interaction between pathological, psychological and socio-
political factors in the expression of identity change. 
b) Self-identity	as	development	
When considering change in self-identity, Erikson’s model of psychological 
development is also worth considering briefly. Erikson (1950) used the term ‘ego-
identity’ and defined eight stages of development that are progressed through, the 
mastery of each stage being crucial before an individual can move onto the next. In his 
model Erikson postulated that development of self-identity continued to occur 
throughout life, with each stage being characterized by specific challenges and 
tensions. 	
In essence, what Erikson’s model describes is ‘growing up’. All of these stages of 
course have a bearing on self-identity in one way or another, but one particular point 
of interest is Stage 5: identity versus role confusion. Erikson argued that the period of 
time from adolescence to young adulthood is crucial for the developing identity as this 
is the period when people begin to gain a sense of themselves as unique individuals 
and when they make choices about the sort of person they wish to become. In 
Erikson’s view, formation of a strong ego-identity at this stage is essential before 
moving onto forming healthy intimate relationships with others (in his sixth stage of 
psychological development). Indeed, Erikson coined the phrase ‘identity crisis’ 
(Erikson, 1968) to describe failure to develop ego-identity during adolescence. 
TBI and spinal cord injury are particularly common in early adulthood and injuries 
occurring at this time of life may be particularly salient as the resultant disability can 
delay the usual opportunities and experiences that people might otherwise draw on in 




one’s previous day-to-day life due to being in hospital or residential rehabilitation can 
contribute to these kinds of interruptions quite apart from the specific cognitive and 
physical effects of the injury. However, Erikson’s model also shows that identity 
development continues throughout one’s lifespan, with different challenges being 
faced at the different life stages. The key point here is that self-identity is not a static 
entity, but rather it is constantly remodelled and shaped throughout one’s life.  
c) Self-identity	as	narrative	
How an individual achieves a sense of self is a complex phenomenon. There are many 
different ‘layers’ to our sense of self, starting with the basic essential features that may 
be said to constitute a ‘self’ (i.e. an ability to reflect consciously on your own 
existence) which are then augmented via more elaborate processes (e.g. memory or 
language) before that person achieves all the features that are normally included when 
thinking of one’s self-identity. Gallagher (2000) has simplified these into components 
of the ‘minimal self’, devoid of temporal extension, and ‘narrative self’, which has 
continuity through time. 
The ‘minimal self’ refers to a minimum set of criteria that are necessary for an 
organism to be deemed ‘a self’. The addition of an autobiographical layer, strongly 
founded on memory, allows temporal extension and the development of a richer or 
‘extended’ form of consciousness, which is termed the ‘narrative self’.  
Narratives and narrative identity refer to the process of remembering and retelling the 
stories of our lives. It is through this process of linking past with present that a sense 
of continuity through time can be established. Narratives are closely related to 
autobiographical memory but are more than just recall; memories are encoded then 
recalled, told and reinterpreted before being re-encoded. This is a process that can help 
people make sense of the world and produce some coherence to apparently random, 
chaotic events. 
Narratives are closely associated with sense of self and a disruption in one’s life 
narrative can undermine one’s self-identity. There is debate within philosophical 
circles about the position of narratives in the construction of self-identity; whether 
these represent how life is actually lived and meaning construed, or whether they are a 




narratives are our identities (McAdams, 1999; Schechtman, 1996). Narratives are 
formulated not as a passive story to follow as if an actor in a play, but a framework by 
which we make sense of our self-identities in the world. Narratives consist of not one 
single thread but multiple story lines that interweave; some are major themes, others a 
more minor part; some are long and persist throughout the course of our lives and 
others come and go. The 'narrative self' refers to this process that links past with 
present with future, creating a coherent sense of self through time.  ‘There is no such 
thing’ according to Bruner (2002) ‘as an intuitively obvious and essential self to know, 
one that just sits there ready to be portrayed in words. Rather, we constantly construct 
and reconstruct ourselves to meet the needs of the situations we encounter, and we do 
so with the guidance of our memories of the past and our hopes and fears for the 
future’ (p.64). Opponents of narrative identity however have argued that life is too 
unpredictable to conform to such a structure and that not everyone thinks in a narrative 
way. Others, it is argued, are more ‘episodic’ in their experience of self-identity, 
viewing themselves as discrete selves during particular episodes of their lives, rather 
than having one continuous narrative that binds their sense of self into a single whole 
(Strawson, 2004).  
d) Self-identity	as	composite	of	multiple	selves	
One notion, widely applied in social psychology and used in psychotherapeutic 
approaches when dealing with identity loss, is that of healthy individuals having a 
multiplicity of potential selves or identities. Despite the experience we might have of 
being a single, unified self, it is argued that self-identity is instead a dynamic 
construction based on an underlying multiplicity of representations. Most theoretical 
perspectives agree that the experience of multiple self-identities is good for social and 
psychological well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2012). This is by virtue of the flexibility of 
responses that they provide to any given event; one can respond in different but 
equally appropriate and self-consistent ways in a variety of situations, e.g. present a 
different ‘face’ at work in the role of doctor to that at home in the role of mother.  
Markus and Nurius (1986) introduced the notion of ‘possible selves’; giving a 
temporal dimension to the representation of self-identity and providing goals, 
motivation and directions for future behaviour. ‘Possible selves’ define how people 




that we all carry ‘ideal’, ‘hoped-for’ and ‘feared’ selves. We can have several hoped-
for selves (e.g. the successful self, the rich self, the fit self) and several feared selves 
(e.g. the alone self, the incompetent self, the depressed self). These possible selves are 
cognitive manifestations of hopes, fears, motivations, and goals in that they are 
metaphors embodying those aspirations.  
Some people may have relatively few ‘identities’ at their disposal whereas others may 
be more complex and have a larger repertoire to call upon. The relative importance of 
particular identities to one’s overall sense of self-identity can vary as well. So for 
some people loss of a particularly key identity (e.g. being the family breadwinner; 
being the boss of several dozen employees) can be devastating for a person’s overall 
sense of self, whereas loss of a more minor component might not have such severe 
consequences. Having multiple and varied identities can ‘buffer’ some of the effects of 
disability on self-identity by allowing a greater range of responses when some are no 
longer available (Linville, 1987). Self-identity can therefore be construed as dynamic 
and fluid; changing as circumstances dictate. This idea (that within each person is a 
selection of possible selves) has been utilised therapeutically with patients who have 
brain injury, where losses (physical or cognitive) may render the current self-identity 
no longer viable (Heller, Mukherjee, Levin, & Reis, 2006; Ylvisaker, McPherson, 
Kayes, & Pellett, 2008). In this context, part of rehabilitation might be to explore 
options regarding the types of person the individual with brain injury might wish to 
become in the future, and identity-salient goal setting becomes central to person-
centred practice. Reciprocally, this suggests that pursuit of certain rehabilitation goals 
may not be ultimately successful if the individual in question is unable to link these 
outcomes with a desirable ‘future self’. 
2.7 Threats	to	self-identity	
Given the foundations of our self-identity discussed above (cognitive processes, 
interpersonal relationships, and links with our past and linguistic skills) it is perhaps 
no surprise that TBI should precipitate a questioning of that identity. But, regardless of 
how identity is construed, there are also other factors that can lead one to report a 
change in self-identity. In this section, we consider three broad types of threats to self-
identity that have been associated with injury or chronic illness: ontological assault, 





Loss or change of self-identity has been reported following a diverse range of life 
experiences: spinal cord injury (Hammell, 2007), postnatal depression (Abrams & 
Curran, 2011), and domestic violence (Oke, 2008) to give just a few examples. 
Perhaps common across these different types of phenomena, and contributing to 
changes in self-identity following them, is the notion of experiencing an alteration to 
one’s worldview: a change in perception regarding what constitutes reality or 
existence, leading to a change in how one views oneself as a person. Illness and 
disability experiences in this context have been described as an ‘ontological assault’ 
(Kleinman, 1988) in that they challenge a person’s basic understandings and 
assumptions about life and the world. 
Both the concepts of boundary experiences (Yalom, 1980) and liminality, popularized 
byVictor Turner, have been applied to the process of identity change following illness 
states, and both relate to this notion of ontological assault. ‘Boundary experiences’ are 
described as events that lead to the psychological experience of being forced to 
confront existential issues that we, as individuals, usually would prefer to avoid: 
‘freedom, death, isolation and meaninglessness’ (Patterson & Staton, 2009, p. 152). 
‘Liminality’ was originally used in anthropology to refer to a phase of social 
development that is undergone as the ‘rites of passage’ as one moves from childhood 
to adulthood. This stage of life, when an individual is at the threshold between one 
state and the next, is characterized by ambiguity of identity, place, and status in 
society (V. Turner, 1969). Latterly, a state of ‘permanent liminality’ has been used to 
describe the experience of disablement, where people with impairments are treated by 
society as being neither one thing nor another: ‘neither sick nor well, neither dead nor 
fully alive…. state of being is clouded and indeterminate’ (Murphy, Scheer, Murphy, 
& Mack, 1988, p. 238). At their core, both of these concepts contain the notion of a 
disruption to the normal flow of existence – traumatic events that force one to re-
evaluate and confront unwelcome truths such as the fragility of one’s own existence.  
Another notion related to the experience of disruptions to one’s worldview is that of 
‘biographical disruption’ (Bury, 1982). In the context of acquired chronic illness, the 
term ‘biographical disruption’ has been used to refer to the undermining of a person’s 




hard to predict. Bury (1982) introduced the concept of biographical disruption in his 
longitudinal study on patients following a diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis. He 
identified a series of profound changes that occur in a person’s life view when faced 
with a chronic, disabling condition. Notions of pain and suffering and even death, 
which had been on the peripheries of one’s existence, become a reality with the 
experience of illness. This, Bury (1982) argued, results in recognition of a change in 
one’s social relationships and the possibility of growing dependency on others. It also 
results in a re-examination of expectations and plans for the future. Bury’s  (1982) 
participants were predominantly younger adults who had previously considered ill 
health to be ‘in the future’, so the diagnosis of arthritis caused a shift in their whole 
life trajectory, rendering their futures uncertain.  
Many illness stories involve talk about a loss of autonomy, and refer to how the 
medical system can be disempowering. Foucault (1973) used the term the ‘medical 
gaze’ to describe the depersonalization that occurs as people are reduced to a 
collection of symptoms and pathologies. There is an inherent power imbalance as 
more weight is given to objective medical knowledge over the subjective experiential 
knowledge of the individual. In the acute stages of illness this is inevitable as control 
over a person’s body is given over to the medical team tasked with a person’s 
recovery. There comes a point during recovery however where this autonomy must be 
actively reclaimed, at which time the ‘patient’ can begin their journey towards 
becoming a ‘person’ again with control over their body and life (Frank, 2013). Cloute, 
Mitchell, & Yates (2008) reported on the disempowerment created by a lack of 
recollection of acute events in their TBI participants. Even years later, this gap in their 
knowledge of their own lives maintains their ‘passive position’ as a patient and 
prevents them reclaiming full autonomy. There is also a growing recognition of 
autonomy as a social relational process; it only makes sense in the context of human 
society. Various types of social interactions are vital components in the decisions we 
make, the goals we set and the life path we choose to pursue (Levack, Siegert, & 
Pickering, 2014). Thus active reclaiming of full autonomy may be limited by cognitive 





The relationship between the body and mind is a complex one.  The word ‘mind’ is 
itself a loaded and controversial term.  Some consider the mind to be a separate ‘thing’ 
from the body, perhaps equating the mind with a ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’ that exists apart from 
the body, yet somehow communicating with and influencing the action of it.  This 
viewpoint is called mind-body dualism or Cartesian dualism after René Descartes, 
who is attributed with first articulating this perspective (Demertzi et al., 2009).  
Materialists however would strongly dispute the notion that there is any non-physical 
substance separate from the body that produces our conscious experiences, such as 
that of self-identity; that instead we are the product entirely of biology (Melnyk, 
2012). Regardless of this debate however, one thing that is unique about having a 
‘mind’ is having a capacity to reflect on one’s own conscious experience and to 
internally influence those experiences.  So, for example, we can make ourselves feel 
happy or sad to some degree by choosing to think happy or sad thoughts, and this in 
turn can affect how we behave.  The conscious identification and selection of certain 
thought processes is central, for example, to cognitive behavioural therapy (Beck, 
1979).  
What is pertinent to a discussion of rehabilitation of self-identity however is what 
happens when people lose this sense of strong connection between their conscious 
experiences and their physical bodies. This can be expressed in terms of both problems 
with receiving messages from the body (i.e. in the case of disrupted or misinterpreted 
sensory signals) and with sending messages to the body (i.e. in the case of problems 
with controlling bodily movements). When sufficiently extreme, both these problems 
can result in reports of people experiencing a disrupted sense of self. 
Most people do not pay much conscious attention to their bodily states on a day-to-day 
basis; the role of the body in maintaining homeostasis of the vast majority of its 
physiological functions occurs well below the level of conscious awareness. However 
when stability of this homeostasis is questioned attention must be refocused and 
meanings ascribed to changes (Bury, 1982). Thus the onset of illness or disability 
necessitates a re-examination of this relationship; the body that in health has 
‘dis’appeared from our conscious experience in disease ‘dys’appears and calls for 




the body that was not present before. There is a need to be acutely aware of changes in 
one’s internal milieu as it may provide a signal of relapse or progression of disease or 
disability. There may also be a requirement to pay particular attention to basic bodily 
functions, such as those of the bladder and bowels. The body instead of being a 
vehicle for expression, to aid individuals in achievements and fulfilling their desires, 
may then be experienced instead as ‘a hindrance’ (Jumisko, Lexell, & Söderberg, 
2005, p. 45) or even as ‘the enemy’ or ‘an alien force’ (Charmaz, 1995, p. 662).	
Gadow (1980) applied Hegel’s description of a master-slave dialectic to this 
phenomena as follows: (a) the self is experienced as free subjectivity; the body its 
vehicle and instrument, serving the will of the self as does the slave its master; and (b) 
the inversion of that relation: the body rebels, refuses to function, and through the 
asserted independence, the former master—the self—becomes the slave. 
Frank used the term ‘body-relatedness’ to describe the degree of intertwining of 
conscious experience and body that people can experience (Frank, 2013). He 
described this as a continuum from an ‘associated’ body type at one end of the 
spectrum to ‘dissociated’ at the other. A person with a dissociated body type can view 
changes in the body as separate and distinct from his or her self-identity, whereas for 
more ‘associated’ types, bodily changes necessitate a redefinition of self-identity, with 
the two (body and self-identity) being inextricably linked.  
The nature of one’s body-self relationship can change with the onset or development 
of disability,  ‘undermining the unity between body and self and forc[ing] identity 
changes’ (Charmaz, 1995, p. 657). Charmaz (1995) examined the process of adaption 
to a new bodily situation in terms of changing self-identity goals and self-identity 
trade-offs. This describes a process of analysing which identities or roles are more 
important.  So, for instance, if it is no longer possible to maintain high work standards 
and good familial relationships, a question can arise regarding which one is more 
important and which can be sacrificed or adjusted. Successful adaptation to a change 
in circumstances entails the development of new and deeper meanings, through which 
people ‘transcend their bodies as they surrender control’ (1995, p. 675). Charmaz’s 
concept of surrender refers not to a process of mental separation of self from body but 
a process of acceptance and  personal growth: i.e. ‘they suffer bodily losses but gain 




adaptation to chronic impairment has been viewed as acknowledging the  ‘ultimate 
moral supremacy of the inner self’ (Gelech & Desjardins, 2010, p. 70).  	
The body also has an intimate relationship with one’s social identity. Goffman (1963) 
discussed  the role of ‘stigma’ and a ‘spoiled identity’ associated with physical 
imperfections. People with illness or disability risk becoming socially identified and 
exclusively defined by their impaired bodies (Bury, 1988). This has been termed a 
‘master status’ as the stigmatized component of one’s identity completely dominates 
all other statuses (Becker, 1963, p. 33), reducing ‘all one’s achievements and attributes 
to a single, stigmatized identity’ (Hammell, 2006, p. 113). There is a tension here 
between ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ impairments.  Visible impairments can alert others to 
potential problems and the need to accommodate them or they can create 
uncomfortable assumptions: e.g. ‘everyone still just sees a twisted body and assumes I 
have a twisted mind to match’ (Padilla, 2003, p. 418). Zitzelsberger’s (2005) 
participants also commented on how visible differences can dominate social 
perceptions ‘I was visible as someone different….they would not go and think I could 
be visible as a woman that could have a relationship, as a woman that could be a 
friend… as a woman that could be seen in the workplace, as a woman that could be a 
mother one day’(Zitzelsberger, 2005, p. 394). Invisible impairments (with a lack of 
physical evidence of any problem), such as executive dysfunction after TBI, present a 
different type of challenge, often resulting in a perceived lack of empathy from health 
professionals and the wider community (Chamberlain, 2006). 
2.7.3 	Cognitive	impairments		
However the nature of self-identity is construed, the substance of the brain is certainly 
involved in its production. Thus an injury or illness involving the brain is felt to be 
particularly threatening when considered from the perspective of one's self-identity. 
Change in self-identity has been reported for instance in the context of TBI (Levack et 
al., 2010; Nochi, 1998a), stroke (Salter, Hellings, Foley, & Teasell, 2008) and in 
dementia (Caddell & Clare, 2010). Furthermore, therapeutic interventions involving 
deep brain stimulation (e.g. for Parkinson’s disease) have been reported to produce 
experiences of immediate and profound changes in self-identity on occasions, which 




Witt, Kuhn, Timmermann, Zurowski, & Woopen, 2011). Brain injury can affect 
cognitive functions associated with the sense of self in many ways, as discussed next. 
Injury	to	crucial	‘self’	regions	
There is evidence of modular organization of function within the brain. Different 
regions are specialized for distinct cognitive functions, which then require higher-
order brain areas to interpret and integrate their outputs. Thinking of a neural correlate 
to our minimal sense of self, Damasio (2003) has highlighted the role of 
‘interoception’ in the formation of self-identity. Damasio (2003) described 
interoception as being a sixth sense, ‘most critical for the self’ (p.256), that gives us an 
internal representation of our bodies, providing the link between our thoughts and our 
body, and enabling us to interpret our feelings and current body state. These functions 
are attributed to the insula region of the brain (Damasio, 2003). From a more 
extended, narrative identity perspective, it has been proposed that crucial integrative 
functions for formation of self-identity occur in the left-hemisphere interpreter region 
(Gazzaniga, 2005). Thus damage to these specific brain regions could produce an 
alteration in the experience of sense of self.  
Others have argued for a more diffuse representation of self-identity in the brain, 
viewing the sense of self as a ‘Psycho-Social Dynamic Processing System’ (. Leary & 
Tangney, 2012, p.36).  From this perspective, injury to any of a multitude of brain 
regions or the connections between them, as may be seen in diffuse axonal injury, 
could produce a change in one’s sense of self.  
Memory	impairment	
One specific cognitive function that has received much attention when considering 
changes in sense of self is that of memory. In 1690, Locke postulated that it was 
continuity of consciousness, derived from our memories that created our self-identity 
(Locke, 1690). It follows from this that any disruption to our memories could also be 
associated with a disruption to our sense of self.  
The temporal lobes are recognised as being crucial for memory formation and 
integration; damage or changes to these structures have been implicated in experiences 
of loss or lack of coherence in self-identity e.g. in brain injury (Perna & Errico, 2004) 




Autobiographical memory has semantic and episodic components both of which 
support identity formation. Episodic memories are of our day-to-day experience and 
give us our rich autobiographical narratives, and a sense of being able to mentally 
‘travel back in time’(Tulving, 1985, p. 387) to a previous event. This ability to re-live 
the past is termed ‘autonoetic consciousness’. Autobiographical episodic memory is 
crucial to the formation of coherent self-narratives and gives a sense of personal 
continuity; a sense of being the same individual, persisting through life events.  
Semantic memory encodes more factual information, including abstracted information 
about oneself from autobiographical experience.  This includes things such as 
persisting traits and beliefs, personal likes and dislikes, and knowledge about how one 
might behave in certain situations (i.e. predictability of responses). This information 
from sematic memory forms the basis for our self-knowledge which can then be used 
to generate our ‘conceptual self’ (Conway, 2005).  
Loss	of	linguistic	skills	
The ability to construct coherent self-narratives is tied up both with autobiographical 
memory and linguistic capabilities. Language is the primary means by which we can 
express our identities to others and highlight our individuality. A study of people with 
aphasia has shown that this impairment can result in a profound effect on one’s 
interpersonal relationships and social life, which (from a social identity perspective) 
could translate into a change in a person’s self-identity, although this is difficult to 
assess directly given the limitations of communication impairments (Parr, 2007).  
Executive	impairment	and	loss	of	interpersonal	skills	
Personality change is a well-recognized consequence of brain injury (Yeates, Gracey, 
& Collicutt McGrath, 2008). This term refers to a wide-range of alterations in a 
person’s temperament, characteristic traits and interpersonal skills.  ‘Personality 
change’ tends to be something that is reported by others’ (i.e. third-party views on the 
self) rather than relating to self-reported changes. However, the interrelationships we 
have with others have a significant bearing on how we come to see ourselves. Other 
people’s opinions are instrumental in the forming our own self-identities (Cooley, 




changes in these relationships can ultimately have a marked influence a person’s sense 
of self. 
Loss	of	agency/	loss	of	decision-making	capacity	
Cognitive impairments resulting in emotional lability, impulsivity, or apathy can also 
lead to a feeling that one is no longer in control of one’s own actions (i.e. a loss of 
sense of agency). One common theme in qualitative research on the experience of life 
after brain injury is that of having a ‘loss of sense of personal control over one’s body’ 
(Levack et al., 2010, p. 994). This is more than just a feeling of unfamiliarity with a 
changed body, it also  includes the feeling of having a body that  is untrustworthy or 
‘could betray [one] indiscriminately’ (Jumisko et al., 2005, p. 44). Also associated 
with some people’s experience of a brain injury is a sense of loss of control over 
emotions and behavioural reactions (Jumisko et al., 2005). Nochi (1998b) discussed an 
additional tension arising here: between actively incorporating the brain injury into 
explanations of unwanted behaviour, which involves a degree of relinquishing of 
responsibility for some behaviours, versus fighting against the brain injury explanation 
for these changes due to a desire to retain a sense of agency and the feeling of being in 
control of oneself. 
Autonomy can also be compromised, particularly in controlled residential or 
institutional living circumstances (Levack et al., 2010). Cognitive injuries may mean 
that capacity for decision making is impaired and individuals are judged no longer 
competent to make decisions about crucial aspects of their lives (e.g. relating to 
medical treatment, living accommodation etc.). Such loss of decisional autonomy can 
erode an individual’s sense of being a complete person (Johansson & Tham, 2006) 
although this effect is likely be influenced by other factors such as an individual’s 
personal values and the sociocultural context.  
Loss	of	self-awareness	
Self-awareness has been defined as ‘the capacity to perceive the ‘self ‘ in relatively 
‘objective’ terms, while maintaining a sense of subjectivity’ (Prigatano & Schacter, 
1991, p. 13). Impairment of self-awareness following brain injury can lead to 




Thus, there are a wide variety of reports and theories about the nature of development, 
maintenance and representation of a sense of self both in states of health and illness or 
trauma. The contribution of these facets to the experience of people with TBI warrants 
further examination and this is examined in more detail in Chapter 4. 
2.8 Measuring	change	in	self-identity	following	TBI	
2.8.1 Existing	measures	
A recent systematic review of the evidence for self-identity change following TBI 
identified ten different scales that had been used in an attempt to quantify change 
(Beadle et al., 2016). These scales included the Head Injury Semantic Differential 
Scale (HISDS) (Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984), Selves Adjective Checklist (Cantor et 
al., 2005), Rosenberg self-esteem level (Cooper-Evans, Alderman, Knight, & Oddy, 
2008), Tennessee Self-concept scale (Ponsford, Kelly, & Couchman, 2014; Vickery, 
Gontkovsky, & Caroselli, 2005) and various personality inventories. Beadle et al. 
(2015) commented on the gap between the conceptualisation of self-identity change, 
i.e. individual characteristics and common social memberships as key features, and its 
operationalisation in the TBI literature using the tools listed above. Very few studies 
have used tools that were designed specifically for the TBI population – in fact only 
the HISDS was designed specifically for TBI, with other tools having been adapted or 
validated for use in TBI populations. There are a few validated and widely-used tools 
to assess self-concept. These include the Tennessee Self-concept Scale (Fitts & 
Warren, 1996) and (specifically for head injury) the HISDS (Tyerman & Humphrey, 
1984). These scales have been applied to the study of change in self-identity following 
TBI, and are based on comparing a person’s retrospective assessment of their self-
concept prior to the injury with their current self-concept, to produce a measure of 
‘perceived change in self-concept’. However, as described above, self-concept is only 
one part of the construct of self-identity. Furthermore, the use of retrospective self-
reports has been heavily criticized as introducing systematic bias, even in populations 
of people without brain injury (Schwarz, 2007).  
A Sense of Self Scale (Flury & Ickes, 2007) has been developed for use in the mental 
health field, primarily in the assessment of borderline personality disorder. This scale 




However, there are problems inherent in using generic instruments in specific patient 
groups as they may not cover the  pertinent areas of function (Gracey et al., 2008). The 
issue with a weak sense of self in the case of borderline personality disorder is a 
developmental or biological question. In comparison, as highlighted by the discussion 
above, problems with self-identity in TBI are associated with a number of additional 
issues (e.g. TBI is typically associated with a sudden, disruptive event, altering life 
trajectory and often associated with physical disabilities). The items in the Sense of 
Self Scale therefore do not fully address the issues related to self-identity change after 
TBI.  
Measures are available to address other specific areas of physical and emotional 
functioning after TBI but there is a ‘significant gap’ in the battery of measures used to 
assess outcome from TBI in the area of personal identity (Levack et al., 2010, p. 996). 
In a recent review of self-identity after brain injury Ownsworth stated that ‘future 
advances in research on self-identity processes after brain injury are reliant on access 
to reliable and valid tools’ (2014, p. 185) and identified development of valid tools for 
assessing the impact of brain injury on sense of self as a key priority for future 
research.  
2.8.2 Prior	work	towards	development	of	a	measure	of	change	in	self-identity	after	TBI	
Where there is no existing instrument, or the ones that exist are not fit for purpose, 
new items can be generated from five sources : the patients or people being studied, 
clinical observation, theory, research and expert opinion (Streiner & Norman, 2008, p. 
18). The research completed for the purposes of this thesis builds on prior work in the 
study of change in self-identity after TBI (Levack, Boland, et al., 2014; Levack et al., 
2010).  Figure 2-1 illustrates the steps taken towards development of the questionnaire 
items prior to the beginning of this thesis.  These steps involved using patient views 
and expert opinion to generate a theoretical framework and a list of potential items for 





























In order to begin work on development of a measure of change in self-identity after 
TBI, grounded theory was used to collect data from eight focus groups with people 
who had TBI, held around New Zealand (Levack, Boland, et al., 2014). Participants 
were selected on the basis of self-reported experiences of personal or social changes 
and/or negative experiences arising from a TBI acquired after the age of 16 years. 
Purposive sampling was used to ensure a wide range of participants were included, 
e.g. from urban and rural settings, from different ethnic backgrounds and at different 
stages post-injury. The topic of the research was introduced to participants by the 
question: ‘How has brain injury and life after brain injury affected: your sense of who 
you are as a person, your sense of identity, your sense of self, or what makes you 
‘you’?’ Factors that helped people regain a sense of positive identity following TBI or 
other areas that participants felt were relevant to the topic of self-identity were also 
discussed. The discussions were recorded and transcribed. The constant comparative 
method of grounded theory was used, meaning that transcripts were analysed as the 
study progressed so themes emerging from one group discussion could be explored 
further in the next. Overall 49 people with TBI took part; the topic of loss or change in 
self-identity after TBI was one that participants could easily relate to.  The central 
finding that emerged from this study was a feeling of desiring to be, or having lost a 
sense of being, an integrated, valued person.  This was further defined by three main 
themes underpinning this core finding as follows:  
1.Having a coherent, satisfying and complete sense of oneself, 
2.Respect, validation and acceptance by others, and 
3.Having a valued place in the world. (Levack, Boland, et al., 2014, p. 4) 
The analysis of the focus group transcripts and subsequent expert panel discussion 
produced Draft 1 ‘Personal Identity questionnaire’ (see Appendix A). Eight cognitive 
interviews on Draft 1 had also been completed, audio-recorded and transcribed but 
these recordings had not been analysed or incorporated into the questionnaire in any 





TBI is common and represents a significant global problem, affecting millions of 
people worldwide and accounting for a sizable amount of healthcare-related 
expenditure. Some of these costs are related to the initial acute care, but much is 
incurred many months or even years after the injury. Outcome measures are important 
to assess the effectiveness of intervention strategies but also to shape the rehabilitation 
programme that is delivered. Outcome measures that are currently in use for TBI are 
often overly reliant on physical markers of recovery, with insufficient emphasis placed 
on psychosocial markers of recovery. Many people with TBI report that it is the 
feeling of having changed as a person that bothers them the most; however, this is an 
area that is not incorporated into any outcome measure currently. In order to ensure 
that rehabilitation programmes are relevant to the population that they serve, it is 
essential that patient reported outcomes are used and self-identity change after TBI 
would seem to be an obvious target.  
The specific aims of this thesis are as follows: 
• to attempt to define self-identity change after TBI as a construct 
• to examine the attributes of the concept of self-identity and determine 
if it is, in principle, measureable 
• to refine and expand on the questionnaire items in Draft 1 in order to 
assess the concept of self-identity change after TBI with acceptable 
face validity 
• to utilise modern measurement theory to assess and validate the 
questionnaire items to produce a useful clinical tool through which to 






In the previous chapter, development of a tool to assess identity change after TBI was 
shown to be a high priority in order to progress research in this area. The purpose of 
this chapter is to discuss what is meant by measurement in the scientific sense and the 
methods used to develop and assess the properties of new measures.  
There are many steps between defining a construct to be measured to producing a final 
instrument that is numerically validated and reliable. Firstly, it is important to consider 
what is meant by measurement in the scientific sense, and then examine how this 
might be achieved. 
3.2 Definitions	of	‘measurement’	
Measurement is a frequently used word and has both lay and technical uses. To begin 
with, it is helpful to consider what measurement might entail and the difference 
between the concepts of measurement and scaling.  Four levels of scales are 
commonly identified: 1) nominal, 2) ordinal, 3) interval, and 4) ratio.  These scales 
differ according to the relationships between the items making up the measure.  
Nominal scales are comprised of items derived from observations that can be 
classified, but not ordered. This type of scale involves categorizing or grouping 
together items with similar characteristics, for example grouping children in a class by 
hair colour or gender. The children can be assigned to different groups according to 
this characteristic, and these groups could be allocated numbers (e.g. Group 1= blonde 
hair, Group 2= brown hair, Group 3= black hair) but these numbers do not imply an 
ordering of the groups, merely a statement of difference.  
Ordinal scales have the properties of a nominal scale but in addition the observations 
can be placed in rank order, e.g. from lowest to highest, with the numbers assigned to 
them representing their position in that hierarchy. For example, ranking children in a 
class in order by height from shortest to tallest is an example of an ordinal scale. From 
these data we would know the position of a child in the list of class heights, e.g. 29th 
out of 30, but we would not know how much taller they were than the 30th placed 




Interval scales have the properties of categorization and rank ordering of nominal and 
ordinal scales, but also have an additional property whereby the numbers assigned to 
the observations do tell us something about the distances between observations. So 
instead of just assigning a number based on rank ordering, the number assigned is 
based on an iterative and standardised unit of measurement. An example of an interval 
level measurement for a classroom would be to examine the birthdates of the students. 
We would be able to place the children in order of birthdate and see which child was 
the oldest and by how much. 
Ratio scales describe an interval level scale constructed with an absolute zero point so 
that the numerical properties of the numbers assigned are all preserved and 
mathematical ratio relationships hold. An example here would be to look at the 
weights of the children in the class. We can order them from lightest to heaviest, but 
we can also see that child A is 50% heavier than child B and 25% lighter than child C.  
However, whilst some following Stevens’(1946) assertion that measurement was ‘the 
assignment of numerals to objects or events according to rules’(1946, p. 677)  would 
use the term ‘measurement’ to describe data generated at any one of these levels, 
others would reserve the term for just data produced by an interval or ratio level 
scale(Hobart & Cano, 2009; Michell, 1997).  Campbell (1920) showed that what 
physical scientists mean by measurement requires an ordering system and the kind of 
additivity that could be illustrated by physical joining or concatenation. Campbell 
called this ‘fundamental measurement’. This ‘fundamental measurement’ allows for 
arithmetic operations such as addition and subtraction. In order to achieve this, a scale 
must maintain the numerical properties of order but also must permit that a meaningful 
answer can arise from the addition of points on the scale.  If addition is a requirement 
for fundamental measurement, then this requirement is only met by scales with an 
interval or ratio structure.  


















A simple ordinal sequence would place the rods in the order A, B, C, D and could then 
assign the numbers 1,2,3,4 to their order. An interval sequence, using rod A as an 
arbitrary unit of measurement would still order the rods A, B, C, D but would assign 








Thus the process of allotting a numeral to the rod based on the relationship between its 
length and an arbitrary unit of measurement (in this case rod A) serves to preserve the 
numerical properties of addition and subtraction between the points on the interval 
level scale. The allocation of numbers merely according to rank ordering does not 
preserve the mathematical properties and the positions on the ordinal scale cannot be 
summed in a meaningful way.  
Nominal or ordinal level data is often presented as bar charts or pie charts. Ordinal 




above, ordinal data does not support the mathematical operation of addition so 
calculation of mean and standard deviation(SD) and therefore use of parametric 
statistical methods are invalid. Whilst nominal and ordinal data provide useful means 
of classifying and scaling attributes the term ‘measurement’ should be reserved for 
scales providing interval or ratio level data and will be used as such throughout this 
thesis. 
Having looked at the different levels of sophistication of scales and the types of 
manipulations that are permissible with the data generated we can now move on to 
consider how to construct a new measure.  Many approaches have been suggested over 
the years with a variety of assumptions employed. However, most authors agree that a 
useful starting point is a definition of the construct to be measured and a consideration 
of its properties. Michell (1997) identified two separate tasks  in order to scientifically 
measure an attribute: 1) the scientific task of establishing that the attribute in question 
possesses a quantitative structure and 2) the instrumental task of devising the measure 
that will produce a numerical estimation.  
3.3 Scientific	task	-	Defining	the	concept	to	be	measured	
3.3.1 Measurement	in	physical	sciences	vs	psychological	sciences	
Measurement in physical sciences has been around for centuries.  There is evidence 
that early societies introduced standard measures for trading purposes dating back to 
3rd or 4th millennia BC (Gascoigne, 2001). It is only much more recently that 
researchers have begun to question whether the same standards of measurement that 
are used in the physical sciences could be applied to psychological constructs. 
Ernst Weber, a 19th century experimental psychologist, studied weightlifters and 
looked at the minimal detectable differences between two stimuli. He was interested in 
the ‘discrimination threshold’ that is the minimum difference in weights that a lifter 
could detect. The discrimination threshold varied in a mathematically predictable 
fashion dependent on the original stimulus intensity. ‘Weber’s law’ of just notable 
difference states that the change in a stimulus that will be just noticeable is a 
proportional to the strength of the original stimulus. His work was extended by 




found to hold true. This was the beginnings of the branch of science known as 
psychophysics.  
Thurstone (1927, 1928), expanding on the work of Weber, began exploring the 
challenges of scientific measurement in the psychological sciences, looking in 
particular at the subject of qualitative judgements. Thurstone was interested, for 
example, in the most scientific ways of measuring qualitative judgements related to 
academic excellence or political opinions. Thurstone’s work identified key factors that 
the psychological sciences would have to address if they were to aspire to 
measurement akin to that of the physical sciences (Hobart & Cano, 2009) including: 
• Accessibility of the concept of interest: how to measure an unobservable entity 
such as an attitude 
• Independence of the scale of measurement from the group being measured  
• Unidimensionality: measurement of only one attribute at a time, and 
• Continuum of measurement  
 
Accessibility	
Often, in the physical sciences, the attribute of interest (e.g. height) is directly 
observable. Some physical properties are not directly accessible (e.g. density or 
temperature) and their values are interfered from their effect on other directly 
observable phenomenon. Psychological concepts are harder to access and all have to 
be measured indirectly. Thurstone (1928) argued that psychological attributes could be 
accessed by their observable manifestations - attitudes can be measured via people’s 
expressed opinions, overt acts or past history.  These expressed opinions or observed 
behaviours can be taken as indicators of the (unobservable) variable of interest which 
is termed the ‘latent trait’. Thus one task on measurement construction is the 





Thurstone (1928) recognised that for numbers to form a measure, the scale of 
measurement had to transcend the group being measured.  This is a crucial test of 
validity for any measurement instrument. Again, using an analogy with the physical 
sciences, a tape measure should perform its measuring function just as well regardless 
of what it is measuring, be it a table or the width of a room (Thurstone, 1928). An 
instrument that performs differently depending on the object that it was measuring 
would produce invalid (or meaningless) results.  
In order to be able to meet this requirement it is crucial to separate out the processes of 
construction of a scale of measurement and the application of that measurement scale 
to subsequent research questions. If the scales constructed remained dependent on the 
group used to create them then their use in future studies would be limited. For 
example, if one was trying to devise an attitudinal scale on climate change, and the 
group used to construct the scale were all members of Greenpeace, then the 
applicability of the scale to other groups would clearly be limited. Thurstone (1928), 
looking at attitudinal measurement, acknowledged that this was indeed often a difficult 
requirement for scales to meet. He suggested that using groups with strong contrasting 
opinions during scale construction (e.g. drinkers and teetotallers if devising an 
attitudinal scale towards prohibition) and comparing the scales thus formed would go 
some way to meeting this criterion.  
Unidimensionality	
The concept of unidimensionality refers to the need for the clear specification of a 
single attribute to be compared or measured, e.g. weight, size, or temperature.  In 
Thurstone’s (1931) work on measurement of attitudes he acknowledged that the 
purpose was not to try to sum up a person’s attitudes with one score, but rather to 
break the construct down into its component parts and to quantify each of these.  
When describing the measurement of a table there are various attributes one could 
choose to focus on: its height, its surface area, its weight, its monetary value etc. No 
single value can define the table in its entirety (i.e. there is no measure of ‘table-ness’). 
When it comes to measuring these attributes a different tool is needed for each: 




The same applies in measuring psychological attributes – the concept of interest must 
be clearly defined, and if necessary deconstructed, so that the thing being measured is 
a single unified construct. Various different measurements may be required to 
adequately describe the person or object in question, but each measurement can only 
describe one specific attribute for it to be considered a measure.  
Continuum	of	measurement	
The fourth key factor was the expectation that the attribute to be measured could be 
placed along a continuum. In other words, the construct of interest must be able to 
possess one of a range of values; it must be possible to have more or less of the 
construct. The purpose of the scale is then to position the person or object along this 
continuum. Thurstone (1931) introduced the notion of a measurement continuum by 
first applying this to measurements of physical properties such as weight, and then 
later to measurement of psychological properties. To take an example from physical 
sciences: to measure weight we use scales and by systematically weighing a series of 
items we are able to assign them positions along a line ranging from the lightest at one 
end to the heaviest at the other. The instrument being used may be able to assign 
numerical scores or just a rank ordering but they will still be able to position all 
objects measured along this continuum. The same applies to measurement of indirectly 
observed variables. This time taking physical mobility as an example, numerous scales 
exist to ascertain a person’s level of physical mobility. These generally consist of a 
series of questions requiring differing levels of functioning to which a person is asked 
to respond as to whether or not they are able to perform that function. The philosophy 
behind these scales is that there exists an underlying physical mobility continuum with 
completely immobile in bed at one extreme to Marathon running at the other. The 
items then cover a variety of different scenarios to fill the gaps in between these 
extremes.  
These essential features of a measure are combined in Wilson’s approach to 
measurement construction (M. Wilson, 2005). He describes the four building blocks of 
a measure, the first one being the development of a construct map. The notion of the 
construct map is to construct a diagrammatic representation of the concept, 
amalgamating the concepts of continuum of measurement, unidimensionality with the 




indicator variables, the observable or expressed manifestations of the latent trait,  can 
act as ‘stepping stones’ (Bond & Fox, 2007) enabling the person to be allocated a 
position on the construct map. See Figure 3-2 for an example of what a construct map 
for a measure of ‘sense of self’ might look like. 
Not all constructs are amenable to measurement in the same manner. The idea of a 
construct map imposes a certain sort of structure on the construct to be measured. It 
assumes that the construct extends from one extreme to another, i.e. that it can be 
viewed along a continuum of measurement, there is a range of values that it may take; 
that, it is not an all or nothing phenomenon. Within this structure there may be 
distinguishable qualitative levels but the point is that the underlying construct is 
continuous. It does not matter if the concept is multidimensional and thus not easily 
envisaged as being continuous along a linear line of measurement but that it can be 
broken down into unidimensional-linear attributes. If the concept is in fact a discrete 


































Despite these requirements for scientific measurement being set out by Thurstone in 
the early 1930’s they have been largely overlooked in the field of psychological 
measurement until relatively recently.  A Committee of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science debated the thorny issue of measurement in Mathematical 
and Physical Sciences and in Psychological Sciences between 1932 and 1940, 
specifically trying to address the question of the possibility of quantitative estimation 
of sensory events. Finally, having looked at the concrete example of the Sone Scale of 
Loudness (Stevens & Davis, 1938), they concluded that the concept of additivity (a 
requirement for  ‘fundamental measurement’ as outlined above), as applied to 
sensation was meaningless. Stevens (1946), in defence of his scale, reported that 
discussions were in fact not about the act of measuring but more about semantics and 
insisted that the four types of scales already discussed (nominal, ordinal, interval and 
ratio) all constituted measurement, the difference being the mathematical operations 
one could legitimately apply to the resulting data. He stated that ‘measurement… is 
defined as the assignment of numerals to objects or events according to rules’ 
(Stevens, 1946, p. 677).  
This definition of measurement has been perpetuated and extended in influential 
psychology texts, for example in ‘Statistical Theories of Mental Test Scores’, Lord, 
Novick, and Birnbaum (1968). They refer to the four levels of ‘measurement’ and go 
on to state that ‘at various times in this book we shall treat a measurement as having 
interval scale properties, although it is clear that the measurement procedure and the 
theory underlying it yield only a nominal, or at best, an ordinal scale’ (Lord, Novick, 
& Birnbaum, 1968, p.22) 
The other criticism that has been levelled at the mainstream approaches to 
psychological measurement throughout most of the 20th century is an assumption of 
quantitative reality, i.e. that instead of analysing the construct under investigation and 
determining its continuous nature, this has just been taken for granted. This 
assumption has distorted the field of psychological measurement for decades (Michell, 
1997). Influential figures such as Thorndike (1918) stated that ’whatever exists at all 




trying to measure a person’s inner state, to measurement of their performance on a 
test.  He also considered that measurement of psychological attributes by ‘relative 
position’ was equivalent to measurement in the physical sciences ‘by amount of some 
unit’. He stated that ‘measurement by relative position in a series gives as true and 
may give as exact, a means of measurement as that by units of amount’ (Thorndike, 
1904, p. 19). This has been shown to be misleading (e.g. (Michell, 1997) and in order 
to truly measure psychological constructs the same rigorous methods of measurement 
need to be employed as in the physical sciences. Not all psychological constructs will 
be ‘measureable’ in the scientific sense, and this is particularly the case for constructs 
that are composed of discrete rather than continuous distributions.  This fact cannot be 
ignored in the measurement task. Approaches to studying these constructs would focus 
on description and classification (nominal data), or seriation and rank ordering (ordinal 
data) rather than measurement per se. 
Instead of ignoring or making assumptions about the construct of interest, the concept 
needs to be clarified and defined, boundaries delineated and conceptual attributes 
clearly stated. Specific questions need to be addressed such as: Can the construct be 
viewed as existing along a continuum? Is the construct unidimensional or in fact 
composed of many different facets? And, importantly, how does the construct of 
interest (the latent trait) relate to the indicator variables? 
	Consideration	of	the	types	of	variables	and	the	purpose	of	the	scale		
There is also a difference between scales that use causal variables and scales that use 
indicator (effector) variables, illustrated in Figure 3-3. When considering 
psychological scales earlier in the chapter, the concept of a latent trait was introduced; 
that is an attribute that cannot be measured directly and has to be accessed through its 
observable manifestations. A scale of this sort is composed of items that are intended 
to reflect greater or lesser amounts of the concept in question. For example, anxiety 
scales might ask about experience of palpitations, sweatiness and poor sleep as 
indicators of an underlying state of anxiety. These are indicator variables as they are 






























































However, other healthcare scales e.g. Quality of Life (QoL) scales, are composed of 
causal variables where the items in the test define the construct being evaluated and 
may produce a change in that construct. Here, the component parts of health, finances, 
family and housing, for example, contribute to and help define quality of life.  
Questions about specific symptoms, e.g. vomiting in cancer questionnaires, are often 
included as they are believed to affect QoL. Having symptoms of severe vomiting may 
well lead to reports of a low QoL, but having a low QoL does not necessarily imply 
the person is suffering from severe vomiting (Fayers & Machin, 2007). Another 
typical feature of causal variables is that having only one may be sufficient to change 
the underlying construct; it is not necessary to suffer with all the possible symptoms or 
side effects of a treatment to report a low QoL.   
Some cases are very clear cut and it is easy to determine whether an item is an 
indicator or a causal variable. However, it is not always obvious in which direction the 
relationship between the latent trait and the variable runs. Indeed, sometimes the 
variables can have both causal and indicator properties e.g. insomnia can indicate or 
cause a state of anxiety.  In these ambiguous cases a thought experiment can be helpful 
(Fayers & Machin, 2007), considering whether a change in the variable would be 
expected to lead to a change in the latent trait or vice-versa. 
Traditional psychometric approaches and modern Item Response Theory are both 
designed to assess scales composed of indicator variables, assuming a unidimensional 
scale, with items linked by a common underlying factor – the latent trait. The term 
‘clinimetrics’ has been applied to approaches used to assess scales composed of causal 
variables (Fayers & Hand, 2002). These scales tend to include a broad array of 
indicators combined together for their clinical utility e.g. GCS, Apgar score. These 
types of scales require different approaches to assess their validity and are often most 
usefully reported as a state rather than a sum score e.g. GCS described as E3M4V2, to 
described score on the component parts of the assessment, rather than 9/15, to describe 
a total score. Causal variables may well be linked by additional factors (e.g. 
chemotherapy) and the criteria for unidimensionality is relaxed as these are separate 
independent indicators of the construct of interest. The aim of a QoL scale is to 





In terms of health research, using scales with indicator variables, the requisite level of 
measurement depends on the intended applications or questions the researcher is 
trying to answer (Bowling, 1997). An ordinal scale is entirely sufficient if the purpose 
of the research is to identify a cut-point e.g. for diagnostic categorisation where a score 
above a certain threshold indicates presence of the condition (e.g. Beck Depression 
Inventory) or to answer a basic question such as how does X compare with Y. It is not 
sufficient for the calculation of change scores, means or standard deviations or other 
forms of parametric statistics.  If the question relates more to quantifying the degree of 
difference between two states – how  different is X to Y, or to monitor change over 
time – an interval level scale is required.  
Thus, there is a significant task prior to development and selection of the items for a 
questionnaire or scale. This involves a consideration of the nature of the construct of 
interest, how it relates to the items in the questionnaire and what purpose the 
instrument is being developed for. These features will determine the best approach to 
assessing the measurement properties. 
3.4 Instrumental	task	
 Having addressed the questions on the scientific nature of the construct to be studied 
and devised a construct map, the next three steps in designing a measure focus on the 
task of developing the instrument to measure the construct. This involves designing 
the items (indicator variables), designing the outcome space and selecting the 
measurement model. These are blocks two, three and four of Wilson’s (2005) four 
building blocks of measure development and are discussed in the subsequent sections.  
It is helpful however to begin by clarifying some of the terminology used in 
instrument design. 
Psychometrics refers to the branch of science concerned with the construction, 
application and interpretation of tests of psychological variables such as personality 
traits, intelligence and aptitude in a quantitative manner.  The term ‘questionnaire’ 
refers to a list of items, used to collect information from people. ‘Items’ refer to the 
individual statements or questions that make up the questionnaire. Items that seek to 






Devising the items for a questionnaire, the indicator variables,  is a crucial step as ‘no 
amount of statistical manipulations after the fact can compensate for poorly chosen 
questions’ (Streiner & Norman, 2008, p. 17). Many tests are based on historical 
predecessors, e.g. in the case of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, (Wechsler, 
1958). Where there is no pre-existing instrument, or the ones that exist are not fit for 
purpose, new items can be generated from five sources: the patients or subjects being 
studied, clinical observation, theory, research and expert opinion (Streiner & Norman, 
2008).  
This generates a pool of items that can be further refined into the final questionnaire 
for testing. It is important to consider both the breadth of coverage of the items and the 
wording of the items. Thinking back to Wilson’s idea of the construct map, the 
purpose of the items is to tap into the latent trait, to enable the researcher to position 
the respondent at an appropriate location on the map. In order to do this there needs to 
be sufficient numbers of items with a range of difficulties to be able to ascertain how 
much of the latent trait the respondent possesses. Items need to cover all aspects of the 
concept of interest that were identified in the conceptual definition in the prior 
scientific phase of development. 
Items should be easy to understand and written with the respondents in mind. If, for 
example, the respondents were children or people with cognitive impairment, the 
wording or length of the items would need to be appropriately adjusted. As a rule of 
thumb it is recommended that items are written so that they are understood by 
someone with a reading age of 12 years . For all items it is important to use 
appropriate terminology (technical vs non-technical language) avoid ambiguous words 
and have clearly labelled response categories (DeWalt, Rothrock, Yount, & Stone, 
2007). Items should take into account different perspectives and use neutral 
vocabulary wherever possibly to try and eliminate ‘social desirability’ bias, where 
respondents manipulate their answers to project themselves in a favourable light 
(Oppenheim, 2000). 
The length of the questionnaire also needs careful consideration. On the one hand, in 




adequate sampling of the concept of interest and following analysis items can be 
removed (so in testing the draft questionnaire will always be longer than the desired 
finished version). However, this needs to be offset against the length of time taken to 
complete the questionnaire. This is a particularly important consideration with 
participants who may struggle with maintaining attention for longer periods of time or 
with the effects of fatigue. 
As well as considering issues of content of items, it is also important to consider the 
impact of the ordering of items. Some authors recommend starting with items that are 
‘non-threatening’ and easy to answer (Sim & Wright, 2000). Items on similar themes 
should be grouped together and introducing a new topic with a ‘transition statement’ 
can be helpful (Woodward, 1988). 
3.4.2 Outcome	space	
Determining the outcome space refers to the process of how the respondents will 
answer the questions. For some questions a simple yes/ no answer will suffice whereas 
for others a scaling response is necessary. In a similar way to assessing the nature of 
the construct – whether it will generate nominal, ordinal, interval or ratio level data – 
the same assessment needs to be performed when looking at the individual items to 
determine the appropriate type of response. Is a categorical response required (e.g. 
gender male or female, i.e. nominal data), or are we trying to position a response 
relative to others (e.g. educational level), or does the response consist of interval or 
ratio level data (e.g. weight)? 
The first decision to be made when determining the outcome space is whether open 
ended responses are required (e.g. free text boxes suitable for qualitative enquiry) or 
whether closed responses would be more appropriate where the participant chooses 
from predetermined response categories. Items that are seeking to quantify a particular 
entity, i.e. a scale, would utilise closed responses.  
There are several commonly used closed answer categories such as numerical rating 
scales, visual analogue scales, adjectival rating scales or Likert scales. Devising 
response options requires some consideration so that the categories are clearly defined, 
cover all possible responses and are mutually exclusive (Linacre, 2002). Likert scales 




measurement.  The traditional Likert scale is a five-point scale that is bipolar (i.e. 
responses cross a zero or neutral point, with extreme positive or negative responses on 
either side of this. It typically utilises a hierarchical series of descriptors (strongly 
agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree) that respondents 
use to indicate their views on each item. It is important to consider the number of 
answer categories to use: fewer categories can lead to loss of information, loss of 
efficiency of the instrument, and a reduction of reliability co-efficient (Streiner & 
Norman, 2008); but too many categories can be confusing and increase the burden on  
respondents (Fries, Bruce, Bjorner, & Rose, 2006)  Too many categories can also be 
unnecessary if it turns out that participants do not make use of the full spectrum of 
answer options or where there is no meaningful distinctions between steps between 
some categories.  However, it is always possible to contract responses for analysis 
after the data are collected by amalgamating answer categories or insertion of cut-off 
points, but you cannot regain information that was lost by introduction of a 
dichotomised response category. The general consensus, from Miller (1956), is that 
the normal human capacity for processing information and discriminating between 
categories is 7 +/-2 and thus this number of categories theoretically provides the best 
trade-off between maximising information and minimising burden on respondents. 
However, four or five answer categories is the preferred option for most researchers 
and respondents (Fries et al., 2006). The optimal number of categories for a given test 
is a decision for the test developer bearing in mind the preferences and abilities of the 
respondents and the purpose of the test (Bond & Fox, 2007). Too many categories can 
result in cognitive overload so reducing the number of response categories may be 
appropriate for participants with cognitive impairment (Hawthorne, Mouthaan, Forbes, 
& Novaco, 2006)  
Another consideration here is that the adjectives used in response options must be 
appropriate for the stem concept or question in order for the item to make sense. If 
there is to be a ‘middle position’, this must make sense as the midpoint on a bipolar 
scale, and not reflect an inability to answer the question.  The midpoint should 
represent a true neutral stance, e.g. a neutral position; neither agree nor disagree. 
However, Bradley et al. (Bradley, Peabody, Akers, & Knuston, 2015) have shown that 
this is rarely the case and use of a neutral answer category usually distorts the data as 




applicable.  Scales with smaller numbers (five or fewer) of response options tend to 
show overuse of the neutral category (Matell & Jacoby, 1971). Therefore there are 
times when it is preferable to design a measure with no middle position option, to 
force respondents to take a position on an item (Bond & Fox, 2007) and reduce 
ambiguity and bias (Garland, 1991).  
To create a user-friendly but balanced scale all items should be positively worded but 
have some that tap one direction of the trait and some the opposite direction (Streiner 
& Norman, 2008) with response categories clearly and unambiguously labelled. 
Cognitive Interviewing describes a process of exploring the interpretation of the items 
with a few respondents prior to full scale data collection and this should be used 
before the items are finalised to ensure the questionnaire is working as intended 
(DeWalt et al., 2007).  
Often the responses in a Likert scale are then assigned a numerical score, e.g. ‘1’ for 
the lowest point on the scale and then increasing at one point intervals to the 
maximum number. Likert Scales can be utilised in uni-item or multi-item scales. 
When used as a multi-item summative scale the scores for the responses on each item 
are added together. However, unless further development and testing is undertaken, 
raw data from Likert scales must be assumed to constitute ordinal and not interval 
level data. In other words, it cannot be assumed that it takes the same amount of trait 
to move from a position of ‘strongly agree’ to ‘agree’ on any particular item as it does 
to move from ‘disagree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ and so forth. Likert et al. (1934) 
however argued that summation was valid as data from this type of scale approximates 
interval level data and therefore could be treated as such. Whether or not the data from 
Likert scales can be used as interval data has generated considerable debate over the 
years and will be discussed in the next section under measurement model.  
3.4.3 Choosing	the	measurement	model:	classical	test	theory	vs	item	response	theory	
The whole aim of the tool being constructed is to determine how much of the latent 
trait the participant has, i.e. to position them on the construct map. How the raw scores 
relate to the construct is done through the measurement model (also termed 
psychometric model, statistical model or interpretation model). The measurement 




results in practical applications, i.e. the measurement model ‘translates’ the scores on 
the sheet to locations on a construct map. Examples of measurement models include 
classical test theory, domain score model, factor analysis models, item response 
models and latent class models. The model used determines the relationship of the raw 
score to the latent trait and determines which ‘level’ of data has been generated, i.e. 
nominal, ordinal, interval or ratio, and therefore what statistical manipulations of the 
data are valid.  
These models evaluate rating scales in terms of their reliability, validity and 
responsiveness. There have been several features that have been identified as the 
essential principles of a good ‘outcome measure’ (Hobart & Cano, 2009) and the 
different measurement models vary in the emphasis they place on these different 
aspects: 
• Data quality – Can the scale be successfully administered to the target 
population? Are there lots of missing data suggesting a problem? 
• Targeting – Does the range of the scale reflect the full range of abilities in 
the target population or is there evidence of significant floor or ceiling 
effects? 
• Validity – Does the tool measure what it says it measures? 
• Unidimensionality – Are all the items measuring the same underlying 
construct? 
• Reliability – Is the data generated reproducible, independent of the 
administrator, with minimal influence from random or systematic error?  
• Responsiveness – Does the measure have the ability to detect meaningful 
change (i.e. clinically meaningful change in the health sciences)? 
Validity	
Validity refers to an assessment of how well the scale is measuring what it says it is 
measuring, i.e. how accurate the conclusions are that can be drawn about the degree of 




experienced psychological variables, the construct of interest (e.g. sense of self after 
TBI) is not directly measurable but accessed through the indicator variables (i.e. the 
items on the questionnaire) that comprise the measurement tool. It is hypothesised that 
these indicator variables will give an accurate indication of how much of the construct 
of interest (e.g. the strength of sense of self) that the person possesses.  Validity testing 
therefore looks at examining that assertion. The starting point for the assessment of 
validity of measurement of any construct has to be a clear definition of the construct 
under scrutiny (M. Wilson, 2005). In general, validity is an evolving property of a 
scale, in need of constant assessment and re-examination (Bond & Fox, 2007). A 
sound theoretical framework with clear conceptual boundaries and models of 
interactions with other related concepts of interest provides evidence of face or content 
validity, i.e. the items look like they should relate to the concept of interest.  
Judgement of experts, both professionals and representatives of the target population, 
on the items to be included or excluded can also add to the assessment of content 
validity.  
Criterion validation refers to a means of assessing the validity of a new scale by 
comparing with a gold standard measure. This type of validation is used when a good 
means of measurement already exists but needs improving because it is dangerous or 
invasive (e.g. Doppler ultrasound scanning replacing venograms as a means of 
detecting deep vein thrombosis) or when a measure is too long or time-consuming to 
complete and a more concise version is developed. 
Construct validity was a term introduced by Cronbach and Meehl (1955) to describe a 
framework of hypothesis testing based on a clear conceptual definition of the 
underlying construct. This is an ongoing process where theory and knowledge of the 
underlying construct being measured is used to make predictions about how the 
measurement tool will perform against other variables of interest. Thus, construct 
validity testing is simultaneously testing both the theory of how the construct should 
behave and the measurement tool itself. Assessing construct validity is not a one-off 
test – it is a process of accumulating evidence to support the theoretical construct by 





When constructing a scale, the aim is for all the items to be tapping into different 
aspects of the same trait, and not different traits. Unidimensionality is required if the 
summed score is intended to be interpreted as a reflection of the amount of one 
particular trait, as all items need to be testing or examining the same attribute or 
quality. This has two implications for test scores: Firstly, there should be a degree of 
correlation between the responses on the various items, and secondly there should be a 
correlation between individual item scores and the total score on a scale. These 
relationships are examined in tests of scale homogeneity or internal consistency. 
Adding item scores together to make a total score only makes logical sense if all the 
items are measuring different aspects of the same thing; if the items are looking at 
different characteristics of an individual, then adding them up to produce a total would 
be uninterpretable, e.g. adding up measures of height, weight and systolic blood 
pressure would not produce a meaningful statistic.  
Reliability	
Reliability is a way of looking at error in any measurement, i.e. how accurate is the 
measurement? In this context, an ‘error’ can be random, affecting scores in an 
unpredictable manner, or systematic, where all scores are equally affected to the same 
degree. No measurement whether of a physical attribute – such as length with a ruler, 
or walking ability with the ABILOCO questionnaire (Caty, Arnould, Stoquart, 
Thonnard, & Lejeune, 2008) – gives a precise, absolute reading, rather these figures 
are interpreted as accurate within a range.  The width of the range is known as the 
measurement error. The degree of acceptable measurement error for a tool depends on 
what is being measured. So for example, if measuring the distance between adjacent 
towns, a measurement that was accurate to within 100m would be acceptable, but if 
measuring children’s height this degree of error would need to be much less, to within 
1cm for instance.  Thus, when assessing the reliability of a tool for the job at hand it is 
important to consider the measurement error of the tool, the expected variability in 
readings between the participants, and the ratio between the two.  
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The results generated by a tool should also be independent of the test administrator or 
observer. Thus, a reliable test would produce similar results when the test was 
administered to the same subject by different examiners. Likewise, we would expect 
the same examiner to return very similar results on consecutive administrations of the 
same test to the same subject (provided there has been no change in the underlying 
trait being measured, for example due to learning effects or recovery in the case of 
measurement of aspects of health status). These types of reliability are termed inter-
rater reliability (the ability of a test score to remain the same despite different 
examiners) and intra-rater reliability (the ability of the test score to be reproduced on 
subsequent administrations). 
In the case of self-administered tests that do not require an additional examiner or 
observer input, the reproducibility of the test score is termed test-retest reliability. 
Assessing the reproducibility of test scores is much easier with examples from the 
physical sciences. Using a tape measure to assess the length of a piece of wood can be 
done repeatedly without affecting the length of the wood. However, administering the 
same test of a psychological attribute repeatedly would be expected to affect the 
subject’s performance either through learning or through cognitive fatigue. There can 
also be real changes in the underlying trait, e.g. mood states can fluctuate. Thus, 
assessing reliability in psychological testing can be challenging as low values can be 
interpreted in three ways: one, the scale may indeed be unreliable, second, the 
underlying trait may have altered between test administrations and third, previous 
administration of the test may alter current test performance.  
Responsiveness	
In health sciences, the term ‘responsiveness’ refers to the ability of a test to detect a 
clinically meaningful change in the underlying trait being measured. The term 
‘targeting’ refers to the range of values that the test will measure over and whether this 
range is appropriate for the population being studied. Floor and ceiling effects refer to 
the inability of a test to differentiate between subjects who score at the extreme ends 
of the scale. For example, if a person is scoring 20/20 on the Barthel Scale it is 




scale, looking at more complex activities would be more appropriate, e.g. the 
Nottingham Extended Activities of Daily Living Scale.  
All of these areas need to be assessed for any outcome measure as they are looking at 
different properties of the measure. A measure can be reliable but not valid, e.g. a 
measure of head circumference might be very reliable i.e. reproducible, but not a good 
indication of underlying intelligence. Likewise, measurement can be valid, but 
unreliable for example, in the case of faulty weighing scales producing random, 
inaccurate weights. It is imperative that a good outcome measure conforms in all these 
areas. 
Classical test theory and more modern approaches such as the Rasch measurement 
model approach the assessment of these qualities of scales in different ways, which are 
















































Lord and Novick (1968) argued that mental testing was unlike measurements of other 
quantities. Firstly, the nature of the attributes being measured is different in that 
mental attributes are not directly observable – they are studied indirectly through other 
variables. Secondly, assessment of measurement error in in mental testing is more 
challenging: In physical sciences one can repeat a measurement ad infinitum to get the 
most accurate reading on the instrument being used; however, with human subjects 
repeating the test changes the test as the examinees responses change significantly 
with repeated testing as discussed above. 
Most scale construction in psychology and health care in the 20th century was 
undertaken using classical test theory. The attraction of classical test theory is that is 
makes very weak assumptions about the construct and thus is applicable in most 
scenarios. This psychometric approach focuses predominantly on evaluating rating 
scales in terms of reliability, it models the sources of error that may impact on a test 
score and seeks to minimise them. However, it makes assumptions about the nature of 
the construct and the validity of summing scores from ordinal counts.  
Assumptions	underpinning	classical	test	theory	
The main assumption underlying this theory is that each observed score is composed 
of a true score and an error: 
! = # + % 
Where X= observed score on the instrument 
T= the person’s true score 
E= error  
Classical test theory also assumes a normal distribution of responses.  In classical test 
theory ‘error’ refers only to random error and not systematic error. The instrument 
measures the observed score and as the error is minimised this can get closer to 
approximating the hypothetical ‘true score’.  From the formula above it can be seen 




score. If it were possible to repeat the test hundreds of times classical test theory also 
assumes that the mean of the observed scores will approximate the true score. The 
error score is uncorrelated with the true score and the average error summed over all 
the items is zero (Streiner & Norman, 2008). 
The assumptions underpinning classical test theory lead to a series of mathematical 
formulae that can then be used to calculate reliability and standard error of 
measurement. So, if and only if, the assumptions hold true the results of these 
calculations be meaningful.  
Reliability of the construct is assessed using item-total correlations or using split 
halves. Calculation of ‘split halves’ involves dividing the scale into two random 
subscales and assessing the degree of correlation between them. The concept is that 
rather than assessing reliability by repeating the assessment (which might be 
confounded by memory or learning effects), two parallel forms of the instrument are 
compared. Cronbach’s alpha is a computed value giving the mean of all possible split 
half reliabilities. A high degree of correlation (>0.7) provides evidence of acceptable 
reliability. If all the items were the same Cronbach’s alpha would equal 1, i.e. perfect 
correlation, very high values of alpha (>0.9) indicate redundancy in the items. 
Cronbach’s alpha has also been used to support the notion of internal consistency. This 
can be calculated sequentially to see if omission of individual items leads to improved 
internal consistency during the development of a new scale. This would then suggest 
that this item should be omitted from the finalised measurement tool to ensure a 
homogenous scale. Dimensionality is best evaluated with factor analysis.  Factor 
analysis can be used to confirm the presence of one or more unidimensional scales.  A 
unidimensional scale is a requirement for summating a set of Likert style items 
(Pallant & Tennant, 2007).  
Limitations	of	classical	test	theory	
There are however, problems with classical test theory as an approach to measurement 
development.  One key problem is that both the true score and the error score are 
unobservable, theoretical values meaning that the assumptions stated in classical test 
theory cannot be formally tested. The derived formulae equally cannot be proven, nor 




any measure is uniform all along the distribution, whereas in a normal distribution 
sample size is much larger in the middle, producing a smaller error of measurement, so 
this assumption does not hold.  
Classical test theory also has limitations in terms of fulfilling the requirements for 
fundamental measurement set out earlier: it does not transcend the group measured, 
gives no information on the individual items and their relevance to the construct being 
measured and it provides ordinal level data. 
Sample	dependency	
One of Thurstone’s (1928) requirements for measurement was that a measure should 
‘transcend the group being measured’ (p. 547) and tests validated with classical test 
theory do not do this. The item and scale statistics generated using classical test theory 
apply only to the specific group of participants who took the test as the statistics 
generated are based on that population’s norms and variance. This means if the test is 
then to be applied to a group that differ in some way from the test group, it is 
necessary to re-establish the psychometric properties. This makes equating tests 
difficult and can pose particular problems for longitudinal studies. As time passes, 
scales need to be revised and norms alter, making comparisons across time periods 
problematic. Respondent characteristics and item characteristics also cannot be 
separated – each can only be interpreted in the context of the other, meaning that 
theoretically the psychometric properties of the test need to be reassessed with each 
new population sample. This is also true if the test is subsequently altered, e.g. by 
removing or altering any of the items. 
Assumption	of	item	equivalence	
Classical test theory assumes that each item contributes equally to the final score - i.e. 
the total score is often simply the sum of all the individual scores, irrespective of how 
well each item correlates with the underlying construct. This in turn means that if a 
person scores 50% on a test all we can say on the individual item level is that they 
have a 50% chance of scoring positively on it because of an assumption of equal 
weighting. Logically, this has to be wrong as not all items are as easy to endorse or 
pass as each other on any particular scale. Classical test theory does not provide any 




scores, error scores, parallel tests and all concepts central to classical test theory are 
defined on a complete test level, thus assessment of validity and reliability in classical 
test theory gives scores for the group of items as a collective but says nothing about 
specific, individual items themselves.  
To take an example using the Barthel scale, if the items in Barthel scale for an 
individual person are summed to achieve a total score of 11/20, this could represent 
two very different patterns of functional ability (Table 3-3). The Barthel scale score 
cannot distinguish between them and much information about their level of 
dependency is lost. Classical test theory does not permit a distinction to be made here 
as the person’s ability is summarised by their total summed score. In item response 
theory attention is paid to both responses on an individual item level as well as the 
total score on an instrumental level, and the relationship between the two, retaining 





















Classical test theory generates ordinal level data, but summing all the items to produce 
a single score is treating the data as if it is an interval scale. In order to be able to sum 
a set of Likert-style items, there needs to be some evidence to support the presence of 
one or more valid uni-dimensional scales.  Rating scales and questionnaires are 
composed of an ordered hierarchy of response options.  For these to be treated as 
interval scales it needs to be demonstrated that it takes the same quantity of the 
underlying latent trait to move a person’s response from one answer category to the 
next for all options. This would have to apply across all items of the scale. Just 
because the categories have been assigned numbers as their ‘label’ does not 
automatically confer on them the numerical properties of summation, allowing for 
calculation of means or change scores (Svensson, 2001). In interval level 
measurements the ordered count differs by a unit of measurement which is the same 
throughout the  whole range of the data continuum (Hobart & Cano, 2009). Therefore, 
this would imply that two people whose scores differ by 5 points experience the same 
difference in ability whether they sit at the lower, middle or upper ends of the 




Likert (1934) argued that while these rating scales produce ordinal level data, they can 
be seen to approximate interval level data and thus mathematical operations such as 
summation are valid. Likert proposed a simple summated ratings approach to 
analysing responses from rating scales: ordered response categories are allocated 
sequential integers and the resulting numerals simply summed. He was able to 
demonstrate high correlations between his methods and the more complex interval 
level measurement techniques advocated by Thurstone (Hobart & Cano, 2009). This 
has led to many researchers taking Likert’s lead and, incorrectly, attributing interval 
level measurement properties to ordinal counts from rating scales and questionnaires 
(Massof, 2002).  
3.4.5 Modern	test	theory	
Item response theory provides an alternative approach to measurement development.  
Many of the limitations in classical test theory, i.e. problems with ensuring 
unidimensionality, lack of transcendence of the scale over the group being measured 
and lack of formal testing of the characteristics (ordinal or interval) of data produced 
by the scale noted above, can be addressed using modern test theory. Modern test 
theory encompasses Rasch measurement theory and item response theory. These two 
theories differ in their approach to the relationship between the model and the data and 
have been termed the experimental paradigm and the statistical modelling paradigm 
respectively (Andrich, 2011). In item response theory the analysis involves looking to 
identify the measurement model that best fits the data, whereas the model itself is 
paramount in Rasch, with the emphasis being on getting the data to fit the Rasch 
model by analysing the reasons for variance. If the data fit the Rasch model, or can be 
made to fit, then the mathematical properties of the model apply to that data set. The 
Rasch measurement model provides the necessary and sufficient means to transform 
ordinal counts into interval measures and places a strong emphasis on assessment of 
internal construct validity (i.e. unidimensionality). The Rasch measurement model is 
the only model that explicitly examines the ordering of response categories and has 
been recommended as the most suitable measurement model for construction and 
validation of rating scales within social sciences (Andrich, 2011).  
The Rasch model is a one parameter ( item difficulty) model and is therefore simpler 




guessing parameters. This gives a Rasch validated scale distinct advantages when 
compared with other IRT models as specific objectivity i.e. sample independence is 
only present when using the one parameter model. This is a requirement for 
fundamental measurement. Therefore, the Rasch measurement model was used for this 
thesis.  
There exist several statistical models within the experimental measurement paradigm, 
but for convenience in the following sections I shall refer to the Rasch ‘model’ as they 
all share the same basic principles.  It is helpful to start off looking at an alternative 
method of constructing scales, that of Guttman scaling as an introduction to the 
mathematical basis of the Rasch model, before then considering the properties of the 
model that emerge. Rather than assuming that all items are equivalent, as in classical 
test theory and producing an assessment based solely on a total summed score, the 
Rasch model produces estimates of item difficulty as well as person ability. 
Guttman	Scaling	and	the	mathematics	of	the	Rasch	model:	
Guttman (Guttman, 1950) first introduced the idea of making the quality of the 
response more interpretable through using an explicit hierarchy of response options. 
Rather than just having a series of statements to agree or disagree with, on a relatively 
random basis, a Guttman scale is designed so that the response categories or items are 
ordered or scaled statements, progressing from statements that are easy to endorse 
through to statements that are hard to endorse. So, for example, the Rivermead 
Mobility Index (Collen, Wade, Robb, & Bradshaw, 1991) is a questionnaire looking at 
levels of mobility utilising a scaling approach. It starts off with a question relating to 
bed mobility, then progresses through questions about sitting balance, transferring, 
then walking, then running. It would be reasonable to assume that if an individual 
could run they could also turn over in bed, and if an individual could not turn in bed, 
they would probably be unable to complete any of the other tasks either.   This is 
encompassed by the notion that: ‘if a person endorses a more extreme statement, he 
should endorse all less extreme statements if the statements are to be considered a 
scale’ (Guttman, 1950). Thus, in a hierarchical Guttman scale with items 1-4 
representing increasing levels of the latent trait, a person agreeing with item 4, by 
definition ‘agrees’ with items 1,2 and 3 as well. Similarly, a person disagreeing with 




the response pattern agree, disagree, disagree, disagree. This method of collecting data 
has been shown to be superior to a collection of  items with Likert responses, in which 
the ‘difficulty’ level of each item is assumed to be the same, but is significantly harder 
in terms of the generation of such items (M. Wilson, 2005). 
The Rasch model takes the deterministic principles of Guttman scaling but interprets 
them in a probabilistic manner. The Rasch model deems that each person has an 
underlying value on the measurement continuum of the construct of interest – the 
respondent’s location (or ability) which is termed θ and that each item has a 
‘difficulty’ level attached to it – the item location, termed δ. Thus, how a person will 
respond to a given item is determined by the difference between these two values – the 
respondent’s location and the item location – and nothing else. The mathematical 
expression of this for dichotomous items is shown below: 
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(Rasch, 1960) 
The probabilistic nature of this interaction accounts for the person with low ability 
who happens to have a good day, and also for the person with higher ability who 
perhaps misreads a question and therefore fails to endorse an ‘easier’ item.  
This gives the following expression for the transformed linear score on a logit scale for 
dichotomous items: 
ln 0121 − 012 = (1 − 42 
Where θn is the ability of person n and δi is the difficulty of item i and pni is the 
probability that person n will endorse item i.  Thus, the term ‘logit’ refers to a log-odd 
unit, which is used a unit of measurement in the Rasch model. 
Subsequently, the dichotomous Rasch model has been extended to apply to rating 
scales with polytomous answer categories in the Rating Scale model and then the 
Partial Credit model. The Rating Scale model was developed by David Andrich (1978) 




items the thresholds are equally spaced across the trait. However, in practice this 
degree of uniformity is difficulty to achieve even if all items share the same outcome 
space structure. The partial credit model, so called as it was initially developed for 
multiple choice testing, is used when the items each have their own individual scale 
(Masters, 1982). 
Properties	of	the	Rasch	model:	
The Rasch model makes several strict assumptions about the data which are explicitly 
tested during analysis to ensure that the data fits with these expectations. The Rasch 
model assumes a hierarchy of items, with some being easy to endorse and some being 
harder to endorse, and this property is illustrated by the construct map, where items of 
different difficulties are spaced along the measurement continuum as stepping stones 
(Bond & Fox, 2007) in order to construct the measurement ‘ruler’. The item difficulty 
for each item, calculated by Rasch will therefore impose a rank ordering on the items. 
The items are assumed to be locally independent.  This assumption requires that 
responses to individual items be independent of each other. For instance, if a person 
endorses the first item on a particular scale, they should not be more or less inclined to 
endorse other items, other than as a reflection of their amount of the underlying trait 
being measured. 
The construct being measured must be unidimensional. Assessment of 
unidimensionality is at the heart of Rasch analysis and strict criteria for assessment of 
scale unidimensionality is used. 
The outcome of the interaction between a person and an item (i.e. their response to a 
question) should be related to the item difficulty and the person’s ability and nothing 
else. Any bias in the form of the effect of respondent characteristics (e.g. gender) other 
than the latent trait on responses is looked for and eliminated - an appraisal exercise 
known as ‘differential item functioning’. 
Thus, the Rasch model describes a set of requirements that must be met for rating 
scale data to generate interval level, internally valid measurements that are invariant 
across different patient groups (Hobart et al., 2006). If the data fits, or can be made to 




of this stated mathematical relationship: 1) the property of additivity and 2) the 
property of specific objectivity – properties that are required for fundamental 
measurement (B. Wright & Stone, 1999).  
Specific objectivity refers to the fact that the differences between two item locations 
must be independent from the data sample that was used to obtain them. So, if two 
items are shown to differ in their difficulty (i.e. their item location) by one unit of 
measurement (termed a ‘logit’ in Rasch), this relative position should not vary when 
analysed with a different set of data. In physical sciences, the stricter criteria of 
general objectivity can be applied, this involves being able to give an absolute rather 
than a relative position on the scale. To illustrate the difference imagine two weighing 
scales and two rocks. Under the specific objectivity criteria the weighing scales would 
be able to tell you that rock A weighed 5 more units than rock B. Under the general 
objectivity criteria the weighing scales would be able to give an absolute figure and to 
report that rock A weighed 10 units and rock B weighed 5 units.  
Specific objectivity emerges as a property of the Rasch model because item locations 
can be calculated independently of the person locations and vice-versa. Another 
mathematical property of the model is that the specific response pattern of a person 
contains no information about their respondent location, all the information required to 
calculate this is contained within their total score (and likewise for items). Thus in 
Rasch models the total score is a sufficient statistic from which to calculate the other 
item and respondent parameters.  
Many of the requirements for fundamental measurement that are assumed in other 
measurement models like classical test theory are explicitly examined in Rasch 
analysis, e.g. category ordering, strict unidimensionality, meaning that it can provide 
scales that meet the criteria for measurement in the scientific sense.  
3.5 Conclusions	
This chapter has set out two distinct phases of questionnaire development. In term of 
the development of the BISOSS, the first phase, which involves the scientific task of 
defining the construct to be measured, is addressed in Chapter 4. The second phase, 




Chapters 5 and 6, which cover the methods used for this instrumental task and the 







In Chapter 2, theories of self as related to reports of self-identity change in the general 
health and disability literature were considered, as was potential mechanisms for the 
experience of loss or change in sense of self. Chapter 3 clearly outlined that the first 
task in devising a new measurement tool is ‘the scientific task’ (Michell, 1997, p. 355) 
of providing a clear definition of the construct to be measured and a consideration to 
the structure of the construct. It has been highlighted previously that many studies 
looking at self-identity change have failed to adequately define their concept leading 
to a multitude of different interpretations of this phenomenon (Caddell & Clare, 2013). 
Thus it is the purpose of this chapter to address this task and set out some clear 
conceptual boundaries for the process of identity change following TBI prior to 
moving on to the instrumental task. This chapter will cover the methods, results and 
conclusions to this initial stage of measurement development as the completion of this 
task was required before moving on to developing the measurement instrument. 
This chapter will provide answers to the following questions: what are the defining 
characteristics of this construct (i.e. self-identity after TBI), what features are 
included, or not included and how does this construct differ from other, related 
constructs? The other important point to consider is whether self-identity after TBI can 
be viewed as having a quantitative structure, i.e. is self-identity change after TBI 
something that can be viewed as existing along a continuum, and is it unidimensional? 
This chapter will consider literature specific to identity change after TBI to answer 
these questions. Currently, there are a number of problems with incorporating self-
identity within clinical rehabilitation practice. These problems relate to how self-
identity is conceptualized, described, operationalized, and evaluated in clinical 
environments. The current literature shows a lack of clarity regarding use of the 
concept of self-identity following TBI. The terms ‘loss of sense of self’, ‘loss of self-
identity’, and ‘loss of personhood’ appear frequently in the TBI literature, but have 
been loosely applied with varying definitions within and across several disciplines 




these terms relate to or are distinct from other associated terms: e.g., ‘self-awareness’, 
‘self-concept’, ‘self-esteem’, ‘self-knowledge’ and so forth.  
This chapter utilizes ‘concept analysis’ methods (Morse, 2000; Morse, Hupcey, 
Mitcham, & Lenz, 1996) in order to identify, examine and synthesize ideas from all 
relevant literature on recovery following TBI and to map out how these have been 
applied in various clinical and research settings. The consequences and implications of 
the process of identity change following TBI are also explored.  
The specific objectives for the concept analysis are: to explore the factors said to 
influence change in self-identity after TBI; to examine how these factors have been 
combined and interpreted within different models or theories on the effect of TBI on 
self-identity; and to develop a comprehensive understanding of current knowledge on 
loss or change in self-identity following TBI in order to support development of a 
valid and reliable measurement tool. 
4.2 Methods:		
The term ‘concept’ in this context refers to a cluster of behaviours or psychological 
processes. Due to the often abstract nature of these phenomena it can be difficult to 
explicate a precise, universally accepted definition of a particular concept. This is 
particularly the case when the concept is applied in both everyday language and 
scientific texts, resulting in researchers assigning subtly different or sometimes 
opposing meanings to the same conceptual label (Morse, 2000).  
A concept analysis approach was used, specifically concept clarification (Morse, 1995; 
Morse, Hupcey, et al., 1996), by critical appraisal of the literature (Morse, 2000). The 
aim of this type of work is not to provide a summary of all that has been written on a 
particular topic, nor to critique the individual articles, but rather to look at what can be 
learnt about the concept itself. This includes identifying the attributes, preconditions 
and outcomes of the concept as well as delineating boundaries between the concept of 
interest and related concepts (Morse, Mitcham, Hupcey, & Tasón, 1996). Concept 
clarification is recommended when a particular concept initially appears to be ‘mature’ 
(i.e., well-defined, with clear characteristics, delineated boundaries, and with 




dedicated to it), but, on closer inspection, use and descriptions of the concept vary, 
with different (sometimes competing) assumptions underpinning it (Morse, 1995).  
Following Morse's (2000) guidelines for concept analysis, the initial step was an 
extensive literature review, the results of which formed the data for the subsequent 
analysis. Critical appraisal, content analysis, and analytical questioning composed the 
core strategies of this analysis, with the aim of revealing new insights; as Morse 
(2000) stated ‘more than synthesizing and summarizing the literature . . . the end result 
pushes knowledge beyond what is presently known about the concept and reveals new 
insights’ (p. 334). 
4.2.1 Data	Collection	
A systematic approach was used to search for and select relevant literature. A 
preliminary review identified all terms employed in the literature on self-identity in the 
context of recovery after TBI. These terms included: identity change (Coetzer, 2008), 
loss of personal identity or personhood (Levack et al., 2010), reconstruction of identity 
(Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000), changes in ego-identity (Biderman, Daniels-Zide, Reyes, 
& Marks, 2006), changes in self-concept (Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984; Vickery et al., 
2005), loss of self (Nochi, 1998a), sense of self (Myles, 2004) and experience of self 
in the world (Gracey et al., 2008). 
MEDLINE, PsycINFO, AMED (via OVIDSP) and CINAHL (via EBSCOhost) were 
searched for books and journal articles relevant to this review published between 1946 
and March 2012 (when this study was performed). MeSH headings and text words 
were selected for the search strategy based on the terms identified above combined 
with search terms related to TBI, e.g., brain injuries, craniocerebral trauma and so 
forth (for full search strategy see Appendix F). This was complemented with a manual 
search of the reference lists of all included articles.  
Two researchers (myself and my supervisor, William Levack) independently screened 
the title and abstract of each publication (and, when necessary, full text copies of the 
articles or books) for inclusion or exclusion. Publications were only included in the 
analysis if they were in English and involved some perspective on or discussion of 
self-identity in relation to recovery following TBI acquired during adulthood. Articles 




forms of non-traumatic brain injury (e.g. brain tumours, infection and so forth) or if 
the primary focus of the article was on a different concept to that of self-identity (e.g., 
self-efficacy, self-awareness, personality change, subjective well-being, quality of life, 
coping, psychosocial adjustment, self-actualization, and so forth). However, following 
Morse’s (2000) recommendation to include a wide breadth of literature in a concept 
analysis, in the event of any doubt or disagreement between myself and my supervisor 
regarding the inclusion of an article or book, the default decision was to include 
publications. Full text copies of all selected articles and books were then sought. 
4.2.2 Data	Analysis	
I read all included publications in depth, paying particular attention to definitions, 
conceptual boundaries, and methodological approaches that provided further insights 
into use and development of relevant terms.  One of my supervisors, William Levack, 
also independently read the full text copies of the publications that were key to the 
emerging concept analysis. Articles were then grouped by ‘type’ (i.e. in terms of the 
particular view or perspective they presented on self-identify after TBI) and content 
analysis was used to categorize the relevant terminology and concepts within these 
publications.  
This revealed a broad range of conceptualisations of ‘identity change’ and further 
literature was identified from reference lists to expand on the main themes. 
Publications were also categorized in terms of whether they provided a major 
contribution to the concept analysis or whether they provided only incidental data. A 
document provided a ‘major’ contribution if it included an in depth discussion of some 
aspect of loss or change in self-identity after TBI. ‘Incidental’ documents were those 
that touched on self-identity after TBI, using terminology related to the concept, 
without explicitly describing what was meant by terms used or how these terms were 
conceptualized. 
Analytic questioning was used to examine the data to yield more information about 
how the concept of change in self-identity after TBI had been interpreted. Questions 
included: what justification was provided that loss or change in self after TBI, as a 
phenomenon, existed? Were there degrees of loss (i.e., complete loss of self versus 




loss of a quality of being human (i.e., loss of a self) or as a disconnection with life 
prior to injury (i.e., loss of being the same self)?  How did loss of self relate to or 
overlap with other concepts such as ‘personality change’ and ‘self-awareness’?  
Data analysis was conducted as an iterative activity: as new questions arose, further 
answers were sought from the literature. Due to the volume and breadth of the 
available literature, the aim for the analysis was not to incorporate all individual 
articles in the final write up but rather to integrate all points of view to produce a 
cross-disciplinary framework for operationalising the concept of change in self-
identity following TBI.  
4.3 Results	
4.3.1 Outcome	of	database	search	and	screening	
A summary of the process for selection of publications for inclusion in this concept 
analysis is provided in Figure 4-1. Initially, 926 abstracts were retrieved and screened. 
From these, 142 articles and textbooks were selected for full-text review, of which 
seven could not be obtained and 36 were excluded following full-text review as they 
did not fulfil the study’s criteria. In addition, 11 other publications were identified 
through manual screening of reference lists. A final set of 110 publications were 













It has been reported that the terms ‘self’, ‘sense of self’, ‘self-identity’, ‘ego-identity’, 
‘personal identity’ and ‘identity’ get used fairly interchangeably in the literature with 
no clear distinctions between them (Biderman et al., 2006; Coetzer, 2008). The finding 
from this concept analysis supports this viewpoint. For example, in the general 
psychology literature, the term ‘self’ has been attributed with at least five distinct 
meanings (Leary & Tangney, 2012, p. 4). Likewise, the term ‘personal identity’ takes 
on different and specific meanings when applied in the context of social identity 
theory, where it is contrasted with ‘social identity’ (Gracey & Ownsworth, 2012), or 
when used in philosophical discussions, and as defined in the Oxford English 
Dictionary (Personal identity, 2013), to refer specifically to the continuity of the same 
individual throughout different phases of existence. Therefore, to reduce ambiguity, 
throughout this chapter and this thesis the terms ‘sense of self’ (as the process) and 
‘self-identity’ (as the product) have been used to refer to the subjective sense of one's 
own being.  
Seven broad categories of literature were identified that reported on change in self-
identity following TBI. The first two categories included articles that provided 
primarily descriptive or comparative insights into the lived experience of change in 
self-identity after TBI. The other five categories included articles that drew on 
specific, theory-driven approaches to interpret these experiences.  
The two categories that provided primarily descriptive or comparative insights 
included: (a) qualitative reports on the lived experience of TBI, and (b) articles 
comparing self-identity change in TBI with change that occurs in other types of 
chronic illnesses or traumatic events. The rich descriptions in the qualitative studies 
give a sense of the range of experiences that are captured by reports of a change in 
sense of self after TBI. The terms ‘self’ and ‘identity change’ are used in self-reports 
in a very generic sense to express the sentiment: ‘I just don’t feel like me anymore.’ 
They also provide evidence to support the notion that loss or change of self-identity 
after TBI as a phenomenon does exist and that this experience can be expressed along 
a continuum. Some have reported a complete loss, as a ‘death of the self and being 
reborn’ (Muenchberger, Kendall, & Neal, 2008, p. 983) or as a ‘life in two parts’ 




some aspects of self-identity (Roscigno & Van Liew, 2008), e.g. ‘ . . . although I am 
different I am still dedicated, motivated, driven.’ (Smith, 2008, para 5.2.2). For some 
there can be a difficult-to-define ‘change in the essence of self’ (Lawson, Delamere, & 
Hutchinson, 2008, p. 241). Others feel they have lost their individuality or uniqueness 
as a result of TBI (Chamberlain, 2006). 
Analogies have been drawn with the change in identity resulting from chronic illness 
or other traumatic life events. Change in self-identity following TBI has been likened 
to a boundary experience (Patterson & Staton, 2009), a state of liminality 
(Muenchberger et al., 2008), and a biographical disruption (Bury, 1982). Charmaz 
(1995) has written on how bodily changes might prompt the changing of identity 
goals, which she terms ‘identity trade-offs’ (p. 670). This approach has been used to 
describe how people with TBI find a path to a new definition of self (Klinger, 2005; 
Paterson & Stewart, 2002). Identity change following TBI has also been interpreted 
within the context of shame and suffering (Jumisko et al., 2005) and grief (Coetzer & 
Corney, 2001; Persinger, 1993). 
The other five (of seven) categories of literature that were identified included those 
which used theory-driven approaches to interpret the experiences of people with TBI 
in the contexts of: (a) self-identity as ego-centric self, (b) self-identity as memory, (c) 
self-identity as socio-centric self and social identity theory, (d) self-identity as 
meaningful occupation, and (e) self-identity as narrative. Most authors have focused 
on one or maybe two of these theoretical perspectives when discussing changes in 
self-identity that occur following TBI, but the analysis showed that by linking them 
together a more comprehensive and universally applicable framework can be devised 
through which the felt sense of change in self-identity after TBI can be explained. The 
product of the concept analysis therefore is a synthesis of theories, which allows the 
relationships between these various theoretical concepts to be examined, and which 
presents change in self-identity after TBI as being the ultimate expression of a number 
of interrelated functions and processes. This synthesis is depicted in Figure 4-2. 
4.3.3 	Conceptual	attributes	of	sense	of	self	as	a	process	
Figure 4-2 depicts a process of change. Several assumptions are implicit in this model; 




continues to evolve during adult life. After TBI some people report a dramatic change 
in their sense of self such that they no longer feel like the ‘same person’ (Myles, 2004, 
p. 494). There are many things that change after a brain injury, such as physical and 
cognitive losses, psychological and behavioural changes, and altered interpersonal and 
social relationships, however not all of these are fundamental enough to lead to the 
experience of a change in self-identity. The elements depicted in Figure 4-2 have all 
been implicated, either individually or in combination, in producing a change of 
sufficient magnitude for people to report that they have changed as a person. However, 
for any one individual the relative weighting of these elements will vary, so that, for 
example, loss of a work position might be felt as a loss of self-identity for one person 




































The model demonstrates three levels at which changes can occur. The first being the 
component parts, the second being the internal processes, and the third being system 
level disruption. ‘Component parts’ refers to a person’s internal self-representations, 
divided into ‘ego-centric’ self and ‘socio-centric’ self, and ‘identity as shared with 
others’. These are interdependent and linked by the internal processes of self-
awareness, narratives and expression of identity through meaningful occupation.  
The third level of change identified was that of system disruption. This emerges as a 
strong sense of purposelessness in qualitative studies of people’s experiences 
following TBI; a feeling of ‘losing one's way’ (Jumisko et al., 2005, p. 44) or ‘a sense 
of emptiness and disconnectedness’ (Soeker, 2011, p. 87). This is also seen as a 
breakdown in the unity of the sense of self; described for example as a ‘fragmentation’ 
of oneself (Muenchberger et al., 2008, p. 985) or a sense of needing to ‘find the bits of 
the puzzle’ (Brown, Lyons, & Rose, 2006, p. 940). These qualitative descriptions 
relate more to the process as a ‘whole’ going astray rather than its elements and this 
necessitates some consideration of the nature and purpose of the sense of self which 
we shall address later.  
4.3.4 Component	parts	
Ego-centric	self	
The concept of ego-centric self and the Jamesian constructs of ‘I-self’ and ‘Me-self’ 
were introduced in Chapter 2 and include views of self-identity that encompass 
biological and psychological models based on internally derived variables i.e. private 
components. The ‘I’ components of self, according to James (1890), are expressed 
through experiences such as the subjective sense of continuity, distinctiveness and 
volition, and are equally important as the ‘me’ components to one’s overall sense of 
self, although harder to objectively evaluate (Damon & Hart, 1982). Despite reports of 
anatomical localisation of key self-related functions e.g. the left-hemisphere 
interpreter (Gazzaniga, 2005) and self-integration functions in the insula (Damasio, 
2003), self is generally regarded as an executive processing system dependent on 
extensive network connections and so cannot be localized to a single brain area (Leary 
& Tangney, 2012). The most commonly identified single neurological substrate of 




Self-identity has been described as providing (a) a sense of self-definition and (b) a 
sense of sameness to individuals, experiences which have been labelled by Ricouer 
(1984) as ipse and idem respectively. 
Qualitative studies highlight the involvement of all of these facets in the phenomenon 
of change in self-identity after TBI. A sense of continuity, of being the same self 
through time comes both from our direct autobiographical memories and also from a 
connection with the ‘I-self’. James (1890) stated ‘each of us spontaneously considers 
that by “I” he  means something always the same’ (p.196). This gives a sense of 
perspective – an ‘inner being’ that experiences and ‘thinks’ and ‘feels’ – and gives a 
feeling of some essential characteristic that defines oneself as an individual. 
Examining volition and TBI, Levack et al. (2010) reported on ‘loss of sense of 
personal control over one’s body’ (p. 994) as one common theme related to the lived 
experience of surviving TBI. This is more than just a feeling of unfamiliarity with a 
changed body and includes feeling disconnected with and lacking agency over one’s 
physical body, e.g., ‘a sense that her body acted on its own impulses’ (Padilla, 2003, p. 
418), and over cognitive processes and emotions, e.g., ‘I can’t control my aggression 
when I feel offended.’ (Jumisko et al., 2005, p. 46) Furthermore, for some TBI is 
associated with a loss of autonomy resulting from higher levels of dependency, 
particularly when institutional or support living are involved, e.g., ‘[I have] no sense 
of control . . . I don’t even choose what I wear.’ (Chamberlain, 2006, p. 413) 
Impulsivity and emotional lability are features of the dysexecutive syndrome which 
can accompany TBI, and might lead to feelings of loss of agency and unpredictability 
of one’s own actions and behaviours. Nochi (1997) reported a tension existing 
between incorporating the brain injury into explanations of unwanted behaviour (thus 
relinquishing some degree of responsibility for that behaviour) versus fighting against 
the brain injury explanation to retain a greater sense of agency.  
Some authors have also provided additional insights by applying Erikson’s (1950) 
developmental model of ego-identity to TBI (Coetzer, 2008; Rathbone, Moulin, & 
Conway, 2009). TBI frequently occurs in the early adult years and an injury to the 
brain at this time is potentially disastrous from an identity formation perspective 




also been utilized and people with TBI showed lower developmental levels of this 
construct when compared to controls (Levine, Van Horn, & Curtis, 1993). 
Self-identity	as	memory.	
John Locke introduced the idea that self-identity arises not from continuity of the 
body, but from continuity of consciousness (Locke, 1690). Perna & Errico (2004) 
suggested that brain injuries involving temporal lobe structures (especially the 
hippocampus and amygdala) would lead to a difficulty re-establishing a sense of self 
as these areas are recognised as contributing to memory integration and affective 
remembering respectively. Memory impairments are particularly problematic for 
people with TBI. Problems with memory after TBI may just be for events around the 
time of injury (post-traumatic amnesia) but may also extend to periods of time before 
(retrograde amnesia) and after (anterograde amnesia) the insult.  
Piolino et al. (2006) found that irrespective of general intellectual impairment all 
people with TBI exhibited difficulties with episodic autobiographical memory, 
autonoetic consciousness and self-perspective. Participants in Piolino et al.’s (2006) 
study also exhibited loss of the ‘reminiscence bump’; a period of intense recall 
corresponding to late adolescence and a time of identity formation (Rubin et al., 1988). 
The effects of such disruptions are evident in qualitative studies of TBI, where 
participants have commented that ‘both a part of the past and the future disappeared’ 
(Jumisko et al., 2005, p. 44) and Muenchberger et al. (2008) reported on the ‘profound 
impact that the immediate absence of an accurate and continuous personal history’ (p. 
985) had on their participants’ self-identity. 
Knowledge about ourselves held in semantic memory enables us to predict how we 
might respond in current or future situations based on past behavior. Nochi (1998a) 
reported on the ‘loss of clear self-knowledge’ and the ‘opaque self’ referring to the 
inaccessibility of this information following TBI (p.872). One participant in a 
qualitative study reported: ‘I feel like a baby having to learn [about] me and the world 
all over again.’ (Krefting, 1989, p. 75)  
The knowledge stored as the conceptual self will undergo a gradual process of shift 
during a person’s lifetime as they adapt and grow, however brain injury might invoke 




at the effect of TBI on self-concept have demonstrated a perceived change in self-
concept following TBI (E. Carroll & Coetzer, 2011; Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984). 
This sense of ‘self-discrepancy’ has been postulated to account for associated 
emotional distress. Current self-image is normally aligned with congruent self-
memories. When self and autobiographical memory become disconnected, as can 
occur following TBI, memories can no longer provide the scaffold to current notions 
of the self and this can destabilize the self, which is experienced as a lack of coherence 
(Conway, 2005). Nochi’s (1997) phrase ‘void in memory’ incorporates this 
incongruity, stating that ‘when they [people with TBI] went back into their memories, 
they found nothing to explain the present situations.’ (p. 539) 
The autobiographical memory system is an executive system, dependent on frontal 
lobe function and widespread network connections and is therefore particularly 
susceptible to damage in TBI. Deficits in one of these memory systems does not 
inevitably lead to a loss of self-identity; it is possible to know your identity based 
solely on conceptual, semantic knowledge rather than episodic knowledge, although 
this might produce a qualitatively different experience (Rathbone et al., 2009).  
Socio-centric	self	and	social	identity	theory	
Social isolation, loss and change in community roles, and disrupted interpersonal 
relationships are all typically associated with TBI. However, the relationship of these 
changes to one’s self-identity is debated. Some view these as separate issues with 
changes following TBI confined entirely to the social domain, and with individuals 
reporting ‘continuity in the core . . . a stable, inner self’(Gelech & Desjardins, 2010, p. 
67). For instance, one participant in Gelech & Desjardin’s (2010) study reported: ‘I 
have changed in other people’s eyes for sure . . . but I still feel like the same person.’ 
(p. 68)  
However, changes in social interactions and social identity have also been reported as 
necessitating a redefinition of the self (Paterson & Stewart, 2002). Gracey et al. (2008) 
looked at the personal construction of self-identity following TBI and emphasized the 
social domain. Some authors focused specifically on the loss of a particular aspect of 
self in the social arena, for example from the perspective of gender (Gutman & 




acknowledges that a change in self-identity can be a consequence of changes in both 
personal and social arenas, with the egocentric and sociocentric components of self-
identity being interdependent. 
Identity	as	shared	with	others		
Yeates, Gracey, and Collicutt McGrath (2008), in their biopsychosocial deconstruction 
of ‘personality change’ in TBI, concluded that this term seemed to encompass three 
overlapping domains:  
1) subjective experience of change in ‘self’, 
2) judgment of personality change by others, and 
3) altered experience of personhood in interactions. 
The analysis in this chapter focuses on the first of these but further consideration of 
the areas of overlap help to delineate the boundaries between these three domains. 
The relationship between ‘self-identity’ and ‘personality change’ is a complex one. 
‘Personality change’ per se, is based on a third party report, utilizing the views of 
others (clinicians, family members, friends and so forth) and therefore incorporates 
their interpretation of interactions and observed behaviours of the person with TBI. 
However, from an interactionist perspective (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934) we come to 
see ourselves as others do, such that others’ opinions are instrumental in forming our 
own self-concept. A judgment of personality change can therefore lead to a 
subjectively reported change in self-identity.  
Alternatively, some authors have focused instead on the potential for discomfort to 
arise from an incongruence between one’s own opinion and the views of others, 
reporting on, for example, ‘loss of self in the eyes of others’ (Nochi, 1998a, p. 873). 
As such TBI could be said to produce a personality change without an accompanying 
subjective change in self-identity. From the model outlined in this chapter, this could 
be interpreted as a lack of self-awareness on the part of the person with TBI leading to 
a distorted self-image, or it might be due to a breakdown in mechanisms for 
expression of self-identity, or it could result from misinterpretation (perhaps secondary 




Nochi (1998b, p. 665) used the term the ‘labeled self’ to refer to the sense of change 
derived from stereotyping and how these labels contributed to a sense of abnormality 
and powerlessness. Douglas’ (2010) study of how people with TBI conceptualize 
‘self’ reported that none of her participants included TBI as part of their self-
conception. However there is a tendency for strangers to identify only the ‘disabled 
status’ of people with TBI, and for them to become characterised by ‘homogeneity as 
opposed to individuality’(Gelech & Desjardins, 2010, p. 69). The ‘TBI’ label can 
reach a ‘master status’(Conneeley, 2002, p. 359) obscuring all other personal 
characteristics; a reduction to the lowest common denominator (i.e., ‘person with a 
TBI’), rather than being appreciated as a unique, individual human being 
(Chamberlain, 2006). Through the processes of stigmatization, labelling, and loss of 
agency, many people with TBI report feeling they are denied a status of being a 
‘person’ in society. This can form the basis for the reported ‘loss of personhood’ 
(Krefting, 1989, p.75), and consequently contributes to a loss of self-identity in the 
sense of being recognized as a self, i.e. a unique, autonomous individual.  
4.3.5 Integral	Processes	
Meaningful	occupation	as	identity:		
Occupation has been described as ‘the principal means through which people develop 
and express their personal identities’ (Christiansen, 1999, p. 547) and Ylvisaker et al. 
(2008) acknowledged the overlap between the concepts of ‘identity’ and ‘role’. The 
contribution of roles (as occupation) to self-identity change after TBI has been 
conceptualized both as a causative mechanism (i.e. a lack of or change in role as 
contributing to problems with self-identity) and as a reconstructive tool for helping 
people to regain a positive sense of self after injury (Ylvisaker et al., 2008). 
Johansson & Tham (2006) reported that changing work roles could influence a 
person’s sense of self and Cloute, Mitchell, & Yates (2008) highlighted productivity as 
a key life-defining feature. One central theme from Klinger’s (2005) study on 
occupational adaption after TBI was: ‘Who I am is intimately and completely 
intertwined with what I do and how I do it’ (p.12). However contrary to Klinger’s 
expectations, most people in her study reported initially needing to find a ‘new way of 
‘being’ in order to move on to a new way of ‘doing’ (Klinger, 2005, p. 14). Other 




occupation is more bi-directional e.g., ‘[building] their new selves by participating in 
meaningful occupation’ (Soeker, 2011, p. 89). Some authors have also highlighted the 
interconnectedness of occupation, narrative reconstruction and sense of self-identity in 
their autobiographical accounts (Price-Lackey & Cashman, 1996; Smith, 2008). 
‘Meaning’ and ‘doing’ are intrinsically linked in the process of reconstructing self-
identity (Gracey & Ownsworth, 2008). 
Narrative	identity:	
Narrative identity construction is challenged by TBI and the cognitive and linguistic 
impairments that it can entail. Medved & Brockmeier (2008) referred to the two-fold 
setback that a TBI presents: ‘the existential crisis of illness and disability, but also 
with the crisis of narrative dysfunction’  (2008, p. 470). Within the TBI literature, 
narratives and narrative identity are viewed both as being threatened by TBI and also 
as a potential tool for reconstructing a sense of self after TBI (Nochi, 1998a, 2000). 
Several papers presented autobiographical accounts of TBI, illustrating the use of 
story-telling as a means to reconstruct the sense of self (Lawson et al., 2008; Price-
Lackey & Cashman, 1996; Smith, 2007). 
Thus within Figure 4-2 ‘narratives’ could be viewed as being synonymous with the 
overall process; as one of the integral processes, linking egocentric and sociocentric 
components to produce a unified whole, or a means of expressing self-identity to 
others. 
Self-awareness	as	a	precondition	
Coetzer (2008) criticized the literature on identity change following TBI for 
inadequately considering the role of self-awareness. In Figure 4-2, self-awareness is 
represented as having a gate-keeping role, modulating or filtering the degree of 
connection between the self components and self-identity. A mismatch here might lead 
to a report of no change in self-identity despite significant changes elsewhere.  
Self-awareness has been defined as ‘the capacity to perceive the “self” in relatively 
“objective” terms, while maintaining a sense of subjectivity’ (Prigatano & Schacter, 
1991, p. 13). However self-awareness has taken on a more limited scope in the TBI 
literature, with authors operationalising the term on the basis of: comparison with a 




responses . . . in accordance with ratings with some objective standard, usually from 
an informant’ (Bach & David, 2006, p. 398), or knowledge about one’s functional 
abilities, e.g. ‘as an understanding of one’s abilities and limitations and how this 
impacts on task performance’ (Schmidt, Lannin, Fleming, & Ownsworth, 2011, p. 
673). 
Clinical assessment tools are based on these definitions and use discrepancies between 
self-report and third-party reports to measure self-awareness, e.g. the Patient 
Competency Rating Scale (Prigatano et al., 1986). Sense of self however by its very 
nature is subjective and not amenable to third party reporting, thus this is not an area 
of self-awareness that is open to such objective clinical assessment. This ability to 
consciously reflect on one’s sense of self is a necessary precondition for experiencing 
change in self-identity following TBI. For example, participants in Medved and 
Brockmeier’s (2008) study were reported to have retained a ‘strong sense of sameness 
. . . of self-continuity’ (p. 476) when in fact the participants had ‘forgotten the 
tragedies of which they were the protagonists’ (p. 476). Here, the experience of self-
continuity could be a consequence of problems with self-awareness relating to self-
identity.  
4.3.6 System	Disruption	
What purpose does having a sense of self serve and what are the implications of its 
disruption? Despite widely differing models of the cognitive structure and organisation 
of ‘self’ there does appear to be some consensus around the fundamental purpose of 
the sense of self. Leary and Tangney (2012) defined ‘self’ as ‘the set of psychological 
mechanisms or processes that allows organisms to think consciously about 
themselves’ (p. 6). Taylor (1989) also stressed the need for a ‘rich meaningful life’ (p. 
14). He hypothesizes that there are ‘frameworks’ to guide our quest for meaning, with 
failure in this quest resulting in one’s world losing its spiritual contour. He described 
‘ego loss’ as creating a sense of flatness, futility, lack of purpose, and ‘terrifying 
emptiness’ (p. 19). These ideas converge with the qualitative statements reported 
earlier when considering the effects of system disruption. Consider Nochi’s (1997) 
generic ‘void’ (p.533), and the ‘disturbing “unknown” that people with TBI may find 




followed Christman’s (2004) recommendation to define the sense of self – the process 
as a whole – as the ‘process for self-reflective meaning-making’ (p. 711). 
4.3.7 Attributes	of	Self-Identity	
Some authors have examined the attributes of self-identity following TBI rather than 
having focused on the component parts and processes described in Figure 4-2. One 
important attribute is the idea of a multiplicity of representations. This has been 
elaborated on both in terms of possible selves and in the context of relational frame 
theory. 
Figure 4-2 has depicted (for convenience) a single ‘self-identity’. However most of us 
have a variety of ‘identities’ at our disposal, enabling us to maintain a flexibility of 
responses but still functioning in a self-congruent manner, e.g., a ‘work’ self and a 
‘family’ self. Arguably, having multiple and varied identities can buffer some of the 
effects of TBI on self-identity by creating a greater repertoire of identities to utilize 
when some aspects of self-identity are no longer available (Linville, 1987). This idea 
has been used therapeutically to provide direction and motivation to people with TBI 
whose physical, cognitive, and social losses threaten their pre-injury self-identity 
(Heller et al., 2006; Ylvisaker et al., 2008). 
Likewise, Myles (2004) has applied relational frame theory to TBI. Relational frame 
theory (Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001) defines three distinct 
senses of ‘psychological self’: (a) a conceptualized self (psychological content), (b) a 
self as on-going process of verbal knowing (flow of experience, emotions) and (c) a 
self as context (position from which one experiences). Typically, the conceptualized 
self dominates and thus Myles (2004) views change in self-identity following TBI as a 
‘crisis in the conceptualized self’ (p. 494). The conscious awareness of discrepancy 
between pre-injury conceptualized self and current functioning is interpreted by the 
individual as a total loss of self. Some success with use of acceptance and commitment 
therapy has been reported as a means of drawing on other ways of developing a sense 
of self (i.e. via self as on-going process of verbal knowledge and accessing the self as 





Myles (2004) provided the only explicit definition of loss of sense of self following 
TBI in papers resulting from this literature search. Myles’s (2004) definition was 
based on the following features:  
1) a conscious awareness on the part of the survivor that they are somehow ‘not the 
same person’, 
2) associated negative value judgment, 
3) feelings of emotional distress and 
4) denial.  
However, when formulating a concept it is important to distinguish defining 
characteristics of that concept from its antecedents or outcomes (Morse, Mitcham, et 
al., 1996). Emotional distress might be one (albeit fairly common) outcome of a 
change in sense of self following TBI but it is not intrinsic to the concept, nor is it the 
only outcome. While it is commonly assumed that change in self-identity is a negative 
phenomenon, some authors reported positive change following TBI. ‘I think in a lot of 
ways, I’m a better person now . . . more tolerance . . . more appreciation.’ (Klinger, 
2005, p. 12). Roscigno & Van Liew (2008) commented that positive evaluations of 
post-TBI self-identity tend to be explained away as a ‘coping mechanism’ (p. 11). 
Others have reported a surprising amount of positive emotion associated with TBI 
recovery experiences (Collicutt McGrath, 2008), and there is a growing body of 
literature on post traumatic growth following TBI (Ownsworth & Fleming, 2011). 
Nevertheless, change in sense of self has been suggested as one mechanism to account 
for the high levels of affective distress following TBI. Cantor et al. (2005) applied self 
discrepancy theory to TBI-related changes and postulated that depression arises from a 
perceived negative change between pre-injury self and current self. A full exploration 
of the link between change in self-identity and affective distress is only possible if 
they are considered as independent variables and as such depression should be 





Since the pioneering work by Tyerman and Humphrey (1984), who acknowledged the 
validity of the subjective experience of TBI, there has been a growing interest in 
exploring the lived experience of TBI. Levack et al. (2010) conducted a qualitative 
metasynthesis identifying 26 qualitative articles addressing this topic, with loss and 
reconstruction self-identity as a key finding. However, Markova and Berrios (cited by 
Bach & David, 2006) pointed out ‘slack, imprecise and ambiguous terms continue to 
confuse research results leading to theoretical and empirical obfuscation.’ (p.398) Loss 
of self following TBI, as a concept, has been applied in a variety of different contexts 
with no clear universal understanding of what this term means. This limits progress in 
this area of study.  
The concept analysis outlined in this chapter served to highlight several key points 
related to sense of self following TBI: 
• Sense of self is a cyclical, evolving, evaluative process. 
• There are multiple components that contribute toward self-identity; and 
these will vary between individuals. 
• There are multiple points at which this process can be interrupted, 
potentially producing a subjective experience of change in self-identity or 
sense of self. 
• Loss or change in a component part of this process does not inevitably lead 
to loss of self-identity. The effect on identity will depend on the relative 
contributions of the component parts for that individual. 
• The purpose of this process is self-reflective meaning making.  The process 
contributes to one’s purpose in life and provides motivation and goals for 
future behaviour.  
• Self-identity provides multiple avenues to explore in rehabilitation. If 
restoration of missing components is not possible then restoring a sense of 




The frameworks discussed have provided a glimpse of the multitude of ways that 
traumatic brain injury can lead to the experience of a change in self-identity. It is a 
heterogeneous collection of experiences and needs to be interpreted within an 
individualistic context. It has been noted that not every change in a person’s psyche 
counts as a change in self-identity and models of self-identity that utilize a ‘core-
periphery’ structure can help explain this (Witt et al., 2011). The core-periphery 
models of individual identity attempt to explain the differential effects of changes in 
the building blocks of identity to any one individual’s sense of self. Noggle (1999) 
described core beliefs as ‘the foundations of the rest of the cognitive structure . . . the 
lens through which she sees the world . . . a change to them constitutes a profound 
paradigm shift . . . a radical discontinuity between the pre- and post- change selves’(p 
319). Only a change in one of the central constructs leads to a sense that we have 
changed as a person in a substantial way; changes in the values and beliefs at more 
peripheral levels however do not have the same ability to produce a change in identity. 
Witt et al. (2011) likened ‘core attitudes’ to load bearing walls: the removal of these 
will cause the structure to cave in, or the individual to experience a ‘loss of self-
identity’ (p. 8).  
By applying this type of model to TBI related changes we can see that the effect on 
self-identity will be mediated by the relative importance to that individual of those 
component parts affected by TBI. These foundations are then enriched with self 
narratives and social interactions to form the unified sense of self. TBI can affect all 
levels of this system together or individually. So for some people loss of one key facet 
has catastrophic effects for self-identity. For example, studying suicidal ideation of 
war veterans with TBI, Brenner et al. (2009) showed that loss of self-identity was 
associated with a decreased sense of masculinity and an increased sense of 
burdensomeness. This represented a huge shift from the participants’ previous self-
definitions and was a major contributor toward suicidal behaviour. For others the 
expression of loss of self-identity might be the culmination of multiple losses at 
various parts of the cycle.  
There are several limitations of this concept analysis: the initial search strategy was 
limited to publications in English, which reduced our exposure to perspectives on self-




2003) were based on ‘Western’ samples reducing the generalizability to other 
populations. I employed an extensive search strategy and took an inclusive approach 
to publication selection, but despite this I might have missed some potentially relevant 
articles if terminology that I did not consider was used, particularly if the publications 
addressed other overlapping concepts like self-esteem, self-efficacy or broader 
constructs such as well-being or quality of life. However, a large number of articles 
relevant to the research topic were retrieved and these represented a broad range of 
opinion adding credibility of the findings.  
Concept clarification, leading to production of a clear definition and description of the 
characteristics of a concept, is a necessary step prior to operationalization of that 
concept (Morse et al., 1996). This concept analysis along with the findings from the 
focus group study (Levack, Boland, et al., 2014) provides a strong theoretical basis for 
the instrumental task of developing a tool to measure sense of self following TBI. 
4.5 Conclusions:	
As a result of this analysis, the label ‘loss of self’ was found to be insufficient and 
needs to be replaced by use of the term ‘change in sense of self’ following TBI.  
Furthermore, change of sense of self can be defined as: ‘A change in one's inner 
subjective experience as a result of changes in egocentric or sociocentric aspects of 
self, or in the relationship with one’s identity as shared with others. These changes are 
of sufficient magnitude that a process of evaluation, acceptance and adaptation is 
required to regain a unified sense of self.’ 
The process outlined in this chapter has addressed the scientific task of measurement 
construction. The construct to be examined is ‘sense of self following TBI’. A 
measurement tool for this construction should not aim to measure change per se, but 
would be aiming to position a person along a spectrum of ‘strength’ of sense of self, 
from someone with a weak sense of self, or poorly defined self-identity, through to 
someone with a strong sense of self and thus a clear, coherent self-identity. Sense of 
self can therefore be viewed as having a continuous structure, it is not an all-or-
nothing phenomenon.  
This analysis has also highlighted the key components of the sense of self after TBI 




components. All three areas would need to be covered by items in a questionnaire in 
order to have acceptable face validity. Whether the three components are sufficiently 
intertwined to function as a unidimensional construct is something that warrants 
further explicit investigation during instrument development. At the conclusion of this 
concept analysis, the findings are to be used to inform item selection in order to refine 






The previous chapter provided a clear conceptual definition of sense of self after TBI 
and a consideration of its structure and completed the scientific task of measurement 
construction. The remainder of this thesis is therefore concerned with the construction 
of a measurement tool with which to assess this construct – the instrumental task. This 
part of the project is larger and is therefore presented over the next two chapters, with 
this chapter covering the methods and Chapter 6 presenting the results. Chapter 7 
provides discussion of this instrumental task, as well as the broader implications of the 
project as a whole. 
There are many steps between item development and final production of a validated 
instrument. Wilson’s four building blocks, summarised in Figure 5-1, provide an 
overview of the process of instrument development and were discussed in Chapter 3. 
The formation of the construct map (block 1) formed part of the scientific task and 
was covered in the previous chapter. This chapter will focus on using blocks 2, 3 and 4 
to develop the final draft instrument and then cover the method of psychometric 














































Instrument development is an iterative process with both the items and the outcome 
space being trialled and refined through a process of cognitive interviewing before 
finalising a draft tool that can be used for data collection for psychometric testing. 
This process is described in detail below. 
5.1.1 Integrating	the	concept	analysis	findings	with	existing	focus	group	study	
findings.	
The starting point for this thesis project was the ‘Personal Identity Questionnaire’ that 
was constructed following a focus group study and development of a framework of 
personal identity (Levack, Boland, et al., 2014). This will be referred to as Draft 1 of 
the questionnaire from now onwards. Raw data from cognitive interviews on the 
questionnaire were also available. The first step of the instrumental task is to develop 
the item bank for subsequent refining. The items in Draft 1 represented the views of 
people with TBI and experts in the field, covering two of the five sources of items 
mentioned by Streiner and Norman (2008). The nature of self-identity (as a self-
reported phenomenon) as discussed in Chapter 4 does not lend itself to investigation 
by clinical observation so this source of item generation was not used for this project. 
The concept analysis utilised both theoretical and research perspectives ensuring that 
the other two potential sources of item generation were utilised. The first task was to 
combine these sources of items into a definitive item bank. 
Cognitive	Interviews	of	Draft	1	items:	
The items in Draft 1 of the questionnaire were derived from statements made by 
participants in the focus group study (Levack, Boland, et al., 2014), some of them 
verbatim. Cognitive interviewing is an important preliminary step in questionnaire 
design to ensure the readability of the items and that people are interpreting the 
questions in the way that was intended. Cognitive interviewing with 9 TBI patients 
using Draft 1 was carried out in January/ February 2012 in Christchurch, New 
Zealand, by a research assistant. Purposive sampling was used to ensure a broad range 
of demographic characteristics among the participants and that they had sufficient 
cognitive and linguistic skills to complete the cognitive interviews (which are more 




the interviews were carried out following PROMIS guidelines (DeWalt et al., 2007). 
The participants were asked to fill in the questionnaire and then underwent a face-to-
face interview with the research assistant to probe the reasoning behind some of their 
answers. Several aspects of the participants’ responses to the questions were discussed 
including: comprehension of the question (i.e. what the participant understood the 
question to mean), the processes they used to respond (i.e. retrieval of relevant 
information from memory), what motivated the participant in answering the question 
(e.g. examining the influence of social desirability on responses). Participants were 
also questioned about the outcome space i.e. response options available– did the 
participant’s desired response match the given options or would a different answer 
format have been preferable?  
Each participant had filled in the entire questionnaire, but the cognitive interview was 
based on 8 to 16 items only to minimise participant fatigue. A different selection of 
items was chosen for discussion with each participant to ensure that several views 
were obtained on all of the items. The interviews were transcribed verbatim and the 
transcripts and the original recordings were available as raw data at the beginning of 
this PhD project. 
I analysed the transcripts, referring to the original audio recordings to clarify meaning 
when required. I grouped comments into those pertaining to individual items, or 
general comments on the format and guidance for the questionnaire as a whole. 
Following guidelines for analysis of cognitive interviews (Christodoulou, Junghaenel, 
DeWalt, Rothrock, & Stone, 2008), concerns about specific items were classified as 
minor (i.e. where subjects suggested a change in wording) or major (i.e. where 
subjects insisted on word change, or where current wording had led to a 
misinterpretation of the question).  
Integration	with	concept	analysis	findings:	
The preceding chapter provided a conceptual definition of sense of self after TBI and 
drew some conceptual boundaries around what is and is not included in this construct. 
I assessed the items of Draft 1 with these findings in mind, to determine which items 
fitted within the conceptual definition and should be retained in the item bank and 




awareness and needed removing. The concept analysis findings were combined with 
the theoretical framework from the initial focus group study (Levack, Boland, et al., 
2014) to provide an updated construct framework with which the individual items 
linked (see figure 6-2). This provided a tool to assess breadth of coverage of the items 
in the questionnaire to ensure that all areas of the construct of sense of self that were 
identified in the concept analysis were represented in the questionnaire. Additional 
potential items were devised on the basis of the concept analysis findings to ensure 
face validity.  
The findings from the concept analysis and the cognitive interviews were used to 
amend Draft 1 and items coded according to whether they should remain unchanged, 
undergo minor revision, undergo major revision or be removed. Suggestions were 
discussed with supervisors and consensus opinion sought. The updated questionnaire 
was renamed Sense of Self Questionnaire and is referred to as Draft 2. 
5.1.2 	Cognitive	interviews	of	Draft	2	
Given that the questionnaire had undergone some major revisions (see results table 6-
2), a second round of cognitive interviews was undertaken, using the same methods as 
outlined above. The Patient-Reported Outcome Measurement Information System 
(PROMIS) Cooperative Group’s guidelines for measurement item testing and 
development (DeWalt et al., 2007) recommends five interviews for every 30 items in a 
measure. Draft 2 had 44 (scored) items, only 22 of which were new or significantly 
amended following the first round of interviews and therefore in need of rechecking. 
Ethical approval was obtained in New Zealand for cognitive interviews using Draft 2 
and subsequent data collection on the revised tool (see appendix A). Four participants 
were recruited for cognitive interviews via a community based rehabilitation service 
for traumatic brain injury, ABI Rehabilitation. The interviews took place either at the 
Wellington site for ABI Rehabilitation or in the participant’s own home – whichever 
was more convenient for them.  All participants were able to give their own informed 
consent to participate. 
Each participant was asked to discuss 11 individual items in depth, giving a total of 
two opinions on each new or amended item. Acceptability	and	face	validity	of	the	




audio-recorded and the responses analysed to see if any further adjustment of the 
questionnaire items was necessary.  
The content of the interviews were analysed and any further changes to the 
questionnaire made to produce Draft 2, revised (Draft 2r) (see results section 6.2).  
5.2 Block	4:	Selection	of	measurement	model	
The next phase of measurement development required consideration of methods to 
assess the new measure’s psychometric properties. The assessment of content validity 
and requisite level of measurement required from a questionnaire depends on the 
clinical questions that the questionnaire aims to address (Terwee et al., 2007). The 
work presented in Chapter 4 refined the concept that was being addressed and 
provided some clear conceptual boundaries. It also clarified that the purpose of the 
questionnaire was not to provide a measure of change in self-identity but a measure of 
current strength of self-identity.  
Only an interval level measure can provide quantification of the change in strength of 
self-identity with repeated administrations in a longitudinal study, as might be used in 
a randomised control trial to assess the impact of different rehabilitation approaches 
for addressing problems with self-identity, e.g. metaphoric identity mapping 
(Ylvisaker et al., 2008). Chapter 3 highlighted the superiority of scales validated using 
Modern test theory over Classical test theory and therefore Rasch analysis was chosen 
as the measurement model to assess the psychometric properties of the questionnaire.  
A scoring template was devised for the Sense of Self Questionnaire with responses 
being allocated codes 0,1,2,3 for strongly disagree, disagree, agree and strongly agree 
respectively, in preparation for Rasch analysis, which requires the lowest answer 
category to be allocated a score of zero. Several items were identified as requiring 
reverse scoring, e.g. D2r-Q 7 “There are bits of my life that don’t hang together” 
where the order was inverted. An interviewer prompt sheet was also developed to aid 
consistency of completion.  
The next phase of the study involved recruiting many participants to complete the 
questionnaire to assess its psychometric properties. Sample size in Rasch analysis is 




size the less precise the results will be, reflected in bigger standard error estimates. For 
99% confidence that stable item calibrations to within +/- 0.5 logit are obtained 108-
243 people are needed (if targeting is poor-good); 64-144 people are needed for 95% 
confidence(Linacre, 1994). As the number of items and the number of answer 
categories increases, so will the sample size requirements for stable calculations as 
answer categories with fewer than ten responses will not have precise, stable location 
estimates (Linacre, 2002). The sense of self questionnaire, Draft 2r had forty-five 
scored items and four answer categories, so a sample size of approximately 150 was 
targeted.  
5.2.1 Process	of	data	collection	
Ethical approval was sought additionally in the UK. Project sponsorship in the UK 
was provided by Poole Hospital NHS Foundation Trust. Ethical approval from the 
National Research Ethics Committee in the UK was obtained (see appendix D). Local 
research approvals were also obtained from Poole Hospital NHS Foundation Trust as 
the primary research site and from Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation 
Trust and University Southampton NHS Foundation Trust as these NHS Organisations 
were involved as participant identification centres. 
Participants were asked to complete a demographic sheet, GOSe, Draft 2r and for fifty 
participants the Sense of Coherence Scale (SOC) for construct validity testing. 
Construct validity testing involves comparing scores on the test questionnaire against 
other validated scales to which there would be a theoretical relationship. This could be 
either a positive correlation (convergent validity) or a negative correlation (divergent 
validity). The SOC and rationale for construct validity testing is discussed further in 
section 5.4.  
A demographic sheet was devised to capture descriptive data. Information on the age, 
gender, ethnicity, employment status, marital status and educational history of the 
participants was gathered as these variables have all been linked with self-identity or 
rehabilitation outcomes. Appropriate regional ethnic categorisations were used in the 
UK and New Zealand, based on each country’s census groupings (Office for National 
Statistics, 2016; Statistics New Zealand, 2016) otherwise data collection in the two 




injury, and some assessment of severity of the injury by length of loss of 
consciousness and duration of hospital stay (or if the participant was unaware of these 
factors other information that enabled classification into mild/moderate or severe 
categories such as the need for craniectomy). Severity of injury was categorised 
according to the Mayo TBI severity classification system (Malec et al., 2007), mostly 
on the basis of self-reported loss of consciousness (LOC) into a mild group (less than 
30 minutes) and a moderate-severe group (more than 30 minutes). The Mayo system 
enables other information to be used for classification, e.g. intracerebral haematoma, if 
the participant did not know the duration of LOC. Permission to further clarify on the 
nature of the injury from the medical notes was not sought as this information was not 
critical to the purposes of the current project. The extended Glasgow Outcome Scale 
was also used as this has been recommended as a core measure with which to assess 
outcome from TBI (Bagiella et al., 2010). This enables participants to be classified 
into a broad outcome group depending on physical needs, independence with extended 
ADLS, work, leisure and family relations. The recommended interview format was 
used (J. T. Wilson et al., 1998) 
Participants:	
In New Zealand, recruitment was through local of branches of the Brain Injury 
Association in Wellington, Christchurch and Auckland and ABI rehabilitation in 
Wellington and Auckland. In the UK, recruitment was via the Medical Brain Injury 
service at Poole Hospital, the Brain Injury Specialist Nurse at Wessex Neurological 
Centre, Southampton, local neurorehabilitation services (NHS and non-NHS) and 
branches of Headway (a UK brain injury charity) around the South and South West. 
Potential participants were made aware of the study by professionals involved in their 
care, or from fliers displayed in local centres. Initial contact with the potential 
participants was made via email or telephone to ensure they were provided with 
written information on the study (Participant Information Sheet – see Appendix C) and 
to answer any questions they may have. Several visits were also made to Headway 
centres around the region to introduce the research project to the therapy teams and 
support workers and then to discuss the research project with potential participants. 
Every effort was taken to ensure that participants were given written information about 
the project, including contact details for the research team, to take home and discuss 




Inclusion criteria were adults with traumatic brain injury, at least 6 months following 
injury and discharged from acute care. In the first six months following injury patients 
are often medically unstable, their prognosis is uncertain and they have not had a 
chance to reflect on and experience what the implications of their brain injury are for 
their future so they were excluded from the study. Participants who remained in slow-
stream rehabilitation after six months, were however eligible for inclusion. There was 
no maximum time limit after injury as the literature shows that people can have 
ongoing issues with self-identity for years after the original insult (Levack et al., 
2010). Initial recruitment criteria stated that participants did need to be over 18 years 
of age at the time of their injury, as the effect of injury to the developing brain is a 
different question. Despite screening participants carefully, three participants were 
enrolled who actually sustained their TBI just prior to their eighteenth birthdays at the 
age of 17 years, however as their age at injury was so close to 18 years it was decided 
to continue to include them.  
Many participants had cognitive impairments due to the nature of their injury but only 
those capable of giving informed consent were included in this study. The ability to 
give informed consent was assessed on a practical level – using the four stage 
assessment of competency in the decision-making process detailed in the UK Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 (Social Care Institute for Excellence, 2016). This was not intended 
to exclude the more severely injured but was a practical decision based on the degree 
of cognitive and linguistic ability required to complete a self-reported measure. The 
questionnaire was administered as a face-to-face interview to be as inclusive as 
possible so that participants who required assistance could be supported and to ensure 
that it was the opinions of the participants themselves and not their family that was 
being recorded.  
Participants had to have evidence of disturbance of consciousness at the time of injury 
e.g. LOC, period of confusion or amnesia for the events to fulfil the criteria for having 
sustained a traumatic brain injury, as distinct from a ‘head injury’. Participants 
reporting a history of head injury with no disturbance of consciousness or focal 
neurological symptoms or only post-concussional symptoms were excluded.  
Interviews were conducted in the participants’ own homes, in Poole Hospital, in local 




Local lone worker protocols were adhered to. Most of the interviews were conducted 
with the participant alone, but they were able to have a support person present if they 
wished. However, it was made clear to the support person that for the questionnaire 
completion their role was limited to helping the participant express their own view. 
Participants were allocated a three-digit participant identification number to 
anonymise responses. All interviews were conducted in the same manner: the purpose 
of the project and the requirements from the participant were reiterated. Any questions 
were answered. Informed consent was obtained and the interview started with the 
demographic sheet. The GOSe was then completed, followed by Draft 2r of the Brain 
Injury Sense of Self Scale.  
The interviewer prompt sheet for the questionnaire completion was followed precisely 
to ensure that all participants were given the same information in a reproducible 
manner to standardise the interview. (Interviewer prompt sheet - see appendix A). One 
alternative wording was provided for most questions to be used if the participant was 
struggling to understand the original item. All interviews were completed by one of 
two researchers, again helping to standardise the administration of the test. I undertook 
118 interviews (16 in New Zealand and 102 in the UK) and a research assistant 
completed the remaining nineteen interviews in New Zealand. Fifty participants (all in 
the UK) also completed the SOC-13 for construct validity testing. All questions were 
read out to the participants and the researcher scored the responses, but participants 
had the option of having a copy of the questionnaire to read along with if they wanted. 
Responses were marked on paper at the time of the interview and scored at a later 
date.  
Completed questionnaires were transported securely back to Poole Hospital where all 
participant identifiable information was stored in a locked filing cabinet in a locked 
office, with enrolment records stored separately from completed questionnaires to 
ensure compliance with local information governance protocols. Completed 
questionnaires were coded using the scoring template and then entered into an Excel 
spreadsheet. Data validation restrictions and were used to provide some assurance as 
to the accuracy of data entry. It was not practical to have all entries double checked by 
a second researcher, but three entries were randomly selected for checking by a seond 




I maintained a reflective diary during the period of data collection, recording problems 
with interpretation of items, overall thoughts about the interviews and any specific 
comments made by participants during the interview.  
5.3 	Psychometric	analysis	of	data	
Rasch analysis and factor analysis methodologies can both be used to examine the 
dimensionality of a scale and can assist in item reduction when developing a scale. 
These two methods can be used to complement each other with multidimensional data 
with factor analysis identifying the underlying main factors in the data that can then be 
looked at further with Rasch analysis. 
5.3.1 Process	of	Factor	Analysis	
For the factor analysis, SPSS software (version 23) was used to perform principal 
component analysis with varimax rotation. When deciding how many factors to extract 
in a factor analysis there are a variety of statistical indicators that can be helpful in 
deciding. One is to examine the scree plot, to determine where the slope appears to 
plateau. Another method that has been suggested for ascertaining the number of 
factors to extract is a parallel analysis (Ledesma & Valero-Mora, 2007). This involves 
generating eigenvalues from a random data set with the same number of variables and 
observations as the test data set. A correlation matrix is calculated from the random 
dataset and used to compute eigenvalues. The eigenvalues can then be compared to see 
at which number of factors the eigenvalues of the test data set no longer differ 
significantly from the randomly generated ones. Rotated solutions for three and four 
factors were compared.  
5.3.2 Applying	the	Rasch	model	to	measurement	
The items in the questionnaire form the ‘item bank’, i.e. a selection of items that could 
all be potentially useful for assessing the latent trait of sense of self after TBI. The 
purpose of the analysis is to determine which items and which combination of items 
behave according to the model’s expectations – culminating in the formation of a 
robust, valid interval level scale. This involves a process of item reduction. Several 
criteria were used for item selection; the first being an assessment of utility during the 




feedback indicating difficulties with response selection were removed at an early 
stage.  
RUMM2030 software was used for Rasch analysis (Andrich, Sheridan, & Luo, 2008). 
Data were transferred from Excel into SPSS in order to prepare an ASCII data file 
suitable for importing into RUMM. Rasch analysis can look at different ‘person 
factors’ to see whether respondents with different characteristics but equal amounts of 
the latent trait respond differently to the same item e.g. comparing the responses of 
men and women.  This is termed differential item functioning (DIF). DIF is a source 
of misfit and bias in some questionnaires and is specifically looked for during Rasch 
analysis. Person factors need to be specified and categorised prior to importing data 
into RUMM. Gender, ethnicity, age at time of TBI, time since TBI, severity of TBI 
and outcome were all identified as important person factors. The raw demographic 
data was re-categorised into two or three clinically meaningful divisions that may 
cause participants to respond differently to the items (rather than simply dividing the 
sample into even groups). However, it is important to ensure roughly equitable 
numbers in each category for a meaningful analysis. Invariance of items can then be 
tested against these person factors to ensure that people with the same amount of 
strength of self-identity respond in identical ways regardless of differences in gender 
or severity of injury for example.  
Rasch analysis software programmes such as RUMM2030 generate initial ‘rough’ 
estimates for person and item locations from the raw data provided. The software then 
runs many iterations comparing the estimated locations against the calculated 
probabilities to refine the estimates until the sum of the calculated probabilities is 
close enough to the actual total score, indicating that the calculated location estimates 
are close enough (usually set to within 0.001 unit) (Hobart & Cano, 2009).  
The process of Rasch analysis is an iterative one. A variety of indicators are used to 
show how well the data is fitting the model and to give some indication of the 
magnitude of the deviation and of where the problems might lie. Items and persons are 
examined individually to see if they fit the Rasch model. Observed scores are 
compared against expected scores and the degree of (mis)fit estimated. Results from 




items, deleting items, deleting person, grouping items together to form subtests to 
improve the fit in subsequent analyses. 
A basic method for performing a Rasch analysis is outlined below, although the details 
vary depending on the results obtained at each stage of the process. The exact details 
of the Rasch analysis on the Brain Injury Sense of Self Scale are presented in Chapter 
6.  
Process of Rasch analysis: 
1. Check summary statistics 
RUMM provides an initial overview in the form of the summary statistics page to give 
an indication of how well the data is fitting the Rasch model.  
Item-person interaction: provides information on the general fit of the items and 
persons to the model, expressed as mean (and SD) for item and person location and a 
mean (and SD) for their fit residuals. The location and fit statistics are expressed as 
standardised scores, such that we would expect a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 
1. The mean for the item location is fixed in RUMM 2030 at 0 and the other values are 
calculated relative to this. The values of the item and person location give an 
indication of the targeting of the scale, i.e. is the range of values over which the scale 
is measuring appropriate for the population from whom the data has been collected, or 
is there evidence that the scale is too easy for the participants (mean person location 
very positive), or too hard for the participants (very negative). When a person with 
location -0.5 encounters an item with location of -0.5 then the probability that they 
will endorse that item is 0.5, i.e. 50/50. If the person location is higher than the item 
location then this probability increases, and if the item location is higher than the 
person location this probability decreases. So, items with more negative locations are 
the easiest to endorse, and items with positive locations are the hardest.  
The fit residual statistics are looking at the degree of divergence from the model. The 
Rasch model calculates ‘expected’ values for each item-person interaction and the fit 
residual statistics represent a summation of the difference between the ‘expected’ 
value and the actual value for each interaction by item or person. The mean and SD of 




approximate a Z-score (i.e. a standardised normal distribution) so perfect fit would 
correspond to a mean of 0 and SD of 1. 
Item-trait interaction: is a formal test of the specific objectivity or invariance of the 
scale, i.e. is the scale working as expected at all points along the scale and performing 
the same for different class intervals? The goodness of fit is evaluated with a chi-
squared statistic, and a chi-squared probability > 0.05 indicates no statistically 
significant deviation from model expectations.  
Person separation index: is akin to Cronbach’s alpha and gives an indication of the 
ability of the test to discriminate between people of different abilities. Unlike 
Cronbach’s alpha it can still be calculated with missing data. Values of over 0.8 are 
indicative of the ability of the scale to statistically differentiate at least three ability 
groups, and this increases to four groups with values above 0.9 (Fisher, 1992). 
Taken together these three sets of statistics give a good general indication of how well 
the data is fitting the model. The sources of misfit can then be explored in further 
detail by examining individual person fit or item fit and adjustments made and the 
analysis re-run to see if fit has improved. 
2. Data quality. 
Rasch can cope with missing data, but it is important to ensure that there are sufficient 
responses to generate stable estimates. This means ensuring an even distribution of 
respondents at around 50 in each class interval (the number of class intervals used for 
the analysis can be adjusted if need be) and an adequate number of responses in each 
answer category. The minimum number of responses for stable estimates is ten in each 
category (Linacre, 2002). Items may need rescoring or additional data collected to 
ensure this criterion is met. Evidence of floor and ceiling effects of the scale are 
provided by identification of extreme scores- participants who have scored the 
maximum or minimum on the scale, from whom little further information can be 
gleaned. 




For polytomous data, i.e. more than two answer categories per item, the Rating Scale 
model (Andrich, 1978) or the Partial Credit model (Masters, 1982) could apply. The 
requirements for the Rating Scale model are stricter, expecting an even distribution of 
responses across each response category for each item, so the Partial Credit model 
with its ability to cope with a different number of answer categories for each item is 
most commonly used. A likelihood ratio test was used to determine the correct model 
for this analysis. 
4. Check order of thresholds. 
An examination of the threshold map in RUMM 2030 demonstrates whether the 
response categories have been used in the correct hierarchical manner. A threshold 
refers to the point between two adjacent answer categories, e.g. between strongly 
disagree and disagree, so for items with four answer categories there are three 
thresholds. The threshold value (for a particular threshold for a particular item) is the 
level of person ability that would equate to a 50/50 chance of choosing either 
response. If the item response categories have ordered thresholds, the graphs will show 
that as a person’s amount of latent trait increases, so too does the probability of 
endorsement of a more positive answer category. In other words, for a positively 
worded item with four response categories (strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly 
agree) a person with a low amount of the latent trait should be more likely to endorse 
the strongly disagree than any of the other answer categories, whereas a person with a 
high amount of latent trait should have the highest probability of answering strongly 
agree.  If the map shows that the thresholds are disordered, such that for some 
responses there is no location where that response is the most likely then the item may 
need rescoring before any further analysis can be completed. If the thresholds are not 
correctly ordered, it suggests that respondents are not using the answer categories as 
intended. This may be, for example, because the response option labels are confusing 
and need clarifying, or there may be too many options.  
5. Check individual person fit. 
An individual with a very atypical response pattern could skew the whole analysis, 
individual person fit statistics can be examined to see if this is the case. Expected 




suggest an individual might not be behaving in the way expected. This could be, for 
example, due to an individual just ticking  all the answers in one column and thus 
distorting the data, or the impact from an unrecorded co-morbidity (Tennant & 
Conaghan, 2007). Removing mis-fitting persons from the analysis can often have a 
significant impact on the fit of the measure, but if too many people need to be 
removed to obtain a good fit this raises significant concerns about the external 
construct validity of the scale (Tennant & Conaghan, 2007). 
6. Check individual Item Fit. 
This will show the detail of how well each item is fitting the model. Chi-squared 
probability statistics and fit residuals for each item are given. A statistically significant 
chi-squared probability (<0.05) or a fit residual outside of the range -2.5 to +2.5 
suggest that the item is not fitting the model well. These are also graphically displayed 
in an item-characteristic curve (ICC), see Figure 5-2, Figure 5-3. The ICC represents 
the calculated expected score for the item (y-axis) plotted against the person location 
on the x-axis. Typically, item characteristic curves are s-shaped. The three black dots 
represent the actual mean scores for three class intervals of persons. A chi-squared test 
is then used to assess the goodness of fit between the observed scores and the expected 
scores. This is summarised in an overall item chi-square value and then the 
significance of this relative to chance is expressed as a probability. A significant chi-
squared probability <0.05, with Bonferroni adjustment suggests that the item does not 
fit the Rasch model. This can be seen in the graphical display as significant 














Thus an assessment of individual item fit can be made by looking at these three pieces 
of information: the fit residual, the chi-square probability and the item characteristic 
curve.  
7. Check for unidimensionality. 
RUMM 2030 provides a formal assessment of unidimensionality, using a method of 
examining the residuals for any patterns (Smith Jr, 2002). The test employed utilises 
the principle that in a unidimensional test, the person location estimates generated 
from one subset of items, should be essentially the same as the estimates generated 
from any other. The only constraint to this argument is that the targeting of the items, 
i.e. the level of difficulty, needs to be appropriate for the level of person ability. This 
principle is used to test a scale’s unidimensionality in RUMM. A lack of any 
discernible pattern in the residuals lends strength to the assumption that the underlying 
construct is unidimensional.  
The comparison between person locations is done via an independent t-test. A 
principle components analysis of residuals is used to identify the most divergent 
groups of items for use in the subtests. The ‘residual’ refers to the correlation between 
the items once the primary factor (in this case the ‘sense of self’ factor) is removed 
and is effectively the second dimension of the scale. Items loading most positively 
onto the first component of the residuals are placed in one subtest, and items loading 
most negatively onto it are placed in the second subtest. This process is basically 
utilising the two most dissimilar groups of items to try to break the assumption of 
unidimensionality of the scale. There must be a minimum of 12 thresholds in each 
subtest for the results to be reliable (Psylab Group, 2012). In order for the scale to be 
considered unidimensional the number of positive t-tests generated from the 
comparison between the subgroups should be below the 5% significance limit. If the 
number of significant tests is close to 5% then confidence intervals can be calculated 
around it using the Binomial test of averages. If the lower 95% confidence interval 
from this test is below the 5% significance level then unidimensionality is acceptable 
(Smith Jr, 2002; Tennant & Pallant, 2006). This property of the scale needs to be 
continuously monitored after any change is made.  




Local response dependency can be a source of misfit for items in a scale. This means 
that the response of a person to one item on the scale impacts on their responses to 
other item(s). The Rasch model assumes that once the primary factor for this scale is 
removed there is no correlation between the items, so the probability of endorsing one 
item is independent of the probability of answering any other item. Local dependency 
is therefore examined by looking at the residual correlations between items once the 
main factor has been removed. Presence of local dependency can be due to 
multidimensionality in the data, redundancy among the items ( i.e. several items 
asking the same thing), or carryover effect from the preceding question (Streiner & 
Norman, 2008). A value of  < 0.3 above the average correlation (Psylab Group, 2012) 
has been suggested as demonstrating an acceptable degree of correlation, values equal 
to or above 0.3 require further evaluation and possibly combining the dependent items 
into subtests. 
9. Check for Differential Item Functioning (DIF) 
Five person factors were specified prior to importing the data into RUMM. If it 
transpired that responses on an item were significantly affected by the gender of the 
respondent and not just the amount of latent trait then this is a significant source of 
bias and a violation of the requirement for unidimensionality as the item exhibits DIF. 
Items should work the same across the class intervals irrespective of these different 
person factors e.g. age, gender. The presence of DIF suggests some bias in the item 
towards one particular group. This is examined in RUMM2030 using an analysis of 
variance. DIF can be uniform, producing the same effect at all points along the scale 
akin to a systematic bias, or can be non-uniform, where the degree of bias varies as 
ability does. Items that show uniform DIF can be modified in the developmental stages 
of a scale, items with non-uniform DIF need to be removed.  
10. Review all results and amend data set accordingly e.g. removing a misfitting 
item 
11. Repeat analysis steps 1-10 
Once a solution is found that demonstrates a good fit to the model, the person-item 
distribution plot of the final scale is examined. This plots the item and person locations 




item difficulty enabling precise localisation of a person along the continuum. Large 
gaps between item thresholds indicate poor precision in that area of the scale. It also 
provides evidence of the targeting of the measure i.e. whether the item difficulty and 
person ability are well matched and the presence of any floor or ceiling effects. 
The final stage of the Rasch analysis is calculation of a conversion table to transform 
the logit scores back to the scoring range of the original raw data. This process is 
purely aesthetic and serves to provide the reader with a more familiar score that will 
be more easily interpreted but still retains the interval level properties.  
5.4 Construct	validity	testing	
Construct validity testing is a process rather than a one-off test (Streiner & Norman, 
2008). The conceptual analysis provided some clarity about the nature of the construct 
of sense of self and enabled theoretical predictions as to how this construct should 
interact with other related measures. This is the basis for construct validity testing. 
Construct validity testing actually involves testing two things simultaneously: 1) the 
validity of the theoretical hypothesis on the nature of the interaction between two 
constructs and 2) the ability of the tool to measure what it aims to measure. If the 
construct validity testing does not behave in the way that was predicted this could be 
either due to a flawed hypothesis or a flawed measure or both. It is a process of 
accumulating evidence in support of the theoretical construct and the ability of the 
new tool to measure that construct. These things can never be proven absolutely but 
having a large body of evidence in support clearly strengthens the claim. Hypotheses 
for construct validity testing need to be as specific as possible and stated prior to data 
collection to eliminate the bias introduced by retrospective theorising based on the 
data compiled (Terwee et al., 2007 ) prior to the psychometric analysis in accordance 
with consensus-based standards for the selection of health measurement instruments 
(COSMIN) guidelines (Mokkink et al., 2009). 
Thus, the starting point for construct validity testing is developing theoretical 
predictions about how the scores on the Brain Injury Sense of Self Scale should 
interact with other measures. 
As part of the process of construct validity testing, an unscored first statement was 




self-identity or am unsure about who I am”. The aim of this statement was to gain a 
general impression of the participant’s own view on their self-identity, the latent trait. 
Participants who strongly endorse this statement were predicted to have lower overall 
score on the Brain Injury Sense of Self Scale i.e., there should be a moderate-strong 
correlation between this response and overall score on the new scale. Spearman’s rho 
was used to calculate the degree of correlation between participant responses to D2r-
Q1 (which produced ordinal data) and their Brain Injury Sense of Self Scale scores 
(which produced interval data after the completion of Rasch analysis). 
Meaningful occupation and roles emerged from the concept analysis as having a 
significant impact on people’s sense of self. Information about the participants’ levels 
of meaningful occupation was collected both through the demographic sheet and from 
the GOSe. Employment status was reported on the demographic sheet and participants 
who were ‘unable to work’ or ‘unemployed-seeking work’ (information from the 
demographic sheet) were predicted to have lower scores on the Brain Injury Sense of 
Self Scale compared with participants who reported an employment status that could 
provide meaningful occupation i.e. ‘full-time employment’; ‘part-time employment’; 
‘voluntary or unpaid work’; ‘domestic duties/ homemaker’ or ‘student’. Participants 
who were retired were not included in either category as this was considered more a 
reflection of the age of the participant than their level of meaningful occupation. The 
person estimates on the Brain Injury Sense of Self Scale for these two groups were 
compared using an independent t-test, hypothesising a significant difference between 
the two groups. Section 6 on the GOSe asks about social and leisure activities outside 
the home. This information was used to divide the participants into two groups: those 
who had resumed leisure activities outside the home and those who had not. It was 
predicted that participants reporting being able to resume leisure activities should also 
score higher on the BISOSS. Again, a significant difference between the mean scores 
in the two groups was hypothesised and tested with an independent t-test.  
The importance of interpersonal relationships was also highlighted in the conceptual 
analysis. Question 7 on the GOSe enquires specifically about the impact of the injury 
on relationships with family and friends. Participants reporting problems in this area 




when compared to those who did not report such problems and this hypothesis was 
tested with an independent t-test.  
Part of the rationale for this project was that there does not currently exist a measure of 
self-identity following TBI so criterion validity testing (against a gold standard) was 
not possible. There are some measures of self-concept that have been devised 
specifically for TBI or used in populations with TBI as discussed in Chapter 4 but 
these do not cover all the elements of the construct of self-identity and were therefore 
deemed unsuitable for construct validity testing. The SOC (Antonovsky, 1993) is a 
valid and reliable scale (Eriksson & Lindström, 2005) measuring an overall orientation 
to life, explaining how people manage to cope with difficult life events and remain 
psychologically well.  It is generally thought to have a multi-factor structure with the 
three factor solution the most used. These three factors are comprehensibility, 
manageability and meaningfulness. The SOC is available both in a long form SOC-29 
and a shorter version SOC-13. There appeared to be many areas of overlap between 
the two concepts of sense of coherence and sense of self, but also distinctions. Sense 
of coherence refers to a general life orientation and is thought to be relatively stable 
over time (Eriksson & Lindström, 2005).  People with a greater sense of coherence are 
supposedly better able to respond to life’s challenges in a positive way. Thus sense of 
coherence has much overlap with concepts of resilience and general coping resources. 
Sense of self is more dynamic and is personally constructed, depending on individual, 
interpersonal and environmental factors. SOC is looking at more of an innate 
attitudinal approach to life rather than a specific psychological construct. It is likely 
that participants with a greater SOC-13 score will be more successful in reconstructing 
a sense of self-identity following TBI and thus SOC-13 was thought to be a suitable 
measure for construct validity testing, with a moderate correlation between the two 
scales predicted. Permissions to use the scale were sought from the copyright holders. 
Fifty consecutive UK participants were asked to complete the SOC-13 in addition to 
the other study forms. Antonovsky intended the scale to be used to measure a general 
orientation to life and not for the three factors to be used as independent subscales 





Thus, five hypotheses were made with which to test the construct validity of the Brain 
Injury Sense of Self Scale, after refinement via Rasch analysis.  These are summarised 
in Table 5-1.  
Ideally, in construct validity testing, there would also be measures for which no 
correlation with scale scores would be predicted. This was much harder to devise for 
the Brain Injury Sense of Self scale, due to the large number of factors that potentially 
influence sense of self. A simple cognitive test such as verbal fluency was considered 
as one that may have no correlation with sense of self scores. However, it was difficult 
to construct a solid hypothesis in this regard. Verbal fluency is widely used as a test of 
cognitive function after TBI but it is disputed what specific cognitive skills are 
required to perform well on measures of verbal fluency (Schwartz, Baldo, Graves, & 
Brugger, 2003). It has been suggested as a measure of some or all of the following: 
executive functioning, semantic processing and speed of processing (Bivona et al., 
2008). Verbal fluency also needs to be interpreted in the context of age and number of 
years of formal education received. However, because executive dysfunction can 
directly influence interpersonal relationships and ability to work, some correlation 
with changes on the Brain Injury Sense of Self scale were still predicted. Furthermore, 
the role of narrative has been highlighted as a core skill required for the maintenance 
and reconstruction of self-identity, thus people with impairment of semantic 
processing may be more likely than those without to struggle with self-identity. 
Therefore, there are several reasons to hypothesise that verbal fluency scores may well 
be linked with Brain Injury Sense of Self scores, so it was not considered a good 
candidate for this form of testing.  
Another consideration regarding further data collection for the purposes of construct 
validity testing was participant burden.  The three forms already used for data 
collection (the- demographic sheet, the GOSe and the Brain Injury Sense of Self 
Scale) were estimated to take 30-45 minutes for each participant to complete.  Given 
the effects of decreased sustained attention and cognitive fatigue experience by people 
with brain injury, it was decided that no further data collection should be added. 
Therefore, in this study there are no construct validity hypotheses that predict a lack of 

















































           The results from the different phases of this study are presented in several 
sections below.  Throughout these results the development of the Brain Injury Sense of 
Self Scale (BISOSS) is presented.  There were three distinct drafts developed for this 
scale as it was refined over a series of phases of research.  This process is illustrated in 
Figure 6-1. Draft 1 of the scale was the version of the scale available at the start of this 
thesis, that was initially developed from the qualitative data collected from focus 
groups in 2011 (Levack et al., 2014). This consisted of 38 items that had arisen from 
the descriptions of personal change used by participants in this study. This version of 
the scale was refined as part of this thesis into Draft 2 based on findings from the 
concept analysis (presented in Chapter 4) and the first round of cognitive interviewing.  
Draft 2 then underwent a second round of cognitive interviews to assess new or 
amended items to produce a revised Draft 2 (Draft 2r).  Draft 2r was then completed 
by 136 people with TBI in two countries: New Zealand and the UK.  Rasch analysis 
and factor analysis was used to examine the measurement characteristics of the tool.  
The findings from this analysis were used to develop Draft 3 of the tool, which was 
then tested for construct validity, using additional data collected from 50 participants.  
At the end of the process, the final version of the BISOSS was confirmed.  This 
chapter presents the findings from each stage of this research, taking the BISOSS from 
Draft 1 to the final version of the validated measurement scale. Throughout this 
chapter questionnaire items will be referred to by their draft number and question 
number e.g. D1-Q1 refers to question number 1 in Draft 1. The drafts of the 











Nine participants were recruited and undertook cognitive interviews on Draft 1 of the 
questionnaire. A research assistant had carried out these interviews on Draft 1 of the 
questionnaire and the audio recordings were available as raw data for this thesis. The 
participant characteristics are shown in Table 6-1. The issues raised by participants 
were classified into general comments about the questionnaire or specific issues about 
individual questions. These were assessed in terms of whether they raised major 
concerns about the interpretation of the questionnaire, or mild concerns only. Major 
concerns were raised in three general areas: time scale of answers, comparison with 
‘pre-injury’ and attributing changes to the brain injury. 
Draft 1 of the questionnaire provided no guidance to participants for what time-scale 
to consider when answering questions. Several participants commented on the 
potential variation in their responses depending on whether they were answering the 
question based on as they were feeling right this minute, as they had been feeling over 
the last week, or considering everything that has happened since the injury. 
Eight questions contained the phrase “since my injury”. Questions asking for a 
comparison with a pre-injury state were difficult for several reasons: for some this was 
a long time ago, for others they had no clear memories of their pre-injury state. It was 
clear from some of the discussions that participants were using a comparison to life 
before the injury to formulate some of their answers, but questions that explicitly 
asked for a comparison were problematic. Other questions required the participants to 
attribute the cause of changes in their lives to the injury e.g. D1-Q11 “I cannot get on 
with my life at the moment because of my injury”. Some people acknowledged a 
difficulty with moving on with their lives, but were unsure whether it was directly 
because of the injury or other factors. The interviews were conducted in Christchurch 
and one participant specifically mentioned the difficulties of distinguishing effects of 
the earthquake that struck Christchurch in February 2011 (“Christchurch earthquake- 
quick facts,” 2011) from their TBI. This ambiguity was also reflected in comments 




circumstances or finances and perceived prejudice were interpreted by some as direct 
consequences of brain injury, but for others these were separate from and not 
inevitable consequences of the physical injury and it was these societal or 
environmental factors that were affecting their recovery independently from the more 
direct effects of TBI.  
There were other more minor problems identified. One issue was the need to clarify 
the nature of ‘family’, e.g. does this refer to immediate family, extended family, or 
non-traditional family models? Participants also reported feeling confused by some of 
the questions and unsure about whose view point they should be reporting on, e.g. D1-
Q21 “My family have a good understanding of who I am now”. This could be 
interpreted in two ways: my family would say they understand me or that I feel that 
my family actually understands. 
The role of acceptance of changes was mentioned by two participants as affecting their 
responses, e.g. one male participant commented there is a difference between knowing 
who you are and being who you want to be, and a second male participant also 
commented ‘cos I can get on with my life, but not where I want it to be’. These 
comments highlight the need to be clear with participants that the questionnaire is 
aiming to distinguish between the factual statements of change versus their evaluation 










































Some individual questions raised major concerns as they were interpreted in very 
different ways by the participants: 
D1-Q4 “I feel in control of the person I am” was construed by some participants as 
feeling in control of one’s behaviour and actions, but by other participants as referring 
to a more general sense of being in control of their life and future. 
D1-Q6 & D1-Q39 “I feel whole” and “I feel spiritually whole” highlighted some 
variations in understanding. The word ‘spiritual’ is enigmatic both in lay use and in 
the scientific literature; for some it is synonymous with a recognised religion whereas 
for others it refers more broadly to the part of the human psyche concerned with 
ultimate meaning in life and questions of transcendence (Collicutt McGrath, 2011). 
This ambiguity led some people to report that there was no difference between the two 
questions, whereas others felt unable to answer Q39 at all as it had no meaning for 
them as they were atheists. This item, “I feel spiritually whole”, was therefore 
behaving in a non-uniform way depending on the religious beliefs of the respondent. 
Good questionnaire items aim to discriminate between participants based on their level 
of the underlying latent trait and nothing else. This item, even in initial cognitive 
testing was demonstrating a confounding influence from religious beliefs based on the 
inclusion of the word ‘spiritual’. Alternative items specifically enquiring about 
purpose and meaning in life were therefore introduced instead to try and capture the 
sense of the areligious interpretation of the word ‘spiritual’. These questions also 
raised some specific issues around concrete interpretation. Some participants reported 
understanding the questions (D1-Q6 and D1-Q39) as giving an overarching impression 
of coherence, of having goals, a picture of the future, knowing where you are going 
whereas others adopted a much more focused interpretation to feeling whole, referring 
instead to specific deficits.  One participant stated that ‘Because I can’t taste, and I 
can’t smell, it – it’s really really hard, it affects the food I eat, it affects how – that 
does affect how I feel about myself, totally.’ These specific functional deficits led this 
participant to disagree with the statements about feeling ‘whole’. 
D1-Q7 “I feel clear about what I am able to achieve in my life”. For some participants 
this was interpreted as  knowing their own limits but for others the effect of external 
circumstances and frustrations with ‘the system’ were more important in limiting 




disagreement over the scope of this question – was it about achievements on a day to 
day basis, or the bigger picture? 
D1-Q10 “I feel incomplete”. This question was interpreted by one participant as 
referring to an ‘incomplete recovery’ and thus seen as a positive, motivating force for 
change: i.e. ‘there’s still room for improvement, once you are complete, that’s it, no 
more improvement’. This question was aiming to tap into a sense of fragmentation, a 
loss of being a whole person but was clearly misinterpreted in this instance.  
Participants were also asked to comment on any areas that they felt should have been 
included but were not and two main areas were identified: a lack of coverage on work 
or being productive, and a need to reflect the number of relationships lost over time, or 
lack of relationships at present. 
The response format was another area that was investigated. Draft 1 contained four 
response options: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.  For Draft 2 of the 
measure, five options for amending the response categories were considered: 1) 
dichotomous categories only (i.e. agree/ disagree); 2) retain the same four response 
options; 3) add in a fifth neutral response category for items that were not applicable 
to an individual; 4) increase number of response categories to reflect a greater range of 
opinion strengths; and 5) change response categories to a frequency scale (e.g. 
reporting how frequently people experienced feeling certain ways).  
Some participants made comments that they would have preferred more response 
categories.  However, they felt that they were still able to grade their answer with the 
four available options. A few people reflected that they were using a retrospective 
comparison (if things had been better or worse in the past) to help them decide 
between strongly agree and agree or strongly disagree and disagree. Other people 
stated that it was their degree of emotional response to the item (e.g. feeling of distress 
or concern over an item), that was influencing their decision to pick a strong response 
over a moderate response. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is necessary to achieve a 
balance between employing sufficient response categories so that participants can 
reflect a range of responses but not having so many that the questionnaire becomes too 
complex and inaccessible for those with more cognitive or linguistic impairments. A 




risks losing information. Answer categories can always be merged during analysis but 
additional information from omitted response categories cannot be regained. The 
current format of four response categories seemed to achieve this balance. One 
participant felt a frequency answer scale e.g. never/ seldom/ occasionally/ 
sometimes/often would be more appropriate as all items were relevant but just to a 
greater or lesser extent, however this was not a widely expressed view, so the current 
wording was retained.  
A neutral response category was also requested on several occasions. This was 
particularly requested for items requiring a causal link to the injury e.g. D1-Q11” I 
cannot get on with my life at the moment because of my injury” and D1-Q14 “I feel 
confused about who I am since my injury”. However, one of the major drawbacks to 
neutral response categories as discussed in Chapter 3 is that this response option can 
be selected by participants for a multitude of reasons such as expressing indifference, 
an inability to answer or not understanding the question. The removal of specific 
reference to the injury was felt to be sufficient to eliminate the confusion that these 
items had caused, and that the addition a neutral category was likely to create more 
problem by being overused as a default response category. Furthermore, participants 
could opt to leave questions blank if they felt unable to answer. 
6.1.2 Refining	Draft	1	based	on	the	results	from	the	concept	analysis:	
The concept analysis (presented in Chapter 4) provided a strong theoretical foundation 
on which to critique the individual items and overall structure of Draft 1 of the 
measure.  As a reminder: Draft 1 of the measure had been inductively derived from the 
reports of people with TBI regarding their experiences of loss or change in their sense 
of self after injury.  The items in Draft 1 of the measure reflected their stories, their 
words, and their experiences.  By contrast, the concept analysis provided an overview 
of the current scientific and clinical thinking on change in self-identity after TBI.  This 
section presents the result of work to integrate and resolve differences between the 
findings from the concept analysis and the items in Draft 1 of the measure.  
To begin with, the concept analysis highlighted that sense of self could be viewed as 
existing along a continuum. People could report having a ‘stronger’ or ‘weaker’ sense 




distinction between self-identity as a self-reported concept and ‘personality change’ as 
a third party view was also highlighted by the concept analysis.  Prior to the concept 
analysis, terminology related to ‘personhood’ and ‘personal identity’ had been used.  
After the concept analysis, these terms were omitted and the terms ‘sense of self’ and 
‘self-identity’ were then consistently used in the measure to avoid ambiguity.  
The three section structure of the questionnaire items was reviewed and compared 
with the findings of the concept analysis. The concept analysis also identified three 
component parts to the construct of self-identity that could be threatened by TBI: 1) 
egocentric self, 2) sociocentric self and 3) self-as-shared with others. These did not 
correspond exactly with the three sections of Draft 1 of the measure (which were 
labelled: ‘how I feel about myself’; ‘how others treat me’ and ‘how I feel about my 
place in the world’) but there were clear areas of overlap.  
The first category: ‘egocentric self’ (from the concept analysis) and ‘how I feel about 
myself’ (from Draft 1 of the measure) corresponded well. However, items in the 
second and third sections of Draft 1 of the measure covered both sociocentric self and 
self-as-shared constructs, with the distinction between these areas being more blurred.  
The processes of narrative identity and meaningful occupation were also highlighted 
in the concept analysis and the cognitive interviews as being key to the construction 
and re-construction of self-identity after TBI, and were areas that were not explicitly 
explored by the items of Draft 1 of the questionnaire. 
The main conceptual point arising from the concept analysis, with implications for 
development of Draft 2 of the measure, related to the separation of ‘knowledge’ and 
‘evaluative’ components of a person’s sense of self. More specifically, the concept 
analysis highlighted that a negative evaluation of change should be considered 
separate from the conceptual definition of sense of self, and thus should be viewed as 
an outcome rather than a component of the construct. Items such as D1-Q3 “I like the 
person I have become since my injury”, D1-Q5 “I have become a better person since 
my injury”, D1-Q16 “I am sad about the person I’ve become since my injury” are all 
evaluative statements and are therefore looking at an allied construct, such as self-
esteem, or related to a potential consequence of a weak sense of self, such as 
depression. It was decided therefore that these items should not be included in Draft 2 




Q36, “I am proud of my achievements since my injury” and D1-Q37 “I feel 
worthwhile” could all be construed as being evaluative too. However, feedback from 
the cognitive interviews highlighted that a person’s sense of achievement or their 
sense of being able to accomplish things is also captured by these statements, and this 
is considered integral to the concept of sense of self. Being able to set and achieve 
goals is an important aspect of the construct to capture and so these items were 
reworded to emphasise this aspect.   
Some features of the construct identified in the concept analysis were not covered well 
by the items in Draft 1 of the measure. In the first section, the egocentric self 
components of self-knowledge, agency, coherence, predictability, and continuity were 
all covered. However, there were fewer items that covered aspects of uniqueness and 
ownership of one’s identity. In the later sections a lack of coverage was identified in 
the areas of meaningful occupation, group memberships and a sense of belonging, 
social stigmatisation and a sense of having a discrepancy between own views of self 
and the views of others. The conceptual analysis defined sense of self as ‘self-
reflective meaning-making’ giving a sense of purpose and meaning in life which was 
not assessed by Draft 1 of the questionnaire.  
The concept analysis also allowed comparisons to be drawn between Draft 1 of the 
measure and other potential measures of self-identity.  In particular, the HISDS 
(Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984), an existing measure of self-concept following TBI, 
was used for comparison.  It was identified that this measure depends heavily on 
retrospective comparisons (i.e. asking people to score aspects of their self-concept at 
one point in time to a point in time prior to their TBI). The validity of retrospective 
scoring on self-report measures in non-brain injured subjects has been heavily 
criticised (Schwarz, 2007). This is particularly problematic when dealing with reports 
of change and intensity of experience, as these are known to not be represented well in 
autobiographical memory.  This means that people need to extrapolate from their 
current situation when asked to report on how they used to feel about themselves (i.e. 
they make an assessment on whether a prior state or experience was better or worse 
than a current state or experience, and to score in a comparative fashion). This 
introduces systematic bias to a measure (Schwarz, 2007). These problems will be even 




pre-injury picture ). In the light of these concerns, and the comments raised by the 
participants in the cognitive interviews, it was decided that the questionnaire should 
not ask participants to compare their current situation with a ‘pre injury state’ in an 
attempt to quantify change but instead should aim to accurately record a current state 
of ‘strength’ of self-identity.  
6.1.3 Combining	the	findings	from	the	concept	analysis	and	cognitive	
interviews	to	produce	Draft	2	
Draft 1 of the measure (with 38 items) was re-evaluated in the light of these analyses 
and changes made. Introductory information was added to the measure to include clear 
direction regarding the timeframe that participants should use for reference when 
answering each question.  As the literature on self-report questionnaires seems to 
favour a 7-day timeframe (Christodoulou et al., 2008) Draft 2 of the measure was 
designed to ask participants to consider how they had been feeling over the previous 
week. At the beginning of Section 2 of the measure (i.e. ‘How others treat me’) a 
paragraph was also added explaining that this section was to do with close 
relationships, and another explanatory paragraph was added to indicate that Section 3 
addresses experience of oneself within the context of the world at large. 
Any specific reference to ‘since the injury’ was removed from measurement items.  
The cognitive interviews indicated that participants tended to use their injury as a 
reference point anyway, with some expressly adding poor recall of their injury as a 
problem when completing the questionnaire.  Removing reference to such comparison 
was intended to minimise any such confusion.  (As a side issue, removing specific 
reference to traumatic brain injury from the measure also potentially enabled the 
measure to be more easily tested with other rehabilitation populations if this were 
indicated in the future.)  
Individual items were listed and colour-coded as follows: black for an unchanged, 
retained item, blue for an item that needed minor revision, with some suggestions 
listed, green for a new item and red for an item that could be considered for removal. 







Draft	1	questionnaire	items	 Suggested	alternative	1	 Suggested	alternative	2	 Suggested	alternative	3	
Section1:	How	I	feel	about	myself	
I	know	what	is	important	to	me	 	 	 	















































































































I	feel	valued	by	my	friends	 	 	 	


















































































This analysis was used to derive Draft 2, which was renamed “Sense of Self Following 
TBI”. A general statement was added in at the beginning of section 1: D2-Q1 “I feel 
that I have problems with my self-identity or I am unsure about who I am”. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, this question was not intended to be scored with the rest of the 
questionnaire, but included to give an overall impression of whether the participant 
felt they had problems in this area for the purposes of construct validity testing. Draft 
2 therefore consisted of 45 items. An updated construct framework was devised, 
integrating the frameworks from the earlier studies and mapping the items to each 
domain. This helped to ensure that all areas of the construct were covered by items in 
Draft 2 and therefore that face validity was adequate. The updated construct 











Four new participants with TBI were recruited for a second round of cognitive 
interviews to test the content of Draft 2 of the measure. These participants included 
two men and two women, aged 20 to 64 years (mean 36.3 years, SD 19.2).  Their time 
since injury ranged from 6 months to 16 years (mean 54 months, SD 92.4). After four 
interviews there were no major problems reported in completing the questionnaire and 
the questions were interpreted in the manner intended, so it was decided no further 
interviews were required. One participant suggested inclusion of the statement “I feel 
left out”, which seemed to capture a sense of being distanced from society and 
loneliness that was not otherwise captured by other measurement items, so this was 
added to Draft 2 of the measure. One participant suggested rewording the item D2-
Q31: “People value my opinion” as she related the word ‘opinion’ to being 
opinionated and bossy, so this was amended to “I feel that other people value my point 
of view”.  A few minor alterations in wording were also made e.g. D2-Q29: “People 
think I’m useless” was changed to “I feel that other people think I’m useless” to 
emphasise that the item was seeking the participant’s perspective on how they feel 
other people view them, and not asking them to speculate on the actual opinions of 
others. D2-Q39 and D2-Q42 also underwent minor alterations to make them less 
cumbersome and easier to understand: “I spend my time doing things which I find 
meaningful” changed to “The things I do give meaning to my life” and “I feel the 
things I do in life accurately reflect who I am” changes to “I am able to express myself 
in the things I do”. These minor amendments formed a revised Draft 2 (Draft 2r) of the 
questionnaire, with 46 items. 
An interviewer prompt sheet was also developed at this stage. As the cognitive 
interviews were carried out it was apparent that there was a need to have a 
standardised approach to the interviews. The development of a prompt sheet also 
enabled a uniform alternative phrasing to be provided if the participant was having 
difficulty understanding the questionnaire item. This ensured a consistent approach to 
all the interviews used in the later stages of questionnaire development regardless of 





This section describes the next stage of questionnaire development, namely that of 
statistical testing of the measurement items. Participants were recruited for face-to-
face interviews to complete the demographic sheet, GOSe and Draft 2r of the BISOSS. 
Fifty participants also completed the SOC-13 for subsequent construct validity testing. 
During this phase of data collection, a journal was kept of participants’ comments and 
reactions to the questionnaire, as well as reflective comments after each interview. The 
following section presents a summary of the qualitative comments on the 
questionnaire, analysis of the data collected by factor analysis and Rasch analysis and 
finally the construct validity testing.  
Data collection for this phase was conducted between April 2013 and June 2015. Data 
were collected from both New Zealand (n=34) and the UK (n=102), with a total of 136 
participants recruited for this phase of the study. I recruited and interviewed sixteen of 
the New Zealand participants from April to June 2013, and all of the UK participants 
from June 2014 to June 2015. A research assistant recruited and interviewed the 
remaining nineteen participants in New Zealand during March to May 2015. The 
demographic characteristics of the participants are presented in Table 6-3. Participants 


























































*Severity of TBI was categorised based on the Mayo TBI severity classification 
system (Malec et al., 2007),  
	
All participants who enrolled completed the interviews, 109 of the 136 (80.2%) 
participants answered all the questions. and there were no adverse events recorded.  
6.3.1 Qualitative	comments	from	data	collection	
The topic, despite its rather abstract nature was one that participants readily engaged 
with and were keen to talk about. For the most part, the items were easy to understand 
and the answer format straightforward, with all response categories being utilised. A 
few participants would have been able to complete the forms independently but most 
required some form of support with reading or writing, which reaffirmed the decision 
to use a face-to-face interview format rather than telephone or postal questionnaire.  
Most participants were interviewed alone, but a few had a family member or carer 
present. The presence of the support person was unobtrusive and did not appear to 
influence the answers of the participant.  
Some support workers for one TBI support group in the UK (Headway) had expressed 
concern when the project was first introduced to them about the nature of some of the 
questions and the potential for the measurement process to stir up negative emotions in 
their clients. The consent process included obtaining permission from the participant 
to contact their primary care provider should there be any concerns about their welfare 
following our discussions and this served to allay most concerns. If there were clients 
with mental health problems, or current personal circumstances that meant that 
participation in the project may not be appropriate I suggested that the support workers 
use their judgement and only put forward clients whom they felt would be able to cope 
with the study. Mental health conditions per se were not an exclusion criterion but 
potential participants may have been excluded from the study on these grounds as 




All participants were asked for feedback at the end of the interview and despite the 
concerns of the support staff, only a couple of participants reported that some of the 
questions had made them feel ‘a bit sad’. Most of the feedback was overwhelmingly 
positive with many reporting that this was a subject they could relate to and were 
relieved and encouraged that this topic was being addressed. Some participants felt 
that the closed answer format was restrictive and did not permit full discussion of the 
topic, but as full discussion of the experience of self-identity was not the aim of this 
particular measure, these comments were just noted for future reference. One 
participant commented that the closed answer format was good as it encouraged 
honest answers without the need to dwell or expand on them. There was no time limit 
set for the interviews and if participants wished to talk through their answers there was 
scope for that, but equally if they just wanted to answer the item and move on they 
were not obliged to explain their responses. Most interviews lasted 30-60 minutes, 
with a few taking significantly longer.  
Some	items	frequently	raised	queries	as	their	meaning	was	unclear:	
D2r-Q9 “I am able to achieve goals I set for myself” was designed to see if people 
could achieve a sense of accomplishment from being able to set themselves a task and 
see it through, however small that task may be. This explanation is reflected in the 
Interview Prompt Sheet alternative wording. However, as many of the participants had 
been through formal rehabilitation settings they were interpreting ‘goals’ in a more 
technical sense as a specific rehabilitation target to be met and felt that the alternative 
format was asking a slightly different question. 
The phrasing of D2r-Q11 “I live more in the past than the present” caused issues for 
some participants, who were unsure which answer category to choose if they felt they 
lived in the present, and so needed support to ensure they chose the appropriate 
category. 
D2r-Q12 “I feel the story of my life makes sense” frequently needed clarification. The 
alternative wording on the prompt sheet was helpful. 
D2r-Q31 “I have been rejected by people who were important in my life” caused 
several serious issues. Some participants reported that they had been rejected by 




on that basis, concluding that ‘if people reject you, they can’t be that important’. So, 
while at the time of rejection that person had been important to them, the subsequent 
redefinition led them to disagree with the question. For others the problem was more 
the active nature of the word ‘reject’. Over the years they had lost friends, but they felt 
the process was one of passive drifting apart as their lives took a different course, 
rather than an active rejection. A third issue with this item was that, whereas all other 
items were asking for how the participants felt about things, this item was asking for a 
statement of fact.  
D2r-Q5 “I know where my life is going” and D2r-Q33 “I know where I fit in the 
world” were both intended as positively orientated questions. However, in two cases, 
both were agreed with for negative reasons, e.g. to D2r-Q5 one participant agreed that 
they knew where their life was going: ‘down the f***** plughole’, and to D2r-Q33 
the participants agreed that they knew where they fit in the world, but this was ‘at the 
bottom’ or ‘in a pokey little hole in the corner’. 
Other questions were prone to problems of interpretation due to cognitive difficulties. 
Concrete interpretation of some questions was an issue for a few participants.  For 
example, in response to D2r-Q2 “I know what is important to me”, one participant 
indicated that they agreed, but clarified that this was ‘food and getting to the 
bathroom’, which did not seem to directly capture perspectives related to a person’s 
sense of self.  
A lack of metacognitive skills also made questions like D2r-Q41 (“Other people see 
me in the same way I see myself”) very challenging: some participants felt that they 
just had no idea how other people viewed them. This was the most commonly omitted 
question with six participants feeling that they could not provide an answer.  
Some participants commented that their family did not behave in a uniform way. They 
felt that some of their family understood, valued and respected them, while others did 
not, and there was no way of indicating this split in their responses to the measurement 
items. For one participant family was ‘irrelevant in how I define myself’. Several 
participants reported having no friends at all, or that they had only a few friends, who 
did not always behave as a uniform group. So, for example, D2r-Q28 (“I feel 




did respect them and other friends who did not.  In comparison, items which included 
the phrase ‘people who are important to me’ enabled the participant to define for 
themselves who to include when answering. Alternatively, use of the terms ‘family’ or 
‘close family’, appeared to be considered more precise than items which referred to 
friends, so while again some participants reported a split regarding attitudes or 
relationships within the family, these questions tended to be less problematic than the 
ones specifying ‘friends’. 
The impact of physical disabilities as a confounder was apparent in some of the 
questions. D2r-Q4 (“I feel in control of my actions”) was intended to ask about 
behavioural disinhibition or sense of connection with one’s body, whereas a few, 
mostly ataxic, participants interpreted the item around motor control. The prompt was 
able to clarify this when the confusion was apparent. Likewise, the prompt sheet was 
useful for D2r-Q37 (“I am able to do things for other people”) as it clarified that this 
is not only referring to physical help, but could also include, for example, being a good 
listener.  Nevertheless, many participants initially thought of just providing physical 
assistance to others in relation to this question. 
All of the participants had undergone a traumatic life experience as well as a brain 
injury and the effects of this were apparent. For some the fact of surviving a near death 
experience had given them a different outlook on life ‘I’m living for each day’ or ‘I 
nearly died so each day is a bonus’. It also inspired in some people a feeling of a 
greater purpose ‘I’m back here for a reason’. However, for other participants the 
reverse was true and the shock of the accident had undermined their view of the world, 
provoking feelings of a loss of confidence and a loss of trust, separate from the 
immediate effects of the brain injury. They could perhaps understand on an intellectual 
level what had happened but there were still many unanswered questions about the 
‘why?’ 
As noted in Section 6.1.1, an overt reference to spirituality was deliberately removed 
following the cognitive interviews, but many people still referred to their faith or 
religion particularly in reference to D2r-Q39 “I feel there is purpose and meaning in 
my life”. A couple of participants reported having ‘found God’ following their brain 
injury as surviving such an accident made them realise that there must be ‘someone 




before the accident, commented that while she hadn’t lost her faith, she had lost her 
ability to communicate with God as a result of the TBI. The other reason that people 
commonly gave when answering D2r-Q39 was their children. These comments served 
to confirm the decision to remove the word ‘spirituality’ from the questionnaire. It was 
apparent that participants for whom religion was a strong force in their lives could still 
reflect that in their answers to this question, but by removing the explicit reference to 
spirituality this question was relevant to all and open to individual interpretation. 
One participant commented on a deep sense of loneliness that she felt, a sense of 
emotional disconnection with people, that while she was present in a group she never 
truly felt included. This feeling was echoed in the comments that several people made 
about D2r-Q45 “I wish there were more people in my life”. This question was 
designed to reflect that sense of loneliness, but proved difficult to answer on 
occasions. Some people reported struggling with a sense of loneliness but also the 
knowledge that they could no longer tolerate company very well. They realised they 
had few social contacts and were viewed as an outcast, but partly this was due to the 
fact they had voluntarily withdrawn from society as they could no longer cope. This 
rendered responses to D2r-Q45 unpredictable as while some participants reported 
feeling lonely, they did not wish to fill this void with more people.  
Many of the participants who were recruited via Headway branches reported that it 
was Headway that gave them a sense of belonging and contact with people who 
understood their difficulties. Some participants felt that people who had never had a 
brain injury themselves could never truly understand what it is like to experience a 
brain injury, and thus valued their friends from Headway as the only ones who 
actually ‘get it’. This contrasted with the cohort of participants recruited from other 
sources, who were often no longer in contact with any formal brain injury services and 
lacked this seemingly crucial peer support.  
Another area of discussion for many participants was around the concept of 
acceptance, particularly in relation to D2r-Q13 (“I accept myself for who I am”). 
Several participants, who had been injured for a long time, spoke of how they had only 
reached the point of accepting their injury relatively recently, often many years later. 
One participant commented that time was the only thing that helped with acceptance. 




being viewed as being synonymous with ‘defeat’ and a cessation of efforts towards 
improvements. This raises the possibility that acceptance and ongoing recovery are 
viewed as mutually exclusive concepts rather than necessarily being mutually 
beneficial. Some participants however remained convinced that their current situation 
was only temporary and that they would get their memory back, or that medical 
science would find a cure for their disability. For these participants, hope was an 
important motivating and sustaining force.  
A summary of all the questions from the BISOSS that raised concerns based on the 
qualitative comments is shown below in Table 6-4. D2r-Q31 was reviewed at this 
stage, as it had caused significant problems during data collection and was felt to be an 
unreliable item so was removed from further analysis. Otherwise, these comments 
were not used to make any further changes to Draft2r of the questionnaire but were 
used to assess the utility of the items and to assist in the item reduction process 




























Data were entered into SPSS Statistics (Version 23). Descriptive data for the sample 
are shown in Table 6-3.  
One key feature of Rasch analysis is its ability to assess for bias in the form of DIF. 
Six participant characteristics had been identified as being good candidates for DIF 
analysis to ensure that the measure was behaving in a uniform manner across different 
patient subgroups. These were: gender, ethnicity, age at injury, time since injury, 
severity of injury and recovery as measured by the GOSe. The ethnic mix of the 
participants was insufficient for analysis by ethnic group: there were too few non-NZ 




of the participants identified as being from a ‘non White’ (NZ or European) ethnic 
group. The concept analysis identified a potential difference in the way that self is 
construed in different cultures, drawing a distinction between ‘Western’ 
conceptualisation of self and conceptualisation in other cultures. However, given the 
limited ethnic diversity of the study population it was not possible to look at this 
further in this study. The five person factors were categorised into two or three 
clinically meaningful groups or levels for the purposes of assessing DIF. Age at injury 
was dichotomised into those injured at the age of 35 years or younger  and those over 
35 years of age. Three groups were used for time since injury: 6 months to 2 years, 
over 2 years but less than10 years and 10 years or more. Severity of injury was 
categorised using the Mayo TBI severity classification system (Malec et al., 2007), 
mostly on the basis of self-reported loss of consciousness. Recovery was split 
according to GOSe scores into severe disability (GOSe score 3 or 4), moderate 
disability (GOSe score 5 or 6) and good recovery (GOSe score 7 or 8). 
6.4.1 Initial	analysis	
RUMM 2030 (Andrich et al., 2008) software was used for Rasch analysis. The entire 
44 item data set was imported into RUMM. Reverse scored items were already 
accounted for by the scoring template and so did not need to be identified as such for 
RUMM. Only one person scored a maximum score of 135 demonstrating a ceiling 
effect of the measure for this one individual.  This indicated the measure performed 
well below the highest acceptable (15%) ceiling effect rate for a measurement scale 
(McHorney & Tarlov, 1995). This person’s scores offer no further information 
regarding relative item difficulty, so RUMM excludes their responses from further 
analysis. 
 A Likelihood-Ratio test was performed, Chi-squared probability = 0.0001, confirming 
that the unrestricted Partial Credit model (see Chapter 3) should be employed. 







































The summary statistics show that the scale is not invariant, Chi-squared interaction 
p=0.002 and that there is significant multidimensionality within it. 
The initial analysis did have ordered item-category thresholds but showed low 
category frequencies (less than 10) for 25 of the items. All answer categories had in 
fact been used by the participants, but low response frequencies were seen for some 
items in categories 0 and 3 (which represent the more extreme views). Ten is the 
minimum number of responses in an answer category needed in order to generate 
stable item difficulty estimates (Linacre, 2002) and so those items with low category 
response frequencies required rescoring. 
The initial scoring template used for Draft 2r of the measure is provided in Appendix 
A. This shows that for positively worded items responses were scored with sequential 
integers 0,1,2,3 for the responses “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “agree” and 
“strongly agree” respectively. The reverse was true for negatively worded items. 
Therefore, it makes logical sense when rescoring items to collapse categories 0 and 1 
together and categories 2 and 3. A few items and their response category frequencies 
and rescoring structure are shown below in Table 6-6 to illustrate the rescoring 
process. Items with fewer than ten responses for category 0, like questions 2, 3 and 4 
below, were rescored 0,0,1,2; so that both ‘disagree’ options would score 0, with agree 
scoring 1 and strongly agree scoring 2. Rasch requires that sequential integers are used 
for scoring so 0,0,2,3 was not an option. Twenty-three items needed rescoring in this 
manner. Two items, had low response frequencies for category 3, like D2r-Q41 (as 
shown in Table 6-6). These items were rescored 0,1,2,2; so both ‘agree’ options were 










Item	number	from	D2r	 SD		 D	 A	 SA	 	
Q2.	I	know	what	is	important	to	me	 1	 12	 57	 58	 0,0,1,2	
Q3.	I	have	a	clear	idea	of	who	I	am	 4	 21	 59	 43	 0,0,1,2	
Q4.	I	feel	in	control	of	my	actions	 5	 33	 62	 27	 0,0,1,2	
Q5.	l	like	I	know	where	my	life	is	going	 17	 54	 47	 10	 none	
Q41.	Other	people	see	me	in	the	same	way	I	
see	myself	
16	 59	 39	 8	 0,1,2,2	
Key: SD= strongly disagree, D= disagree, A= agree, SA= strongly agree
 
It would have been possible to have dichotomised all the items, thus keeping a 
uniform scoring profile across all items, however this would have lost much 
information generated by the participants and potentially reduced the precision of the 
resultant scale, as can happen when the number of response categories falls below the 
optimum of 4 or 5 (Fries et al., 2006), so the items were individually rescored as 
required.  
6.4.2 Initial	analysis	following	rescoring	
The summary statistics for the initial analysis (Initial) and following this rescoring 
(Initial-r) are shown in Table 6-7. This shows that following the rescoring the data still 






















































Examining item fit, D2r-Q45 and D2r-Q46 showed significant misfit (D2r-Q46: chi-
squared probability < 0.001, fit residual 8.735; D2r-Q45: chi-squared probability 
0.002, fit residual 2.745). Person fit was assessed and participant 118 showed 
significant misfit to the model’s expectations with a fit residual of 5.249 and an 
aberrant response pattern. In other words, participant 118’s responses often differed 
significantly from the predicted responses. The instructions for the test are not to 
‘overthink’ the questions but to provide a ‘gut’ response. Participant 118 was reported 
to have had a background in psychology, and was fascinated by the meanings of 
words. This led to significant issues with their responses as they were unable to 
answer the questions as instructed and spent some time deliberating about the exact 
phrasing of each question. Individual participants with skewed response patterns can 
have a significant effect on the analysis and therefore it is best if their responses are 
removed (Pallant & Tennant, 2007). Therefore, participant 118 was deleted from all 
further analyses. 
Local dependency: there was evidence of significant (at 0.3 above average residual 
correlations) local dependency throughout section 2 of the questionnaire: ‘How others 
treat me’. 
Unidimensionality: there was clear evidence of a multidimensional structure in Initial-
r with 26/136 (19.12%), t tests positive at the 5% significance level. As a reminder, in 
a unidimensional scale less than 5% of the t-tests on the divergent subgroup 
comparison should be significant. 
Given the clear multidimensionality of the data, which was anticipated from the 
theoretical model, it was decided to explore the structure of the data with factor 
analysis before any further Rasch analyses. 
6.4.3 Factor	analysis	
Factor analysis was performed in SPSS, version 23. Scaling assumptions were 
examined first with item-total correlations. D2r-Q46 “I feel left out” was poorly 
correlated with the rest of the scale (item-total correlation = 0.263). The remaining 
items all had correlations >0.350 providing evidence that they are all measuring 
aspects of the same underlying construct. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.96 for the scale, 




the 44 items using principal component analysis with varimax rotation showed the 
presence of one major principal component (eigenvalue = 17.36) that accounted for 
39.5% of the total variance, with 51.0% of the variance explained by the top three 
factors. D2r-Q46 (“I feel left out”) also did not load significantly on factors with any 
of the other items, but instead behaved independently, forming its own factor.  
Taken together with the item-total correlations, the factor analysis suggested that D2r-
Q46 did not really fit with the rest of the items. This is perhaps not surprising as D2r-
Q46 was added at the suggestion of one of the participants in the second round of 
cognitive interviews; it did not emerge from the qualitative research nor the concept 
analysis. However, it was felt to be relevant to the research question and was included 
in Draft 2r of the measure. D2r-Q46 was therefore deleted from further analysis as 
both conceptually and mathematically it did not fit with the measure. 
Forty-three items were retained and the factor analysis repeated. Again, one main 
component was identified (eigenvalue=17.11) as accounting for 39.8% of the variance, 
with 51.8% of the variance explained by the top three factors. The scree plot for the 






The most noticeable drop in the scree plot of Figure 6-3 is between components 1 and 
2, with a further small drop to component 3, before a more gradual decline to a 
plateau, indicating perhaps 3 or 4 factors should be retained. A parallel analysis was 















1	 16.434	 2.310	 14.124	
2	 3.064	 2.171	 0.893	
3	 2.413	 2.053	 0.360	
4	 2.167	 1.926	 0.241	
5	 1.741	 1.836	 -0.095	




Comparing the eigenvalues between the two sets of data in Table 6-8, demonstrates 
that between component 4 and component 5 the difference between the two data sets 
reverses. This is shown graphically in Figure 6-4: the solid line which represents the 
eigenvalues from the test data set crosses the dashed line, representing the random data 









The factor analysis in SPSS was therefore run specifying four factors initially. 
Principal component analysis and varimax rotation method were used and the rotated 




1	 2	 3	 4	
16.	I	sometimes	feel	like	I	am	living	somebody	
else’s	life		
.768	 	 	 	
15.	I	feel	confused	about	who	I	am		
.746	 	 	 	
6.	I	feel	like	a	whole	complete	person	
.678	 .301	 	 	
14.	I	sometimes	behave	in	a	way	that	does	
not	seem	like	me		
.670	 	 	 	
10.	I	feel	like	I	try	to	be	someone	I’m	not	






















.612	 	 	 	
4.	I	feel	in	control	of	my	actions	
.605	 .380	 	 	
29.		I	feel	that	people	expect	me	to	be	
someone	I'm	not	
.602	 	 .364	 .327	
12.		I	feel	the	story	of	my	life	makes	sense	
.596	 .346	 	 	
3.		I	have	a	clear	idea	of	who	I	am	
.591	 	 .345	 	
9.		I	am	able	to	achieve	goals	I	set	for	myself	
.568	 	 	 	
5.		I	feel	like	I	know	where	my	life	is	going	
.568	 .422	 	 	
8.	I	feel	clear	about	what	I	am	capable	of		
.559	 .396	 	 	
13.		I	accept	myself	for	who	I	am	
.556	 	 	 	
17.		I	am	not	who	I	want	to	be	
.537	 .330	 .372	 	
11.		I	live	more	in	the	past	than	the	present	
.511	 	 	 	
44.		Other	people	treat	me	as	an	equal	
.442	 	 .375	 .432	
30.		I	feel	that	other	people	think	I'm	useless	
.441	 	 	 .404	
42.		I	feel	I	am	labelled	by	others	
.383	 	 	 .325	
38.		I	have	a	sense	of	belonging	to	a	
community	
	 .787	 	 	
39.		I	feel	there	is	purpose	and	meaning	in	my	
life	
	 .761	 	 	
33.		I	feel	like	there	is	a	place	in	the	world	for	
me	






	 .640	 	 	
34.	I	know	where	I	fit	in	the	world	
.530	 .598	 	 	
35.	I	am	generally	satisfied	with	my	
relationships	with	other	people	
	 .556	 .404	 	
40.		The	things	I	do	give	meaning	to	my	life	
	 .530	 	 .336	
43.		I	am	able	to	express	myself	in	the	things	I	
do	
.368	 .515	 	 	
41.	Other	people	see	me	in	the	same	way	I	
see	myself		
.372	 .476	 	 	
37.	I	am	able	to	do	things	for	other	people		
	 .392	 	 	
2.	I	know	what	is	important	to	me	
	 .374	 	 	
23.		My	family	accepts	me	for	who	I	am	
	 	 .870	 	
22.		My	family	have	a	good	understanding	of	
who	I	am	
	 	 .837	 	
25.		I	feel	respected	by	my	family	
	 	 .812	 	
18.	I	feel	valued	by	people	who	are	important	
to	me	
	 .320	 .713	 	
19.	I	feel	understood	by	people	who	are	
important	to	me	
.329	 .302	 .692	 	
20.	I	feel	accepted	by	people	who	are	
important	to	me	
	 .368	 .654	 	
24.		I	feel	like	a	valued	member	of	my	family	
.368	 .330	 .596	 	
21.		I	have	a	close	relationship	with	someone	
who	makes	me	feel	valued	as	a	person	
	 .366	 .562	 	
27.	I	feel	valued	by	my	friends	





	 	 	 .831	
26.	I	have	friends	who	accept	me	for	who	I	am	
	 	 	 .796	
45.	I	wish	there	were	more	people	in	my	life	
	 	 	 .458	
32.	I	feel	that	other	people	value	my	point	of	
view		





The four factor solution separated out the items specifically enquiring about 
relationships with friends, as distinct from ‘family’ or ‘people who are important to 
me’. The fourth factor also consists of only five items, with the fifth loading almost 
equally onto components 2 and 3. In addition to concerns raised about the three 
‘friends’ items (D2r-Q26-28) in the feedback from the interviews (described earlier in 
section 6.3.1), the results of this factor analysis appeared to indicate that these three 
items in component 4 of Table 6-9  were not really working as intended. 
This was examined further by re-running the analysis specifying a three factor solution 
as shown in Table 6-10. This three factor rotated component matrix was based on 43 


























































































































The theoretical framework had suggested three overlapping but distinct areas of self-
identity that could be threatened by TBI and this was reflected in the three sections of 
the questionnaire. These sections were entitled ‘how I feel about myself’, ‘how other 
people treat me’ and ‘how I feel about my place in the world’.  The findings of the 
factor analysis broadly concurred with this theoretical construction. The results of the 
factor analysis were not used in isolation to group the items into factors but rather used 
to refine the definitions of the three domains and therefore the allocation of items to 
ensure that the items were placed into clinically meaningful and theoretically sound 
factors. 
Figure 6-2 had mapped the items onto theoretical domains that arose from the concept 
analysis and focus group study. Figure 6-2 identified three main components: firstly, 
egocentric aspects of self, specifically those components that contribute to having a 
coherent, satisfying and complete sense of oneself, with the second and third 
components both drawing on aspects of a sociocentric sense of self and an identity as 
shared with others. The second component focused mostly on a sense of respect, 
validation and acceptance by other people, with the third component taking a broader 
perspective of having a valued place in the world.  
The three factors in the current analysis did not completely align with these 




this framework. Factor 1 contained all the egocentric aspects of self but also 
specifically included questions on self-discrepancy. This is both from an internal 
perspective: D2r-Q13 “I sometimes behave in a way that doesn’t seem like me” but 
also included the sense of self-discrepancy that arises from an incongruence between 
your own view on yourself and that of others e.g. D2r-Q40 “Other people see me in 
the same way I see myself” and D2r-Q28 “I feel that people expect me to be someone 
I’m not”.  These items incorporate the sense of self we develop from other people’s 
perceptions of us, termed the ‘looking glass self’ by Cooley (1902). Thus, the key 
features of items in factor one appeared to pertain to a person’s internal sense of self, 
egocentric aspects, and the extent to which this is congruent with that person’s image 
of him or herself or other people’s apparent image of them (i.e. self-discrepancy).  
Factor 3, which contains only eight items, mapped exactly onto the subgroups 
concerning intimate relationships and family in the second component of Figure 6-2. 
Whereas the theoretical model placed the sense of respect, validation and acceptance 
derived from all relationships (intimate and more casual) together, the factor analysis 
seemed to indicate that intimate and family relationships make distinct contributions, 
with the measurement items attributable to friendships being separate from those of 
family relationships, and fitting better with a general sense of belonging. 
Factor 2 from the principal component analysis was the hardest to define. Items in this 
factor appeared to include those that focused on purpose, meaning, belonging and 
productivity. As such it contained many of the aspects of social identity theory 
previously discussed as well as aspects of what might be broadly considered 
‘spirituality’. Spirituality is being used here to refer to concerns about ultimate 
questions of life’s meaning and values, whether this is formalised as a religious belief 
or not (Collicutt McGrath, 2011).  
Many items loaded overwhelmingly onto one factor, whereas some other items loaded 
on two, or even all three of the factors and it was less clear which factor they should 
be placed with. Four items, displayed in Table 6-11 caused particular concern and 










Q34	I	know	where	I	fit	in	the	world	 .625	 .387	 	
Q43	I	am	able	to	express	myself	in	the	things	I	do	 .446	 .393	 	





D2r-Q34, “I know where I fit in the world” mapped best on to factor 2, the socially 
orientated factor, in the four factor matrix (factor 1 0.530, factor 2 0.598), but onto 
factor 1, the egocentrically orientated factor, in the three factor matrix (factor 1 0.625, 
factor 2 0.387) and would therefore appear to have areas of overlap with both factors. 
However, following the descriptions of the factors outlined above, on conceptual 
grounds this item would seem to sit best with the construct of factor 2 and ‘How I feel 
about my place in the world’. This item is more about belonging and knowledge of 
oneself in a relational sense to society rather than the more introspective items of 
factor 1. Therefore, this item was placed in factor 2 for the ongoing analysis. 
D2r-Q43 “I am able to express myself in the things I do” loaded onto both factors 1 
(0.446) and 2 (0.393), but more so onto factor 1. Again, this item had shown the 
reverse pattern in the 4 factor model (0.368 and 0.515 respectively). This item has an 
emphasis on doing and meaningful occupation as a means of sharing one’s identity 
with others and therefore conceptually aligns with the other items in factor 2. 
Therefore, this item was also placed in factor 2 for the ongoing analysis. 
D2r-Q35 “I am generally satisfied with my relationships with other people” loaded 
most heavily on factor 3, along with items about close personal and family 
relationships, but not with items about relationships with friends or the wider world. 
However, this item showed loadings of >0.3 on all three factors, with the loading on 
factor 3 at 0.43 being only marginally greater than factor 2 at 0.42. This item relates 




than the more specific focus on close personal relationships covered by the other items 
in factor 3 therefore it was placed in factor 2 for the ongoing analysis.  
D2r-Q42 “I feel I am labelled by others” has similar loadings on factor 1 (0.387) and 
factor 2 (0.327). It has similarities with the other items in factor 1 relating to the views 
of others e.g. D2r-Q40 “Other people see me in the same way I see myself” but unlike 
this item it is not looking at a sense of self-discrepancy but a sense of stigmatisation 
and a ‘spoiled’ (Goffman, 1963) social identity. It is for these reasons that this item 
fits better with factor 2.  
 All other items were placed within the factor on which they loaded most strongly in 
the 3 factor matrix for the ongoing Rasch analysis. The Rasch analysis was repeated 
using these three components as subscales, and thus examining them individually.  
The subscales were analysed separately but concurrently. This was because all 
subscales needed to work together, and it was assumed that this may have still 
required some items to be moved between the factors to find the optimal solution for 
all three. However, for ease of reading they will be presented sequentially. Class 
intervals were checked regularly for all analyses to ensure an even distribution of 
responses. The grouping of items into subscales as the starting point for the Rasch 









































































The initial analysis, shown in Table 6-7 had identified many items that needed 
rescoring due to a low number of responses in certain answer categories. This 
rescoring was retained for the subsequent subscale Rasch analyses. 
6.4.4 Egocentric	Subscale:	17	items	
Initial fit statistics (see Analysis F1,Table 6-13) were acceptable with mean item fit 
residual of 0.151 and mean person fit residual of -0.279. Item-trait chi-squared 
interaction probability was 0.668, confirming the hierarchical ordering of the items is 
maintained throughout the scale. The person separation index (PSI), which measures 
the power of the scale to discriminate between people of different abilities, is high at 
0.92. This suggests that the scale would be able to statistically differentiate between 4 
or more groups of patients (Fisher, 1992).  
Data quality: Assessment of category frequencies and thresholds revealed ordered 
thresholds but D2r-Q7 now had only nine responses in the highest value response 
category and needed rescoring in order to obtain stable item estimates (Analysis F1r). 
Persons with extreme scores are automatically excluded from the analysis by the 
RUMM software as their answers cannot give any further information. Many 
questions had needed rescoring after the initial analysis but D2r-Q7 was not one of 
these. When items are removed and a subgroup of items analysed the extreme scorers 
change, thus it was important to recheck the category response frequencies with every 
analysis. 
Person fit: The range for person fit residuals was -4.2 to +3.4, with 12 participants 
falling outside the -2.5 to +2.5 range.  
Item fit: All items had fit residuals within acceptable limits (+/- 2.5) and non-
significant chi-squared probabilities.  
Unidimensionality: On tests of unidimensionality 11 of 134 (8.21%) t tests were 
significant at the 5% cut off and the lower boundary of the 95% confidence interval 
falls at 4.5% which provides evidence of acceptable unidimensionality.  
Local dependency: There was no evidence of any local response dependency at 0.3 























































































The person-item threshold distribution for the scale, Figure 6-5, was analysed to see if 
the scale provided a good range of measurement. Items cover the range -2.5 logits to 
+3.0 logits with a small gap at around the zero logits mark, leading to a lack of 
precision of measurement, but overall the scale was shown to have a good 












Overall the egocentric subscale was performing well, showing good fit to the model, 
meeting the model’s expectations of invariance and unidimensionality. It was well 
targeted and had good discriminatory ability. 
6.4.5 Sociocentric	Subscale:	18	items	
Initial summary statistics (see Table 6-14, Analysis: F2) showed reasonable fit to the 
model with mean item fit -0.112 (SD 1.386) and mean person fit -0.452 (SD 1.734). 
The high person fit SD needs further examination by examining the individual person 
fit residuals. However, the summary statistics demonstrated a lack of invariance with a 
significant chi-squared interaction of <0.001 suggesting that the items are not working 
as expected across the different class intervals. 
Data Quality: D2r-Q45 had only 8 responses in the highest scoring category and 
therefore needs rescoring to obtain stable item estimates. Thresholds were ordered. 
Person fit: the person fit residuals ranged from -5.28 to 3.18. There were 18 
participants (14 extreme negative, 4 extreme positive) outside the range -2.5 to +2. 5. 
Interestingly 5/10 (50%) of those with a fit residual less than-3.0 had mild injuries. 
One reason for high negative residuals is participants who answer ‘too perfectly’, as 
the Rasch model expects a degree of uncertainty (Meijer & Sitsma, 2001). In this case 
desirability bias may be a factor, with participants giving the response that they think 
they should in these more socially orientated items, which may more likely occur with 
people who have more insight and less severe injuries. Alternatively, mild injuries 
may have led to fewer problems in this area. 
Item Fit: D2r-Q41 “I feel I am labelled by others” showed misfit with a fit 
residual=2.633, chi-squared probability 0.060.  
Unidimensionality: This subscale showed clear evidence of multidimensionality with 
19/132 (14.39%) t tests significant  at the 5% significance level. 
Local response dependency: There is evidence of significant (>0.3 above the average 
correlation) local dependency between the three ‘friends’ items (D2r-Q26, D2r-Q27, 
D2r-Q28) 














































































Analysis F2 showed several problems and poor fit to the Rasch model. In response, 
D2r-Q45 was rescored (analysis F2R in Table 6-14), but a problem with invariance 
and unidimensionality remained.  
Next, the problems with local dependency for the ‘friends’ items (D2r-Q26-28) was 
addressed. During the interviews one major problem was that people reported having 
no friends and this caused difficulties choosing how to answer. To address these issues 
and the local dependency D2r-Q26 “I have friends who accept me for who I am” was 
retained (as the slightly different wording meant it could be answered whether or not 
you had friends) and D2r-Q27 “I feel valued by my friends” and D2r-Q28 “I feel 
respected by my friends” were deleted (analysis f2a in Table 6-15, Table 6-18).  
Analysis f2a: deleting D2r-Q27, D2r-Q28 
Summary statistics: The data still did not meet the model’s requirements (chi-squared 
interaction probability 0.002).  
Item fit: D2r-Q45 “I wish there were more people in my life” was the worst fitting 
item: fit residual = 2.192, chi-square probability 0.003, and accounted for significant 
misfit for 2 out of 4 people with fit residuals >2.5. The item characteristic curve 
(Figure 6-6) shows classic under discrimination suggesting that this item is not that 










Unidimensionality: the scale is still multidimensional with 10.6% t tests significant 
(lower 95% confidence interval at 6.9%). 
Local dependency: The issues with local dependency were resolved with no 
significant local dependency detected. 
D2r-Q45 was showing evidence of poor fit to the model, and had received dubious 
feedback during the interviews, therefore, it was deleted and the analysis re-run 
(analysis f2b in Table 6-15, Table 6-18). 
Analysis f2b: deleting D2r-Q45 
Summary statistics: The Item fit residual -0.100 (1.250) and person fit residual 0.455 
(1.617) are acceptable and the invariance of the scale was much improved, chi squared 
interaction probability 0.023.  
Item Fit: D2r-Q42 “I feel I am labelled by others” now showed significant misfit (fit 




Unidimensionality: 9.09% of t-tests were significant, with the lower bound confidence 
interval at 5.4% still showing unacceptable multidimensionality in the data. 
Local dependency: There was no local dependency 
DIF: There was no DIF.  
D2r-Q42 was also removed due to item misfit. Results are shown in Table 6-15, 
analysis f2c.  
Analysis f2c: deleting D2r-Q42 
Summary statistics: Item fit residual was -0.097 (1.193) and person fit residual was -
0.516 (1.689) showing good fit and the chi-squared interaction is now non-significant 
= 0.282, proving the scale is invariant. 
Person fit: range from -2.705 to 4.203 (with 7 participants > 2.5), 4 participants scored 
maximally. 
Item fit: D2r-Q2 “I know what is important to me” showed some misfit with a fit 
residual of 2.761, chi-square probability 0.010.  
Unidimensionality: Tests for unidimensionality were acceptable with 6.87% (95% CI 




































0.002	 10.61%	 0.89	 D2r-Q45	removed	(worst	fitting	item)	
F2b	 15	 2,	26,	30,	32,	33,	34,	35,	36,	
37,	38,	39,	40,	42,	43,	44	
47.4	(30)	 0.022	 9.09%	 0.90	 D2r-Q42	removed	(worst	fitting	item)	
F2c	 14	 2,	26,	30,	32,	33,	34,	35,	36,	
37,	38,	39,	40,	43,	44	
31.8	(28)	 0.282	 6.87%	 0.90	 	




The person-item threshold map for analysis F2c was examined, and is shown in Figure 
6-7 
This shows some evidence of floor and ceiling effects for this scale, with some 
participants lying outside of the range of measurement. However, the scale did cover a 
good range from -2.5 logits to +3.0 logits although the precision in the middle of this 
range around the 0 logits mark was less, due to there being few items in this area. 
Overall, the 14 items of the sociocentric scale were working well, fitting the Rasch 












Initial summary statistics: Initial fit statistics are acceptable and all the items are 
working across all class intervals (chi-square probability 0.092), analysis F3, shown in 
Table 6-16, Table 6-18. 
Data quality: there is was a significant ceiling effect with 18 participants scoring 
maximally, the sample size for the analysis was therefore 118. Thresholds were 
ordered. D2r-Q22 and D2r-Q24 also had low category response frequencies and 
needed rescoring. 
Person Fit: ranged from -3.691 to 3.908, with 25 out of the amended sample size of 
118 falling outside the range -2.5 to +2.5 






































































Unidimensionality: This subscale meets the requirements for unidimensionality with 
2/118 (1.69%) t-tests significant at the 5% level. 
Local Dependency: There was significant local dependency between D2r-Q22 “My 
family have a good understanding of who I am” and D2r-Q23 “My family accepts me 
for who I am” at greater than 0.3 above the average residual correlation.  
Analysis F3R: D2r-Q22 and D2r-Q24 were rescored (see Table 6-16, Table 6-18) 
Summary Statistics: Item fit residual mean -0.340 (1.241) and person fit residual mean 
was 0.527(1.446). The item-trait interaction statistic demonstrates a lack of invariance 
with a significant chi-squared probability of 0.027.  
Data Quality: Thresholds were ordered and all categories had a minimum of 10 
responses. 
Person Fit: Person fit residuals ranged from -3.96 to 2.43. Twelve participants had a fit 
residual less than -2.5. 
Item Fit: D2r-Q21 “I have a close relationship with someone who makes me feel 
valued as a person” was the worst fitting item with a fit residual of 1.450 and a 
significant chi-squared probability =0.001. This was mostly accounted for by the 
participants with the lowest ability in class interval 1. 
Unidimensionality: Only 2/117 t tests were significant at the 5% significance level, 
indicating acceptable unidimensionality. 
Local Dependency: There was evidence of significant local dependency between D2r-
Q22 “My family have a good understanding of who I am” and D2r-Q23 “My family 
accepts me for who I am” with a residual correlation of 0.20, which is above the cut 
off of 0.16 (0.3 above the average correlation). 
DIF: There was no evidence of any DIF  
D2r-Q21 was removed due to misfit and the analysis re-run (Analysis F3a in Table 
6-17, Table 6-18). 




Summary Statistics: This showed improved chi-squared interaction p value of 0.909 
Data Quality: Twenty participants now had extreme scores, i.e. had scored maximally 
and thus the sample size for the analysis was reduced to 115, as these extreme scorers 
contribute no further information to the Rasch analysis.  
Person Fit:  Twenty participants had a fit residual lower than -2.5. Range -3.50- +2.23. 
Item Fit: There were no misfitting items 
Unidimensionality: There were no significant t-tests 
Local Dependency: D2r-Q19 & D2r-Q20 and D2r-Q22 & D2r-Q23 both had a residual 
correlation more than 0.3 above the average correlation. 
DIF: There was no evidence of any DIF. 
One way of dealing with local dependency is to group the dependent items together in 
RUMM and form a subtest. The analysis was re-run with D2r-Q19 & 20 grouped as 





























































Analysis F3b: Subtest analysis, combining D2r-Q19 and D2r-Q20 
Summary statistics: The summary statistics for the tests are shown in Table 6-17, 
Table 6-18. In analysis F3b, the mean item fit residual was -0.219 (1.119) and person 
fit residual was -0.543 (1.321) with the item-trait chi-squared probability not 
significant at 0.689.  
Data Quality: Thresholds ordering is not checked in a subtest analysis, as it is not 
expected that the thresholds should be ordered when combining dependent items to 
form a subtest (RUMM Laboratory, 2016)  
Person Fit:  This was acceptable with the fit residuals range -2.94 to +2.43 
Item Fit: All items showed acceptable fit statistics. 
Unidimensionality: There was evidence of multidimensionality in the scale with 
11/114 t-tests significant. 
Local Dependence: There was evidence of local dependency between D2r-Q22 “My 
family have a good understanding of who I am” and D2r-Q23 “My family accepts me 
for who I am”. 
The subtest analysis had removed some of the issues with local dependence but at the 
expense of a loss of unidimensionality. It was therefore decided not to pursue subtest 
analysis and to manage the local dependency in analysis F3a by deleting the dependent 
items sequentially. 
Analysis F3c: based on analysis F3a, deleting D2r-Q19 
Summary statistics: The mean item residual was -0.500 (1.126) and the mean person 
residual was -0.808 (1.719). Chi-squared interaction probability was not significant at 
0.682. The PSI was lower than the other scales at 0.78 but this was still acceptable.  
Data Quality: No issues were apparent. 
Person Fit: Fit residuals ranged from -3.76 to +1.79. 25 participants had extreme 
negative fit residuals. This probably reflected the fact that these participants had 




Item fit: There were no misfitting items. 
Unidimensionality: 3/109 (2.75%) t-tests were significant, which provides evidence of 
acceptable unidimensionality. It should be noted, however, that the number of 
thresholds in each subtest was lower than the recommended 12 as there are only six 
items in this subscale. 
Local dependency: There was evidence of local dependency between D2r-Q18 and 
D2r-Q20, with residual correlation of 0.13, just above the acceptable cut off of 0.10 
DIF: There was no evidence of DIF. 
The local dependency among the items specifying ‘people who are important to me’ 
was still an issue; by removing D2r-Q19 the correlation between D2r-Q18 and Q20 
had become more prominent. D2r-Q19 & 20 and D2r-Q22 & 23 had both had 
problems with dependency in analysis f3a, therefore the next analysis deleted an item 
specifying ‘family’, D2r-Q22, to try and resolve the dependency problems. 
Analysis F3d: based on analysis F3a, deleting D2r-Q22  
Summary statistics: There was good fit to the model with mean item fit residual 0.233 
(0.762) and mean person fit residual -0.549 (1.294 The scale is invariant with item-
trait chi-squared probability of 0.360. PSI is 0.79 indicating the scale would have the 
ability to discriminate between 2 or possibly 3 distinct groups of participants. 
Data quality:  Twenty participants scored maximally, showing a ceiling effect of the 
measure.  One hundred and fifteen participants’ responses therefore contributed to the 
remainder of the analysis. 
Person Fit: Residuals ranged from -2.93 to +1.94 
Item Fit: There were no misfitting items 
Unidimensionality:  6/114 (5.26%, lower 95% confidence interval = 1.3%) were 
significant, providing evidence of acceptable unidimensionality. However, again the 
number of thresholds in this subscale is below the recommended level for PCA/ t-test 




Local Dependency: There was no evidence of local dependency  
DIF: There was no evidence of DIF 
The fit was satisfactory and the local dependency solved. The person-item threshold 
distribution (Figure 6-8). was examined to evaluate the targeting and precision of the 
scale. The Relational scale only consists of six items, and showed good targeting and 
ability to measure across a wide range -3.0 logits to +3.0 logits. Floor and ceiling 
effects were apparent with several participants falling outside of this range. This scale 
showed poor precision however with no items able to discriminate between people 
falling in the -1.0 logits to +1.0 logits range.   
Problems with limited precision in the Relational subscale can be explained by the 
small number of items that ended up correlating in this subscale. The Relational 
subscale ended with only six items and its ability to adequately differentiate between 
people was therefore limited. This was reflected in the lower PSI (0.79) compared 
with the Egocentric subscale (0.91) and Sociocentric subscale (0.86). This scale needs 
developing further with the addition of more items to try and provide a greater breadth 




























Initial		 0	(0.634)	 0.654	(1.227)	 0.077	(1.641)	 -0.480	(2.351)	 0.002	 0.96	 30/136	(22.06)	 	
F1	 0	(0.425)	 0.031	(1.389)	 0.151	(1.039)	 -0.279	(1.463)	 0.652	 0.92	 10/134	(7.46)	 0.038	
F1R*	 0	(0.393)	 0.093	(1.392)	 0.166	(1.045)	 -0.271	(1.458)	 0.668	 0.91	 11/134	(8.21)	 0.045	
F2	 0	(0.436)	 0.200	(1.363)	 -0.112	(1.386)	 -0.452	(1.734)	 0.000	 0.91	 19/132	(14.39)	 0.107	
F2R*	 0	(0.432)	 0.273	(1.392)	 -0.119	(1.284)	 -0.430	(1.708)	 0.006	 0.90	 20/132	(15.15)	 0.114	
F2a	 0	(0.454)	 0.263	(1.374)	 -0.101	(1.321)	 -0.410	(1.619)	 0.002	 0.89	 14/132	(10.61)	 0.069	
F2b	 0	(0.458)	 0.225	(1.435)	 -0.100	(1.250)	 -0.455	(1.617)	 0.023	 0.89	 12/132	(9.09)	 0.054	
F2c	 0	(0.440)	 0.179	(1.446)	 -0.097	(1.193)	 -0.516	(1.689)	 0.282	 0.89	 9/135	(6.87)	 0.030	
F3	 0	(0.676)	 0.377	(1.888)	 -0.341	(1.285)	 -0.539	(1.457)	 0.092	 0.88	 2/118	(1.69)	 -	
F3R*	 0	(0.517)	 0.160	(1.885)	 -0.340	(1.241)	 -0.527	(1.446)	 0.027	 0.84	 2/117	(1.71)	 -	
F3a	 0	(0.533)	 0.175	(1.964)	 -0.362	(1.173)	 -0.643	(1.497)	 0.909	 0.83	 0/115	 -	
F3b	 0	(0.374)	 0.273	(1.951)	 -0.219	(1.119)	 -0.543	(1.324)	 0.689	 0.83	 1/115	(0.87)	 -	
F3c	 0	(0.339)	 0.288	(1.854)	 -0.500	(1.126)	 -0.808	(1.719)	 0.682	 0.78	 3/130	(2.31)	 -	





At the end of Rasch analysis, 37 of the original 45 items had been placed into one of 
three subscales. It is worthwhile just taking a moment to review the discarded items 
before moving on. These are shown in Table 6-19 along with the rationale for the 






















The end result of the iterative process of Rasch analysis was the generation of three 
separate unidimensional subscales looking at different aspects of sense of self after 
TBI: an Egocentric subscale, a Sociocentric subscale and a Relational subscale. The 
Egocentric subscale is comprised of 17 items and looks at internal aspects of self and 
self-discrepancy. The Sociocentric subscale, has 14 items addressing belonging, 
purpose and meaning in life. Lastly the Relational subscale has only 6 items but these 
look at the sense of respect, understanding and acceptance derived from close 
interpersonal relationships. A summary table of the all the analyses performed on 
these three subscales is shown in Table 6-18. 

















































These 37 retained items work as three separate unidimensional scales. A final analysis 
was performed looking at the possibility of re-combining these items to a single scale. 
This was run both with the 37 individual items, and with each subscale as a subtest. 
The scoring structure for the subscales was retained for these analyses. The summary 
statistics are shown in Table 6-21. Combining all the subscale items together as a 
single 37 item scale does not meet the criteria for unidimensionality. However, when 
combined into three subtests fit to the model is improved. There is insufficient data 
currently to generate stable threshold estimates in the combined analysis: the standard 
errors around the threshold estimates for the subtest analysis are large (>1.0 logit at the 
extremes, ~0.6 logit in the mid-range) meaning that the standard error of measurement 
of this combined scale is poor currently across the range of the scale. Therefore, while 
this provides preliminary evidence that combining the subscales together in this 
manner to generate a single BISOSS score could be valid, using the BISOSS as three 





















































Several items got rescored during the Rasch analysis. The rescoring was done due to 
low frequency of responses in certain answer categories to ensure that all answer 
categories had at least ten responses in them so that the location estimates generated 
would be stable. There was no issue with disordered thresholds.  
The scoring structure that was used is shown on the BISOSS scoring template (see 
Appendix B). This can be used to calculate a total raw score for a participant.  
RUMM 2030 provided a conversion table for raw scores to logit scores for the scales. 
However, logit scores are less intuitive to interpret as they include negative numbers 
so to make the scores more accessible for the user it is possible to convert the logit 
score back to a more familiar scale for example using the original score range, or a 0-
100 scale. A conversion table has been constructed to convert the scores back to the 
range available for the raw scores e.g. for the 17 items of the Egocentric subscale the 
range is 0-43. By keeping the same scoring range as the original scale the scoring error 
is not inflated as it would be if a scale that was originally scored on 0-12 scale, as the 
relational scale, was converted to a 0-100 scale. These transformed scores form an 
interval level scale.  
This transformation from the logit score to a more meaningful scale is done utilising 
the formula : 
! = # + % ∗ '()*+	%-(./ 	
Where	s=	wanted	range/	current	range	
m=(wanted	minimum)-	current	minimum*s	
A conversion table was then created using Excel to provide an easy way of converting 
from the raw score to the amended interval scale score (see Appendix B). For 
example, a person scoring 28/43 on their raw score for the Egocentric subscale would 






In Chapter 5, five theoretical predictions were presented about how the BISOSS 
should correlate with other measures and these were summarised in Table 5-2.  These 
five predictions were designed to test the construct validity of the sense of self 
measure and were made prior to the psychometric analysis in accordance with 
consensus-based standards for the selection of health measurement instruments 
(COSMIN) guidelines (Mokkink et al., 2009). However, these predictions were made 
with the assumption that Rasch analysis would result in a single sense of self scale.  
As the Rasch analysis in fact resulted in three separate subscales, the predictions for 
construct validity testing needed to be revised.  The adjusted predictions are 
summarised in Table 6-22. Predictions were tested mainly using the three separate 
subscale  Rasch- transformed scores, but also tested against the combined total Rasch-
transformed BISOSS score generated from the 3 subtest analysis. (This was really just 
for comparison, acknowledging that the person location estimates generated from the 
combined BISOSS score were subject to a much larger standard error of measurement 
than the estimates from the subscale score. The factor analysis also provided some 
support for the validity of regarding the total score as a useful measure, although at the 








































Thus, the SOC is designed to provide an overarching assessment of orientation to life, 
whereas the individual subscales of the BISOSS now have a narrower focus so the 
correlation would be expected to be less than for an overall sense of self score. The 
Relational subscale, with which it has the least overlap with its emphasis on 
interpersonal relationships would be expected to correlate the least with SOC. These 
amended predictions were clearly made after the Rasch analysis of the BISOSS, but 
prior to any correlation analyses.  






































Correlation with D2r-Q1: 
D2r-Q1 was a general opening statement “I feel I have problems with my self-identity 
or I am unsure about who I am.” This question was not included in the Rasch analysis 
and the score was not summed into the BISOSS scores; it was used purely for 
construct validity testing. Participants’ responses are summarised in Table 6-24. This 




scoring a maximum score of 3 through to a score of 0 for participants strongly 
agreeing with this statement. A high score on question 1 therefore reflects no 
perceived problems with sense of self and should correlate with a high score on the 
BISOSS. There was a significant correlation for all three subscales. The Egocentric 
scale shows a strong correlation with ρ=0.639, a moderate correlation for the 
Sociocentric scale (ρ=0.528) and a weak-moderate correlation for the Relational scale 
(ρ=0.390). Moderate correlations had been predicted for all three subscales. 














Correlation with SOC-13 
Fifty-four participants were also asked to complete the SOC-13. These participants 
were quasi-randomly selected by using consecutively recruited participants in the UK. 
Four participants were unable to complete the SOC-13 as they found the questions too 
challenging or were too fatigued. The demographic data for this group is presented in 
Table 6-25. This subgroup has very similar characteristics to the group as a whole.  
There was no significant correlation observed for any of the BISOSS subscales with 
the SOC-13, which could be for a variety of reasons. The proposed theoretical 
correlation was with a total sense of self score, with both scales (sense of self and 
sense of coherence) looking at a global orientation to life with a strong sense of self 
giving purpose and meaning in life and contributing to a strong sense of coherence.  
However, the BISOSS is composed of three separate subscales, each looking at a 
specific dimension of sense of self and as such the theoretical link between the scales 
would be less. There were also some significant concerns about the validity of 
responses on the SOC-13 as a number of the participants struggled with this measure’s 
format. Guidelines for measurement development now suggest that items should not 
require reading skills beyond that of a 12 year old (Terwee et al., 2007) and it is 
unlikely that the SOC-13 would fulfil this requirement. These issues are explored 




































Assessing the predictions on meaningful occupation and family relationships 
Employment status, GOSe question 6 “Are they able to resume regular social and 
leisure activities outside home?”  and GOSe question 7 “Has there been family and 
friendship disruption due to psychological problems?” were also looked at for 
construct validity testing (see table 5-2 for summary of predictions). Independent 
sample t-tests were run using person estimates (i.e. the Rasch transformed score) from 
each of the three subscales as well as the combined BISOSS person estimate, with 
p<0.05 taken to indicate a significant difference between the two groups being 
analysed. 
The participants were grouped into a ‘meaningful occupation’ group (MO) and a ‘not 
meaningfully occupied’ group (NMO) according to their responses on the 
demographic sheet. Participants who were retired were excluded from this analysis.  
One hundred and twenty-five participants were included in the analysis, 54 of whom 
reported having some meaningful occupation (MO). Levene’s test for equality of 
variances showed that equal variances could be assumed for all analyses.  
Egocentric Scale in NMO group: mean -0.17, SD 1.29; Egocentric Scale in MO group: 
mean 0.41, SD 1.58; t(123)= -2.25, p=0.026 
Sociocentric Scale in NMO group: mean -0.23, SD 1.46: Sociocentric Scale in MO 
group: mean 0.89, SD 1.66; t(123)= -3.99, p<0.001 
Relational scale in NMO group: mean-0.13, SD 2.34; Relational scale in MO group: 
mean 0.98, SD 2.44; t(123)= -2.59, p=0.011 
Total BISOSS in NMO group: mean 0.04, SD 0.51; Total BISOSS in MO group: 
mean 0.30, SD 0.48; t(122)= -2.92, p=0.004 
The analyses show a statistically significant difference (p<0.05) between the groups 
tested for all subscales. This supports the assertion that participants reporting 
meaningful occupation score more highly on the BISOSS self-identity measure, both 
on total score and on all subscales, than those who do not.  
GOSe Question 6 asks: “Are they able to resume regular social and leisure activities 




response to this question. One hundred and twenty-four participants provided an 
answer for this question, with 82 reporting that they had not resumed social and leisure 
activities. Levene’s test for equality of variances suggested that equal variances cannot 
be assumed for the Egocentric scale, but could be assumed for the other two BISOSS 
subscales. The results presented for the Egocentric scale, therefore, do not assume 
equal variance.  
Egocentric Scale & No: Mean -0.31, SD 1.24; Egocentric Scale & Yes: Mean 0.90, 
SD 1.61; t(66.4)= 4.26, p<0.001.  
Sociocentric scale & No: Mean -0.01, SD 1.45; Sociocentric Scale & Yes: Mean 0.84, 
SD 1.91; t(122)= 2.76, p=0.007.  
Relational Scale & No: Mean 0.19, SD 2.62; Relational scale & Yes: Mean 0.84, SD 
2.11; t(122)= 1.39, p=0.167. 
Total BISOSS & No: Mean 0.05, SD 0.45; Total BISOSS & Yes: Mean 0.39, SD 0.57; 
t(121)= -3.62, p<0.001 
The hypothesis that participants unable to resume regular social and leisure activities 
would score lower on the BISOSS has been proven true for the Egocentric and 
Sociocentric subscales, however the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for the 
Relational subscale. There is no significant difference between the mean scores on the 
Relational subscale for the two groups of participants. This could be due to a problem 
with the theoretical link between the ability to undertake leisure activities and sense of 
self derived from interpersonal relationships, or it could be due to a problem with the 
measurement properties of the Relational subscale.  
Question 7 on the GOSe asks “Has there been family or friendship disruption due to 
psychological problems?”. The participants were split into two groups on the basis of 
their response to this question. One hundred and twenty-three participants provided 
responses to this question, with 58 participants reporting disruption to relationships. 
Levene’s test for equality of variances showed that equal variances could be assumed 




Egocentric scale & Yes: Mean -0.50, SD 1.32; Egocentric scale & No: Mean 0.66, SD 
1.39; t(121)= 4.71, p<0.001.  
Sociocentric scale & Yes: Mean -0.28, SD 1.40; Sociocentric scale & No: Mean 0.77, 
SD 1.74; t(121)= 3.66, p<0.001.  
Relational Scale & Yes: Mean -0.83, SD 2.22; Relational scale & No: Mean 1.56, SD 
2.13; t(121)= 6.12, p<0.001. 
Total BISOSS & Yes: Mean -0.09, SD 0.46; Total BISOSS & No: Mean 0.39, SD 
0.47; t(120)= -5.61, p<0.001 
There was a significant difference in the BISOSS scores between the groups for all 
analyses, confirming the hypothesis that participants reporting disruption to family or 
friendships have a lower score on the BISOSS measure of self-identity. 



































































Lastly, the relationship between the three factors of the BISOSS was explored using 
Pearson’s Correlation co-efficient as they are all interval level scales (Table 6-27).  
Table	6-27:	Correlations	between	the	three	factors	of	BISOSS,	using	Pearson’s	
correlation	co-efficient,	two-tailed	test	
	 Egocentric	 Sociocentric	 Relational	
Egocentric	 1.00	 0.770**	 0.577**	
Sociocentric	 	 1.00	 0.642**	
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
	
There is a strong correlation (Pearson’s correlation co-efficient>0.6) between the 
Sociocentric scales and both the Egocentric and Relational scales. The correlation 
between the Egocentric and Relational scales is less at 0.577 but this still represents a 
moderate correlation between the two subscales. These correlations also lend support 





The BISOSS was easy to administer and well-received and many participants reported 
problems with their self-identity. The three factor structure suggested by the 
theoretical framework is supported by both the factor analysis and Rasch analysis. The 
three factors form three valid, unidimensional subscales that have been termed: 
Egocentric, Sociocentric and Relational subscales. The Egocentric and Sociocentric 
subscales both have a good spread of items, forming useful measurement tools. 
However, the Relational subscale has only 6 items and does not provide precise 
measurement, particularly in the mid-range of the scale. 
Results of construct validity testing were mixed, with correlations between BISOSS 
scores and overall impression of self-identity as predicted but there was no correlation 
with SOC scores. The t-tests confirmed the predictions that work status and 
relationship disruption would affect BISOSS scores, however the relationship with 
leisure activities was more complex. The three scales of the BISOSS, while looking at 
separate components of self-identity are highly correlated and a total overall BISOSS 
score also fits the Rasch model when the three scales are combined as subtests. 
However, there is insufficient data in the current study and the standard error of 
measurement for the thresholds is unacceptably high in the combined scale. 
As a side note, the ease of administration of BISOSS, especially when compared with 
SOC supports the use of tools designed explicitly for participants with TBI or other 





This thesis set out to address some important issues in the assessment of outcomes 
following TBI. Self-identity change has been highlighted as an area of concern for 
many survivors of TBI and an area that is currently poorly addressed by rehabilitation 
services and for which there has been no suitable measurement tools. It was the aim of 
this thesis to explore what is meant by feeling ‘changed as a person’ following TBI 
and to see whether this was a construct that was, in theory, measurable, and if so to 
devise a scale to do so. The literature presented at the beginning of this thesis, and in 
particular the systematic review of studies of identity change after TBI (Beadle et al., 
2016) underscored the lack of appropriate assessment tools and the heterogeneity in 
the current research approaches. 
It has been necessary to be somewhat narrow in focus. Questions such as ’What is a 
self?’ and ‘How is self construed and represented in neuropsychological terms?’ are 
outside the remit of this thesis. This thesis has focused instead on the experience of a 
change in self-identity expressed by survivors of traumatic brain injury. While the 
analysis of brain lesions has led to many developments in our understanding of the 
functioning of various parts of the brain, extreme caution must be exercised in 
extrapolating information gained from functioning in impaired states to functioning in 
health. Therefore, the discussions on self-identity and sense of self in this chapter 
merely apply to the changes subjectively experienced after TBI and are not intended to 
try to answer the questions of how self is construed, in a neurobiological sense, in 
health.  
The aims of this thesis, as presented in Chapter 2, were as follows: 
• to attempt to define self-identity change after TBI as a construct 
• to examine the attributes of the concept of self-identity and determine 
if it is, in principle, measureable 
• to refine and expand on the questionnaire items in Draft 1 of the 
measure in order to assess the concept of self-identity change after TBI 




• to utilise modern measurement theory to assess and validate the 
questionnaire items to produce a useful clinical tool through which to 
assess self-identity change after TBI. 
The former two aims relate to the scientific task of construct definition and will be 
discussed first, while the latter two relate to the instrumental task of measurement 
construction, and will be addressed later in this chapter. 
7.1:	Scientific	task:	Conceptual	work	and	study	design	
The first question addressed in this thesis was whether is it possible to define the 
changed sense of self after TBI, and if so, what a conceptual definition for this might 
be. The scientific task of defining the construct must precede the measurement task, 
and was an essential first step to operationalisation of the concept. Alongside this task 
was the question of whether sense of self could be viewed as a continuous variable, i.e. 
whether is it feasible to have more or less of this construct, and therefore is this 
something that could be measured.  
A formal concept analysis was undertaken. This proved to be very important in the 
development of the measure as it led to significant changes to Draft 1 of the 
questionnaire, but is a step that is often overlooked in new measurement development 
(Michell, 1997). The qualitative work with people with TBI that had been undertaken 
prior to the start of this project ensured that the focus of the items was on the lived 
experience of people with TBI and their voices were essential in creating items that 
resonated with others with this condition. Streiner and Norman (2008) emphasised the 
importance of sound item development, recommending several sources for item 
development, and these guidelines have been followed closely throughout this project. 
The initial theoretical and conceptual work in Chapter 4 was key to define and 
delineate identity change after TBI from similar concepts such as self-esteem and self-
awareness. The refinement of the questionnaire that was undertaken in light of these 
findings focused the items towards a single construct, with the aim of achieving a 
unidimensional scale of measurement. Three broad areas of this construct emerged: 
two inter-twined internal aspects of self: egocentric and socio-centric self and then an 
external ‘self-as-shared’ component, relating more to other people’s perception and 




Chapter 6) produced similar findings, grouping items into egocentric, interpersonal 
and social domains adding weight to this conceptualisation. Draft 2r of the 
questionnaire consisted of 45 scored items, and of these 37 have been retained and 
organised into three valid, unidimensional scales, emphasising the impact that the 
conceptual work had on clarifying and refining the items prior to the quantitative 
analysis. 
As well as highlighting the distinction between sense of self and related concepts, the 
theoretical analysis also assisted in clarifying which aspect of self-identity the new 
scales measured. Self-identity is a complex construct and cannot be summed in a 
single score: it has qualitative and quantitative components. Nonetheless, the three 
scales of BISOSS combine together to provide an overall assessment of strength of 
sense of self. The process of questionnaire development and concept analysis served to 
focus the research question from a general aim (i.e. Is it possible to develop a measure 
of self-identity change after TBI?) to a much more specific target of quantification 
(strength of self-identity).  
Self-identity research in TBI often focuses on individual personality characteristics 
and how these have been impacted (Beadle et al., 2016). However, the analysis of 
qualitative studies, conducted as part of the concept analysis (presented in Chapter 4) 
prompted a move away from the specifics of what aspects of an individual’s 
personality had changed towards the internal impact of those changes in terms of how 
one feels about oneself. Thus, for example, BISOSS was developed towards enquiring 
about a person’s sense of continuity at a single point in time rather than asking about 
memory problems or periods of amnesia; towards asking about feeling of being in 
control rather than about symptoms of emotional lability. Nomenclature was 
challenging, so the term ‘sense of self’ was introduced to distinguish from descriptive 
measures of self-concept. The concept analysis promoted a move away from ‘loss of 
self’ as a label and suggested instead the use of the term ‘change in sense of self’ 
following TBI which was defined as: ‘A change in one's inner subjective experience as 
a result of changes in egocentric or sociocentric aspects of self, or in the relationship 
with one’s identity as shared with others. These changes are of sufficient magnitude 
that a process of evaluation, acceptance and adaptation is required to regain a unified 




operationalisation and the latter cannot define the former, but data from studies 
operationalising a concept can still provide some useful insights. In light of the 
analysis presented in Chapter 6, for instance, the above definition of a ‘change in sense 
of self’ might be amended to: ‘a change in one’s inner subjective experience as a result 
of changes in egocentric or sociocentric aspects of self or in one’s relationships with 
others’. The emphasis is not on the content of the self, but rather the overarching sense 
having a clear and coherent picture and of knowing oneself. Thus I have used the 
adjectives ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ to describe the two ends of these scales, with the 
BISOSS providing a measure of overall strength of sense of self.  
Due to the lack of validated tools for assessing self-identity change following TBI, 
studies have been using surrogate markers such as self-concept and so failing to 
capture the full picture of identity change; potentially producing misleading results 
regarding the impact of TBI on sense of self. In order to have acceptable content 
validity a tool must sample the entire domain of the construct under examination not 
just parts of it (Streiner, 2003).  In the concept analysis, self-concept sits within self-
identity as a component of it, but fails to encompass all of the egocentric features of 
self-identity such as sense of continuity, distinctiveness and agency as well as the 
social and interpersonal aspects of self-identity that this study has identified. Self-
esteem was separated from the conceptual definition of self-identity as being an 
outcome rather than part of the construct. The conceptualisation and development of 
the BISOSS tool has aligned the description of self-identity change in qualitative 
studies with a measurement tool enabling subsequent quantitative research to explore 
this issue more authentically.  
The results of the concept analysis, presented in Chapter 4, suggested that strength of 
sense of self after TBI would have an underlying quantitative structure and thus, in 
principle be measureable. This conclusion was indeed supported by the Rasch analysis 
findings in Chapter 6. Thus, the concept of strength of sense of self developed and was 
consolidated throughout this thesis, with the concept analysis being an essential step in 
this process.  Paying close attention to developing and applying a conceptual 
definition paid dividends later on in the development of the measure.  This illustrates 





This study is firmly based in measurement theory, ensuring the development of a 
scientifically sound interval level measure. Rasch analysis has been used to formally 
test the unidimensionality of the subscales of BISOSS ensuring that summation to 
produce a total score for each subscale is mathematically valid. These scales will 
support the use of parametric statistics and therefore calculations of means and 
standard deviations and thus be able to quantify change over time.  
The HISDS (Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984) has been the most commonly used 
measure of self-concept change and self-discrepancy following TBI in previous 
studies (Beadle et al., 2016). This utilises a semantic differential scale to capture 
subjective changes to self-concept, and has the option to rate current, past and future 
self. The issues with retrospective reporting were discussed in the Background section 
and will not be re-iterated here. The HISDS has been shown to have good internal 
consistency, Cronbach’s alpha (version 3)=0.93 (E. Carroll & Coetzer, 2011) but it has 
a multifactorial structure. In the initial paper (Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984) the items 
were interpreted as separate scales with results displayed as a plot comparing current, 
past and future scores on the same items. It provides information as to the breadth of 
changes experienced, with self-concept  viewed as a multidimensional construct with 
physical, emotional, energetic and mastery characteristics covered (Doering, Conrad, 
Rief, & Exner, 2011)Results from subsequent studies however, have been presented as 
a single, summed score (e.g. E. Carroll & Coetzer, 2011) to try to quantify self-
concept change. From a measurement perspective, there are serious concerns about the 
validity of summing together the items to produce one single total score and what this 
single score would represent.  
The HISDS can  provide a framework for future therapy (Tyerman & Humphrey, 
1984) and an indication of perceived change in self-concept or self discrepancy, which 
is allied to self-identity but distinct from it. Results should be interpreted as individual 
scales and not summed to produce a total. This serves to illustrate the importance of 
considering the specific research questions that a study is hoping to address when 
selecting the outcome tools to be used, e.g. quantification of a change, in which case 
an interval level measure is needed, versus description of types of changes 




after TBI is a complex issue, with both qualitative and quantitative components that 
require examination in many ways. Tools like BISOSS and HISDS each look at one 
component of this change and should be viewed as providing different but 
complementary data. This data can be combined to build a more complete picture to 
enable evaluation of the nature and extent of changes in strength of sense of self and 
self-concept following TBI, and can be used to examine how these two constructs 
interact. Theoretically, someone reporting a sense of self-discrepancy, as indicated by 
differences in their current and past self-concept on the HISDS, should have a weak 
sense of self as measured with BISOSS, and this relationship could be explored further 
in future research. 
7.2.1 Three	subscales:	What	they	are	and	how	they	relate	to	other	concepts	
The initial qualitative study (Levack et al. 2014), the concept analysis (Chapter 4) and 
the quantitative analysis of data during item testing (Chapter 6) were broadly similar 
in that they shared three dimensions related to self-reported change in self-identity 
following TBI. The qualitative study expressed these different dimensions as ‘How I 
feel about myself’, ‘How other people treat me’ and ‘How I view my place in the 
world’ and these descriptions capture the essence of each subscale. The factor analysis 
and subsequent Rasch analysis developed three inter-related subscales termed 
‘Egocentric subscale’; ‘Sociocentric subscale’ and ‘Relational subscale’; however, the 
phrasing above has been retained on the BISOSS questionnaire sheet as these 
expressions convey the essence of each subscale in a more user-friendly manner.   
Egocentric	Subscale	(BISOSS-E):	
The easiest to succinctly define, BISOSS-E is an individualistically orientated factor, 
that incorporated most of the items from the first section of the original questionnaire 
‘how I feel about myself’ along with items relating to self-discrepancy from other 
sections. This factor addresses the internal aspects of self, including self-concept 
illustrated in Figure 4-2, but also included items such as “I feel that people expect me 
to be someone I’m not” and “Other people see me in the same way I see myself” which 
address a sense of discomfort that arises when our own self-image does not align with 
other people’s perception of us. This factor had 17 items mapping onto it and required 
only some rescoring to account for low responses in certain categories to fit the Rasch 





BISSOS-S incorporates many of the original items related to the question of ‘how I 
feel about my place in the world’ as well as items that initially came from the second 
section of Draft 2, e.g. D2r-Q26 “I have friends who accept me for who I am”, D2r-
Q30 “I feel that other people think I’m useless” and D2r-Q32 “I feel that other people 
value my point of view”. This subscale taps into a sense of purpose and meaningful 
activity, roles and relationships in society and the sense of belonging that these give. 
Items asking more directly about experiences of loneliness following TBI– e.g. D2r-
Q45 “I wish there were more people in my life” and D2r-Q46 “I feel left out” – did not 
fit with the other items in this subscale and so were removed during the analysis. This 
lack of fit may be because these items addressed an assumed solution to a sense of 
loneliness (e.g. having more people in one’s life) whereas the other items, retained in 
the analysis, were asking more about the presence of feelings of belonging, e.g. 
‘belonging to a community’ (BISOSS-S Q9), and knowing where ‘I fit in the world’ 
(BISOSS-S Q5). It is the perceived sense of loneliness rather than objective measures 
of social contact that has been more closely linked to health outcomes such as 
depression and cognitive decline (Cacioppo & Hawkley, 2009). Items tapping into this 
perception of loneliness, akin to items on the UCLA Loneliness Scale (Russell, 1996)  
e.g. ‘I feel alone’, ‘I feel that I am no longer close to anyone’ may have fitted better 
into the BISOSS-S. 
Investigating the influence of social factors on our self-identities has been looked at in 
many ways, e.g. social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), social networks, social 
capital (Jetten et al., 2012), the different types of social identities people can have, for 
example: racial, vocational, athletic, impact of friendships and roles ( e.g. Driver, 
Rees, O’Connor, & Lox, 2006; Soeker, 2011). The BISOSS-S subscale does not seek 
to quantify social identity after TBI in the sense of number of group memberships, 
how extensive a social network is, but rather aims to quantify the strength of internal 
feelings that derive from these interactions.  This includes, for example, feelings of 
belonging, of being generally satisfied with interpersonal relationships, feelings of 
having value, of having a place in the world, of being equal to others, and having a 
sense of meaning and purpose. The significance of social identity markers for one’s 




individuals and between cultures (Jetten et al., 2012). The increasing recognition of 
these social influences to our overall sense of self is acknowledged in the development 
of the BISOSS-S subscale. Egocentric and sociocentric components form separate 
subscales but they are highly correlated (Pearson’s correlation co-efficient 0.76) 
confirming the inter-relation between these two self elements and the need to 
incorporate an assessment of both in studies of self-identity.  
The BISOSS-S also incorporates items addressing spiritual aspects of identity. The 
term ‘spirituality’ is used here to describe a universal aspect of psychosocial life, not 
synonymous with religion but often linked to it. Spirituality as a concept is concerned 
with ultimate questions about life’s meaning as it relates to the transcendent (Collicutt 
McGrath, 2011) – an orientation towards higher order goals. An overt reference to 
spirituality was removed from the questionnaire following the cognitive interviews 
(see Chapter 6) as it was often interpreted as being about active engagement in religion 
by study participants. Studies of brain injury in Māori have highlighted a spiritual 
(‘wairua’) injury as being an integral part of brain injury as the head is sacred in Māori 
culture (Elder, 2012), so inclusion of spiritual dimensions maybe more important for 
some cultural groups in measuring a sense of self after TBI. What was retained in 
BISOSS-S was the contribution that a belief in an overarching purpose or guide in 
one’s life could have in the strengthening of one’s sense of self, e.g. BISOSS-S Q11 “I 
feel there is purpose and meaning in my life”. 
Trauma involves an assault on previous assumptions, potentially coming face to face 
with our own mortality and can cause one to consider the possibility that the world is 
meaningless (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). All participants in this study had experienced a 
significant traumatic event, not necessarily significant in terms of the extent of 
intracranial trauma, but as a life event that potentially caused them to question 
previous assumptions about the nature of life and existence.  
There are areas of overlap here between the concept of ‘spirituality’ and that of post-
traumatic growth. Post-traumatic growth was a term first used by Tedeschi & Calhoun 
(1996) to describe various areas of life in which people reported positive change as a 
result of a traumatic life event. The analysis yielded five factors underpinning their 
concept of post-traumatic growth: 1) relating to others, 2) personal strength, 3) new 




describes an active cognitive process that occurs in the wake of a traumatic event, 
expressed in the form of reordering of priorities and goals, involving processing of the 
event and a change of perception.  
In the case of this study, a sense of renewed meaning did come through in the stories 
of some of the people interviewed e.g. ‘I’m back here for a reason’.  While they 
perhaps could not comment any further, the fact of surviving the injury made them 
believe that maybe there was a higher plan or purpose for them. Various authors from 
different disciplines have tackled the subject of the importance of finding meaning in 
life and its link to broader concepts of health and wellbeing, e.g.  Janoff-Bulman’s 
(1992) theory of shattered assumptions, Marris’ (1974) structures of meaning, and 
Frankl’s (1959/2004) logotherapy.  Recovery from trauma involves the rebuilding of 
these fundamental assumptions and this would be reflected in a strong sense of self on 
the BISOSS-S subscale.  
Relational	Subscale	(BISOSS-R)	
BISOSS-R reports on “how other people treat me” and is addressing issues of sense of 
self arising from close interpersonal relationships. It was interesting that the items 
referring to relationships with friends (and the stem specified close friends) mapped 
very strongly with the more socially orientated items of BISOSS-S than with BISOSS-
R (see Table 6-10). The focus in BISOSS-S is more on a generic sense of belonging 
than the closer ties that come with the more intimate relationships referred to in the 
relational subscale, BISOSS-R. Several participants had problems with the wording of 
the three ‘friends’ items in the original questionnaire (D2r- Q26-28), and this may 
have accounted at least in part for the problem of where these items best fitted in the 
questionnaire.  In particular, lack of friendships made answering some questions more 
difficult than others.  For example, D2r-Q26 “I have friends who accept me for who I 
am” was easier for participants to answer as it still made sense if they had no friends, 
whereas the slightly different wording of D2r-Q27 “I feel valued by my friends” and 
D2r-Q28 “I feel respected by my friends” created a dilemma for participants who 
reported having no friends.  
However, this finding may actually highlight a different role played by the close 




general sense of belonging derived from a wider, less intimate social group of 
contacts. As discussed above the wider social circle contributes to a person’s sense of 
self through a sense of belonging or fitting in with the world, whereas the closer 
relationships are more concerned with feelings of love, being nurtured and feeling 
secure. Sternberg’s (1986) theory of love describes the key ingredients of love as 
being commitment, intimacy and passion.  Intimacy describes the closeness, 
connectedness and bonds that lead to warm, loving relationships; passion is describes 
the physical attraction and consummation associated with a purely romantic form of 
love; and commitment refers to decisions to love (in the short term) and commitments 
to love (in the longer term). The significance of each ingredient varies in different 
types of relationships but intimacy is the constant – dividing loving interpersonal 
relationships from others. Along these lines, BISOSS-R is addressing the contribution 
to sense of self from loving relationships and the sense of intimacy and commitment 
these involve.  
It is worthwhile considering if there are any unique features of a close friendship that 
are not fulfilled by a close loving relationship with a family member due to the issues 
with the ‘friends’ items. Lack of friends is a common finding in the TBI population, 
whose social contacts can often be limited to paid carers and family (Douglas, 2016). 
A ‘desire to share’ was highlighted as feature of friendship in Douglas’ (2016) study. 
One key feature of friendships not present in family relationships is the sense of 
having been chosen. People may feel that family members stand by them out of a 
sense of duty, an obligation, but with friendships there is a greater element of choice 
and perhaps this sense of having been selected as being worthy of friendship is an 
important missing element in the BiSOSS-R currently. 
Thus the three subscales of BISOSS address separate but overlapping components of 
self-identity that undergo changes following TBI. Prigatano (1989) highlighted work, 
love and play as being the three crucial elements for ‘normality’ following TBI  and 
the contribution from all these areas to our sense of self is apparent in the BISOSS. 
7.2.2 Evaluation	of	measurement	characteristics	of	the	BISOSS	subscales:	
BISOSS-E contains 17 items and shows good measurement characteristics across a 




to statistically differentiate between at least four groups of patients. It has excellent 
face validity and correlates highly with the other two subscales and with the opening 
question D2r-Q1 adding strength to claims of construct validity. This scale is working 
well and only needs further examination to assess its reproducibility in the form of 
test-retest reliability and inter-rater reliability testing and longitudinal validity testing 
to assess its sensitivity to change. 
BISOSS-S contains 14 items and also demonstrates good measurement characteristics. 
It has a PSI of 0.90, indicating that this scale is also able to differentiate between at 
least four statistically distinct groups. The range of measurement extends from -2.5 to 
+2.5 logits but there is a greater ability to discriminate between persons at the lower 
end of the range due to a lack of coverage in the 0-1 logits range. This scale could 
benefit from some additional items to improve coverage in this area.  This scale was 
highly correlated with the other two subscales and the predictions about the effect of 
meaningful occupation and leisure activities on sense of self were correct, adding 
weight to the argument for a contribution to sense of self from sociocentric markers. 
The comments in the previous section drawing on related concepts such as loneliness 
could provide useful additional items for testing to improve the scale further. 
Additional testing on reproducibility of scores (i.e. reliability) is also required for this 
subscale. 
BISOSS-R, has only 6 items and 12 thresholds. While it does form a unidimensional 
scale, its ability to discriminate between people with different amounts of the 
underlying trait is limited. The PSI is 0.79, indicating this scale could distinguish 
between three groups of people. This also indicates a lower degree of confidence in 
the fit statistics due to a larger amount of error around these estimates. The items cover 
a range of abilities but do not provide adequate precision of measurement. An 
examination of the item map in Figure 6-8 shows that the thresholds for the items all 
cluster at around the -2 logits and +2 logits mark.  
The items in this section of the questionnaire were thwarted by many of the 
participants being unable to identify with having friends. This subscale would benefit 
from additional items and careful attention should be paid to the wording of the items, 
so that they still make sense if people report few or no friends. Throughout the 




belonging, or of knowing who they are but on that underlying feeling. Additional 
items would need to consider this perspective and not focus on the existence of 
specific relationships but the feelings of being valued, appreciated, chosen and loved 
that could be derived from a multitude of different sources, for example, from pets.  
7.3 Other	findings	of	the	study	
Alongside the development and validation of the BISOSS other key findings emerged 
from this thesis: 
1. Problems with self-identity were commonly reported by participants in this 
study after TBI: Forty percent of people in the study reported having problems 
with their self-identity 
2. Application of measurement theory to a complex psychological construct can 
be successful 
3. Development of tools specifically for use in TBI or cognitively impaired 
populations is important 
Each of these is discussed in more detail below. 
7.3.1 Prevalence	of	identity	problems	after	TBI:	
In the background chapter, evidence was presented demonstrating that identity change 
is a known problem for many survivors of TBI. Tyerman and Humphrey (1984) 
reported that 72% of their 25 severely injured participants reported subjective 
personality change. However, there have been no published studies reporting on the 
prevalence of identity problems for survivors of TBI as it is conceptualised in this 
thesis. The results from this study showed that it is a common problem with 39.7% of 
the 136 respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with D2r-Q1 “I feel that I have 
problems with my self-identity or I am unsure about who I am”. This is a particularly 
striking number when the recruitment strategy is considered. Participants were 
required to have sustained a traumatic brain injury as an adult and at least 6 months 
ago but there was no requirement to be experiencing ongoing problems relating to the 
brain injury. Admittedly, the recruitment sources – from brain injury charities or 
societies and National Health Service clinics – would mostly have contact with people 




problems varied. In fact, one limitation of the study was that because recruitment was 
dependent on a third party, such as support workers, informing clients about the study, 
clients with a history of mental health problems, for example, were often not 
approached. This introduced some bias into the recruiting procedure, with the people 
entering the study, arguably less likely to be experiencing problems with their self-
identity than those people who were not invited to participate. Capturing the whole 
range of people with TBI within research studies is challenging, particularly as many 
milder injuries do not come to medical attention (Feigin et al., 2013).This study is 
therefore not able to provide any information on prevalence of self-identity issues in 
this wider brain injured population but provides interesting insights into the scale of 
the problem for people with TBI who are known to brain injury services.Application 
of measurement theory to a complex psychological construct can be successful 
 The advantages of Rasch measurement over scales validated using Classical test 
theory were discussed in Chapter 3.  However, while Rasch and other item response 
theory methods have been widely adopted in education and cognitive assessment, their 
application in personality-type psychological testing has been slower. Various 
suggestions have been made as to why this is the case: item response theory methods 
are undoubtedly more complex, requiring a greater degree of analysis and impose 
much more stringent criteria on the data. The computer programmes available for 
analysis have also been criticised for being too technical and hard to use (Hays, 
Morales, & Reise, 2000). However, the most significant argument has been around the 
nature of psychological constructs: with discrete cognitive constructs and ability 
testing viewed as more concrete and measureable with other areas such as personality 
assessment, which are viewed as more subjective and therefore less amenable to such 
rigorous scientific methods (Reise & Henson, 2003). The strict criteria for 
unidimensionality is a challenge in an area where cognitive abilities, personality traits 
and test factors can all affect performance (Hays et al., 2000). 
However, this thesis has demonstrated these concerns can be allayed by having a clear 
conceptual definition as a starting point; this significantly changed many of the items 
in the first draft of the questionnaire focusing on a single component of personal 




relatively straightforward with most of the items adhering to their theoretical subscale 
placement.  
Another line of reasoning that has deterred some from wholeheartedly adopting item 
response theory approaches for psychological testing is the close approximations of 
scores obtained using classical test theory to those derived using item response theory. 
This has been interpreted as meaning that there is no justification for adopting the 
more complex analysis required by item response theory(Fan, 1998). While this may 
be true for some measures in some contexts, other important properties of the 
measures thus derived do vary, for example invariance across the range of the scale. 
Only an item response theory validated scale possesses this property and so can also 
give information as to the precision of measurement obtained at different points in the 
scale, which could be crucially important when relying on the scale to assess the 
effectiveness of an intervention (Reise & Henson, 2003). There have been published 
examples of inaccurate conclusions of presence or absence of interactions between 
variables when utilising raw scores compared with estimates obtained using item 
response theory (Embretson, 1996). 
One additional area where item response theory derived scales have been shown to be 
superior to their classical test theory derived counterparts is when it comes to their 
ability to detecting clinically meaningful change (Hays et al., 2000).  This is illustrated 
by several studies that have compared scores obtained from Rasch validated scales 
(either Rasch-scored SF-36 or RAND-36) with classically derived SF-36 scores in the 
same sample and shown that the Rasch scores have a greater sensitivity to change. A 
scale that has been validated using Rasch analysis or item response theory methods 
forms an interval level scale. Inaccurate interpretation of change scores obtained from 
ordinal measures can lead to erroneous conclusions and therefore inappropriate 
allocation of resources (Kersten, Lundgren Nilsson, & Batcho, 2015). So the key 
message here is not that item response theory derived scales are good and scales 
formed using classical	test	theory are bad, just that they serve different purposes and 
researchers need to be aware of the limitations and conditions that are applicable to 
their scale scores. BISOSS has been validated using Rasch analysis meaning that it 




measure change in strength of sense of self over time and how strength of sense of self 
relates to other markers for example: mechanism of injury or age at injury. 
7.3.2 Importance	of	developing	tools	specifically	for	use	in	TBI/	cognitively	impaired	
population	
The GOSe was chosen as a widely used, standardised measure of outcome from TBI. 
Its shortcomings are well-known and apparent at times during this study, re-
emphasising the need for a broader range of tools with which to measure and define 
outcome following TBI. The GOSe is hierarchically ordered so that people with 
physical disabilities score lower than people with purely psychological and social 
disabilities. To illustrate: a participant (participant A) who was severely physically 
disabled and needed a carer to assist him with most activities of daily living scored a 
GOSe outcome of 3 (lower severe disability). He enjoyed an active social life and 
close relationships with his wife and children, thus he reported he was content with his 
life. Another participant (participant B), who was independent in activities of daily 
living and shopping and travelling locally but unable to work, scored 5 on the GOSe 
(indicative of lower moderate disability according to the GOSe scoring system). He 
had no friends and no social contacts, he was desperately lonely, longing for a partner 
in life, but resigned to the fact that this was unlikely to happen. He reported he had no 
purpose in life and no hope for the future. Of these two participants, the first man 
scored lower on the GOSe, but from a personal point of view, I believe he would 
report he had achieved a better outcome than the second man. This is reflected in their 
BISOSS scores with participant A scoring more highly:  BISOSS-E 24/43, BISOSS- S 
21/33, BISOSS-R 9/12; participant B BISOSS-E 17/43, BISOSS-S 13/33, BISOSS-R 
4/12.  
SOC-13 had been chosen as a suitable measure for construct validity testing due to the 
overlap in the theoretical constructs of SOC and sense of self. However, the 
complexity of the questions in the SOC-13 reduced its suitability for use with the 
respondent population. The SOC-13 was not written specifically for a people with 
brain injury and it was noticeably harder for participants to complete than the BISOSS. 
Four of the participants who should have been included in the 50 consecutive 
participants to complete the SOC-13 were unable to complete the measure because of 




long and require the respondent to hold several pieces of information in their head 
before answering. Antonovsky (1993) when devising the scale, adopted a facet 
approach to item construction, requiring each item to be composed of five separate 
facets, four which describe a stimulus and a fifth linked to one of the three dimensions 
of SOC. For example, Question 10 in the SOC-13 states ‘Many people, even those 
with a strong character, sometimes feel like sad sacks (losers) in certain situations. 
How often have you felt this way in the past?’ The phrase ‘sad sack’ is not often used 
in the UK and was not understood by many participants but served as a distraction 
from the remainder of the question. Having to retain and utilise four separate qualifiers 
in the statement to arrive at an answer was cognitively challenging for most 
participants. The seven-point answer scale was also less intuitive, particularly as the 
anchor statements changed for every question.  
 It was also quite difficult for participants to adjust to the different completion 
instructions for the SOC-13. The SOC is enquiring after a general orientation to life 
and does not specify a timeframe to consider when answering questions, however 
several participants perseverated on the seven-day timescale that was given in the 
instructions for BISOSS. Current guidelines for patient reported outcomes recommend 
that items be accessible to people with a reading age of 12 years (Terwee et al., 2007). 
In the TBI population, where cognitive problems are prevalent it is even more 
important to make sure the questions and the answer formats are accessible to the 
participants. Complexity and length of question, changing answer format between 
questions, negatively worded questions and changing the instructions for completing 
the questions were all identified as problems during administration. Many of the 
participants, as a result of their injury, would have problems with, for example: 
information processing, switching easily from one instruction to the next (causing 
perseveration of previous instructions or answer formats), recall, and metacognitive 
skills. To address these problems, the items in the BISOSS were written specifically 
for the TBI population and underwent two rounds of cognitive interviews so that 
questions that were causing confusion could be removed or rewritten. The results of 
this were apparent in the ease of administration, even to participants with quite 
profound deficits. All questionnaires were interviewer administered due to concerns 




It is easy to under-estimate the cognitive requirements of questionnaire completion 
and many studies use generic questionnaires and scales with people with TBI without 
demonstrating a consideration the cognitive requirements of the scales being used. 
Unless the scale has been specifically developed with people with brain injury it is 
likely that the complexity of the questions may render at least some of the questions 
hard for participants to interpret. Lack of ability to self-monitor and self-correct may 
lead to inadvertent errors that are apparent to an interviewer but may otherwise go 
undetected, e.g. if a participant gives an answer that is incongruent with previous 
responses the interviewer can double-check that the question and answer format have 
been understood correctly. Effects from attentional deficits can also be monitored and 
adjusted for, e.g. minimising distractions, taking a break between scales if more than 
one questionnaire is being administered. Studies using questionnaires on participants 
with brain injury that have not been specifically devised for this population need to 
consider the consequences of such cognitive deficits on the validity of the responses 
obtained and take steps to minimise the impact. 
Draft 2r was generally well received and easy to complete. All participants completed 
the form as a face to face interview, and only a few would have managed to complete 
the form independently (for many it was a lack of confidence in completing forms 
rather than any particular feature of the research documents). This is an area that could 
be addressed with more user-friendly formatting, for example larger font, using 
graphics as well as words to depict the direction of positive scoring. Most interviews 
took between 30-60 minutes to complete: this involved completion of demographic 
sheet, GOSe, Draft 2r (46 items in total) and for some SOC-13. Therefore, the 
BISOSS, with only 37 items should only take 15-20 minutes to complete by itself. 
There were only four specific items that have been retained in the BISOSS (BISOSS-E 
Q3, “I feel like I know where my life is going”, BISOSS-E Q7 “I am able to achieve 
goals I set for myself”, BISOSS-E Q9 “I live more in the past than the present” and 
BISOSS-S Q6 “I know where I fit in the world”) that had some minor concerns raised 
during the interview process by a small number of participants around the wording and 
understanding of the items. Overall, however, the BISOSS was well received by the 






Recruitment was challenging in this study; it was especially difficult to recruit people 
with less severe injuries. When people heard about the study they were often keen to 
participate – the barrier was identifying them in the first place. The inclusion criteria 
specified a minimum of 6 months post-TBI but no maximum. Many people at this 
stage, particularly those with less severe injuries or good recoveries, would no longer 
be in contact with health services and therefore informing this population about the 
study was hard. Several strategies were used to try to recruit as broad a sample of the 
TBI population as possible. Hospital recruitment sources and community based 
services were both used. Approximately 50% of the UK participants were recruited 
through NHS services, the remainder through Headway.  The demographic 
characteristics of the study sample are reflective of the TBI population as a whole – 
68.4% male, median age at TBI 33 years old, suggesting the study findings would be 
generalisable. However, the proportion of patients in the study with moderate to severe 
injuries (74.3%) is higher than expected in a representative TBI population. The 
relative incidence of injury severity (mild:moderate:severe) has been reported as 
22:1.5:1 (Tagliaferri et al., 2006), thus patients with mild TBI are underrepresented in 
this study.  
Recruiting more participants with mild TBI would require additional recruitment 
sources as people with mild TBI may present to general practice or minor injury units 
rather than hospital emergency departments (Feigin et al., 2013), if they seek help at 
all. Other recruitment sources outside the healthcare sector would therefore also be 
useful, for example sports clubs, or advertisements in local newspapers or websites.  
There were some concerns from support workers about the nature of some of the 
questions and the potential for causing emotional distress in the participants. The 
questionnaire was very well received and there were no adverse events. The 
participant information sheet had contact details for the local Headway branches as a 
source of further information and support about brain injury but there was no specific 
support service for participants. Some potential participants were not put forward for 
the study by their support workers due to these concerns; this was particularly likely if 




available to assist if participation in the study had provoked any adverse reaction 
might have enabled these people to participate and ensure that people were not 
excluded from the study unnecessarily. Self-identity change is potentially linked with 
adverse mental health outcomes, such as depression, and if this link is to be 
investigated in future studies it is imperative that due consideration be given to the 
availability of ongoing psychological support.    
7.4.2 Evaluation	of	the	BISOSS	
This study was in part a ‘proof of concept’ study. At the outset of the project there was 
no guarantee that self-identity after TBI would be in any way measureable.  The 
analysis was therefore focused on assessing the validity of such a scale, i.e. was the 
construct quantifiable and in principle measureable, and could a scale be constructed 
to do so. The results of this thesis provide robust evidence of internal consistency, face 
validity and structural construct validity and preliminary support for hypothesis 
testing. Nonetheless, reliability was not assessed in this study. Terwee et al. (2007) 
and the consensus-based standards for the selection of health measurement instruments 
(COSMIN) guidelines (Mokkink et al., 2009) provide published quality criteria for 
evaluating measurement scales. By comparing the measurement properties of BISOSS 
against these published standards, areas for development can be identified.  
BISOSS shows evidence of good internal consistency, with tests for unidimensionality 
acceptable for all three subscales. There is also evidence to support the validity of 
summation of the individual subscale scores to produce a total summed score.  
A key part of this project was the development and refinement of the aim of the 
questionnaire. The end result of the conceptual work was a clear assertion that the 
BISOSS would be a questionnaire to evaluate the strength of sense of self following 
TBI. Cognitive interviews ensured good readability and overall the BISOSS rates 
highly on assessment on content validity. 
There are no existing ‘gold standard’ measures with which to compare (criterion 
validity). Construct validity testing is an ongoing process of accumulating evidence to 
support the ability of the scale to measure the construct under examination. Therefore, 
this study aimed to provide some preliminary evidence to support the claim that 




three domains of construct validity: structural validity, hypothesis testing and cross-
cultural validity (Mokkink et al., 2009); this study provides evidence for the first two 
only. There was a compelling concordance between the theoretical domains described 
in the conceptual appraisal and the factors that emerged from the factor analysis. This 
provides convincing evidence of the veracity of the construct framework and the 
structural validity of the scale. 
Several hypotheses were stated before the analysis, in accordance with COSMIN 
guidelines, with which to test the theoretical conceptualisation and the ability of the 
BISOSS to measure strength of self-identity after TBI. The findings from the 
hypothesis testing were summarised in table 6-26. The guidelines state that seventy 
five percent of tested hypotheses should be confirmed in order to be supportive of 
construct validity (Terwee et al., 2007). Overall, the hypothesis testing presented in 
this thesis probably meets this criterion. Two out of the five hypotheses were 
unequivocally supported by the data (relating to employment status and disruption to 
relationships) and one out of the five was not( correlation with SOC), giving a wide 
range of concordance of between 40 and 80%. Of the remaining two hypotheses 
(leisure activities and correlation with opening statement) they were mostly supported, 
with the Relational subscale causing doubt. Given the limitations of the Relational 
subscale (fewer items, poor discriminatory ability and lack of precise measurement) it 
is possible that it was the shortcomings in the measure that accounted for the failure to 
prove the hypotheses correct rather than a conceptual misalignment.  
There were two main limitations of the hypothesis testing in this thesis and these relate 
to the subscale structure of the BISOSS and the suitability of the SOC for convergent 
validity testing in the TBI population. The original hypotheses were based on a single 
sense of self score, however, the analysis produced three subscales. There is 
preliminary evidence that these subscales could legitimately be summed to produce a 
total score, but this requires further investigation. Both the total score and the three 
subscale scores were used in the construct validity testing for comparison. The three 
subscales address different aspects of the sense of self and the hypotheses may have 
been formulated differently if they had been based on the three subscales rather than a 
total score. For example, it might have been expected that the Sociocentric subscale 




the Relational subscale scores not so. Additional hypotheses based on the specific 
subscales could also be developed e.g. convergent validity of the BISOSS-S with 
measures of spirituality or spiritual well-being, divergent validity of BISOSS-R and 
BISOSS-S with measures of loneliness. The subscale structure of the BISOSS could 
also partly explain the lack of correlation with SOC scores. The proposed theoretical 
correlation was with a total sense of self score, with both scales (sense of self and 
sense of coherence) looking at a global orientation to life with a strong sense of self 
giving purpose and meaning in life and contributing to a strong sense of coherence. 
This is perhaps less apparent when the sense of self is deconstructed into subscales. 
There were clearly other issues with the correlation analysis with SOC as there was no 
correlation with either the subscales’ scores or the total BISOSS score. The issues with 
the administration of the SOC were discussed above. This suggests that the lack of 
correlation between the BISOSS scores and the SOC scores could be more attributable 
to issues with administration of the SOC with people who have TBI, reducing the 
validity of scores in this patient group, rather than a conceptual disagreement. Another 
explanation for the lack of correlation with SOC scores was touched upon in section 
7.2.1 when discussing the BISOSS-S. All the participants in the study had experienced 
a traumatic life event and this may have led to changes in their sense of coherence. 
Both sense of self and sense of coherence are meant to be relatively stable over time, 
reflecting an enduring orientation or psychological construct. There is little evidence 
specifically for SOC in people with TBI but some data does seem to suggest that SOC 
is unaffected by TBI (Jacobsson & Lexell, 2013). The SOC scores for the participants 
in this study (mean score 63.3, SD 15.6) are almost identical to those from Jacobsson’s 
study and population norms (Antonovsky, 1993). In fact another study looking at the 
impact on SOC from life-threatening injuries (Schnyder, Moergeli, Klaghofer, & 
Buddeberg, 2001) also showed no change.  
TBI can produce a sudden shift in one’s self-identity, which may be the basis for the 
sense of self-discrepancy that people with TBI often experience. Therefore, while in 
normal circumstances the two constructs may be correlated, the shift in sense of self 
following TBI may disrupt this link between the two constructs explaining the lack of 
correlation in our figures. A general well-being scale such the Warwick-Edinburgh 




provide a suitable instrument for future convergent validity testing of the BISOSS that 
would be less susceptible to these confounders.  
7.4.3 Reliability	and	Responsiveness	
This study is based on data from the single administration of the questionnaire so no 
comments can be made on the test-retest reliability, inter-rater reliability or the 
responsiveness (longitudinal validity) of the scale. These would need to be addressed 
in future studies. Sense of self and strength of sense of self are constructs that could be 
expected to show gradual change during the normal course of a person’s life. Given 
that the rate of change under normal circumstances, would be expected to be slow, 
scores from BISOSS administered on two occasions a week apart ought to be fairly 
stable. The development of the interviewer-prompt sheet was designed to minimise 
any impact on scores from the interviewer and could be used to establish the inter-rater 
reliability in a future study. Before BISOSS can be used for assessing change in 
strength of sense of self, either due to interventions or natural recovery, the stability of 
test scores in terms of test-retest reliability would need to be established.  
The relational scale did show some ceiling effect. Twenty participants out of the 
original 135 scored maximally on the finalised subscale. This represents 14.8% of 
respondents and is therefore just under the 15% cut off that Terwee et al. (2007) state 
is acceptable.  
7.4.4 Applicability	to	other	cultural	groups:	
This study was conducted using a predominantly ‘Western’ population; there were 
very few participants recruited from other cultural groups e.g. Maori or Asian. In 
Chapter 2 the variation in conceptualisation of self between different cultural groups 
was touched upon and the lack of literature on the effect of TBI on self-identity in 
non-Western populations was acknowledged as a limitation of the concept analysis in 
Chapter 4. Therefore it must be acknowledged that the BISOSS has been developed 
based on a Western conceptualisation of self and tested in a Western population and 






The BISOSS will be freely available to use, along with the interviewer prompt sheet 
and scoring templates via a dedicated website. It has the potential for utility in both 
clinical and research settings. This is an emerging area of study and BISOSS provides 
a valuable tool to further knowledge in this area. As outlined above, this study has 
provided initial evidence of validity of the scale, once further tests to establish 
reliability are concluded then the scale can be used for further research.  
In clinical settings the BISOSS can already serve as a tool to initiate conversations 
about identity issues after TBI or to help unpick identity problems, without any further 
testing. It is a common complaint following brain injury ‘I just don’t feel like me 
anymore’ and one that is hard to systematically address. Certainly in the teams I work 
in (subacute and community neurorehabilitation in the UK as a Rehabilitation 
Physician), it is widely acknowledged as a common sequelae of brain injury, but 
perhaps one that we feel ill-equipped and powerless to help with.  Clinicians can feel 
more comfortable with a focus on the more practical sequelae of brain injury. Perhaps 
this lack of attention to problems with self-identity has been because the concept has 
always seemed nebulous and intangible, and outside of the more functional domains 
that the majority of TBI work occurs in.  Alternatively, perhaps the multi-disciplinary 
team views ‘identity’ as the domain of psychologists.  
Much of the focus of brain injury rehabilitation programmes is goal directed and while 
identity issues may be reported by the patient it is a challenging area in which to set 
specific, objective goals currently. The items in the BISOSS provide a means to 
explore what an individual may be meaning when they describe feelings of change in 
self-identity, and clearly demonstrate the breadth of changes that this sentiment can 
incorporate. This evidently situates self-identity as core rehabilitation business, 
involving all members of the MDT.  
The BISOSS construct provides clinicians with a framework and a starting point to 
assist in the assessment of the patient and can provide potential avenues to explore.  
For example, if interpersonal relationships are highlighted as a problematic area then 
couple therapy or work on social cognitive skills may be beneficial. Likewise, 
interventions focusing on purposeful occupation may be expected to have a beneficial 




The concept analysis presented in this thesis emphasizes the complementary roles of 
physical functioning, independence, social interaction and communication in forming 
and maintaining a strong self-identity following TBI and the potentially disastrous 
effects of failing to do so. As such, I suggest that all interventions for TBI might 
potentially need to have self-identity as a core guiding principle to be successful, and 
that this should be a main focus for the whole multi-disciplinary team. The ethos here, 
it has been suggested, should be one of ‘transformation’ rather than ‘restoration’ 
(McGrath, 2004). Similarly, S. D. Morris (2004), when discussing a model for the 
process of rebuilding one’s life following TBI, stated that recovery should be ‘more 
like a phoenix rising from its own ashes, rather than gluing the pieces of a shattered 
mirror back together’(p.16). 
A discrepancy was recognised in Chapter 2 between the outcomes that were important 
to people with TBI and the outcomes that are currently being measured. Outcome 
measurement and proof of cost-effectiveness are integral parts of modern 
rehabilitation practice and part of the rationale for the development of BISOSS was an 
attempt to amalgamate these two, apparently opposing demands. In addition to 
providing a framework for assessment of self-identity issues after TBI, BISOSS 
provides a means to monitor and quantify change, and hence quantify outcome and 
effectiveness of rehabilitation strategies in a manner that is more in keeping with the 
priorities of people with TBI.  
True change in self-identity strength following TBI can only be addressed with 
longitudinal studies, preferably extending beyond more than a couple of years. Being 
able to ‘measure’ change in strength of self-identity as a result of TBI (i.e. pre-injury 
vs post-injury) is something that will rarely be possible. Self-identity is personally 
construed and therefore not something that a third party can report on. Self-identity is 
situated and while some parts endure and do not exhibit much variation with time, 
other parts will.  This therefore needs to be measured prospectively. Tools such as 
BISOSS can be used to measure strength of sense of self at this current time and then 
applied longitudinally, but it is unlikely that there will be a valid pre-injury 
comparison. However, this approach could reveal information about the course of self-
identity changes following TBI and the impact of difference rehabilitation approaches 




Currently there is a lack of high quality evidence to support interventions for self-
concept change following brain injury (T. Ownsworth & Haslam, 2014). Studies 
identified in Ownsworth and Haslam’s review have used a variety of different tools to 
attempt to assess the impact of the intervention e.g. HISDS, Tennessee Self-Concept 
Scale, Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale. The overwhelming message from this review was 
a current lack of high quality evidence with which to make any claims regarding self-
identity interventions. The studies published are all based on small numbers of people, 
with short follow up periods, and have use a variety of different (ordinal level) scales 
with which to try to monitor change. BISOSS may go some way to filling this gap, 
providing a means with which to quantify one aspect of change in self-identity after 
TBI and assess effectiveness of rehabilitation strategies on identity reconstruction. 
7.6 Areas	for	future	development	
During the discussion many issues have been raised that require further study. The 
three most significant are: establishing the test-retest and interrater reliability of the 
scale(s), expanding the BISOSS-R and validating the summation of the subscale 
scores to produce a total BISOSS score.  
The Relational scale has only six items and poor measurement precision. It would 
benefit from the addition of more items. Returning to the five potential sources of 
items discussed in Chapter 3: the patients or subjects being studied, clinical 
observation, theory, research and expert opinion (Streiner & Norman, 2008) – the 
most rewarding avenues to explore would probably be the original data from the focus 
groups, or the new theoretical insights that have emerged during this project. It was 
important to word items in such a way that people who reported few or no friends 
could still answer them i.e. “I have friends who accept me for who I am” (BISOSS-S 
Q2), not “I feel respected by my friends” (D2r-Q28). Feelings of having been chosen 
and of having someone to share one’s life with were identified as important corollaries 
of friendships that are not currently covered by any BISOSS items. 
The Rasch analysis of 37 items grouped into the three subscales as subtests showed 
promising results suggesting that it would be possible to combine the subscales in this 
manner to generate an overall BISOSS score. However, there is currently insufficient 
data to formalise this assertion. The high correlation between the subscales also 




Once these studies have been concluded then there are many areas of identity change 
after TBI that can be further explored. Longitudinal studies could initially look at the 
natural history of change in strength of self-identity after TBI. I intentionally recruited 
participants a minimum of six months following TBI, hypothesising that it is only after 
the acute phase of injury has settled and people have returned to the community that 
the full impact of the injury on their life and thus problems with their self-identity 
would be realised.  
Another assumption that was incorporated into the recruitment strategy was around the 
effect of age: only people who had been 18 years or older at the time of injury were 
included. Identity development has been well-described in the psychological literature 
and I considered Erikson’s model of ego development (Erikson, 1950) when 
formulating the construct. This would predict a differential effect of an injury to the 
developing ego and thus people injured during childhood were excluded to try to 
maintain a homogeneous sample. However, this link between age of injury and 
strength of self-identity can now be explored. In the adult population an injury in early 
adulthood when relationships and careers are still in a state of flux could be potentially 
more damaging in identity terms than an injury later in life. The effect of childhood 
brain injury on self-identity is probably harder to predict. One of the key distressing 
features reported by people after TBI is the sense of self discrepancy, causing one to 
live with two images of one’s self – before the injury versus after the injury. This may 
be less of an issue with childhood injuries, with the pre-injury self less established or 
remembered.  
A range of different approaches have been proposed for the rehabilitation of identity. 
Nochi (2000) reported that acceptance, adaptation and the need for meaningful 
occupation were key themes that emerged in stories of successful identity 
reconstruction. Identity reconstruction is rising to a position of prominence on the 
rehabilitation agenda. Various models have been proposed to incorporate identity 
reconstruction into mainstream rehabilitation practice e.g., metaphoric identity 
mapping (Ylvisaker et al., 2008) and the Y-shaped model (Gracey, Evans, & Malley, 





From this work it can be hypothesised that self-identity strength, as measured with 
BISOSS, should correlate with other variables such as depression (negative 
correlation) or wellbeing (positive correlation). Post-traumatic growth is likely to lead 
to an improved strength of self-identity and thus these measures would also be 
expected to show some correlation. The direction of these relationships would also be 
potentially useful to study.  For instance, if depression is correlated with a weak sense 
of self, is it that problem with self-identify contribute to depression or do depressive 
states weakness one’s sense of self.  
Recent research has been exploring the link between social identity, social contact, 
group membership and health and wellbeing, (e.g. Jetten et al., 2012) and it may be 
this is at least partly mediated through its influence on self-identity. Certainly, TBI 
often entails a large shift in one’s social circumstances, possibly with loss of work, 
friendships and issues of stigmatised identity. Thus another interesting line of enquiry 
would be investigating the link between social contact or conversely loneliness and 
BISOSS scores and the influence these have on general markers of wellbeing.  
There are now plenty of avenues for future studies to explore, looking at establishing 
further evidence for construct validity and providing empirical evidence for these 
theoretical relationships. 
7.7 Measuring	outcomes:	lessons	from	education	
Rehabilitation and human sciences in general faces a dilemma: on the one hand trying 
to categorise, diagnose and measure the commonalities of human experience, while 
also acknowledging the individual differences that make each person unique. 
Quantification does not have to mean a reduction to the lowest common denominator 
and an obliteration of individuality but it is essential to progress an area of scientific 
study. Similar tensions were apparent when modern measurement techniques were 
first used in educational fields where there had been a concern expressed that a focus 
on outcomes would lead to fragmentation of learning: 
On	the	one	hand,	‘outcomes’	as	descriptions	of	intended	and	actual	learning	
can	 help	 recognition	 of	 learning	 achievement,	 and	 where	 this	 fits	 on	 an	






into	 a	 myriad	 of	 disconnected	 parts,	 all	 of	 which	 require	 assessing…	
significance	 is	 lost,	 over-assessing	 occurs,	 and	 teaching	 is	 prescribed	 rather	
than	 informed	by	 the	 child’s	 needs	 and	 the	 teacher’s	 expertise.	 (Australian	
Council	of	State	School	Organisations	cited	in	Andrich,	2002)	
Similar concerns surrounding the use of physical markers of rehabilitation were 
discussed in Chapter 2 (e.g. Hammell, 2006). The challenge, therefore, is not in the 
existence of outcome measures but in their breadth of scope and in their application. 
The point being raised above is around the question of whether the whole can be said 
to equal the sum of the parts?  Deconstruction can lead to disintegration of 
information.  
In a mechanistic view of rehabilitation then, identifying and remedying each 
impairment in turn should lead to restoration of ‘normal’ function and therefore a 
return to ‘health’. However, we know this is not the case.  Even if we could provide a 
complete physical recovery, the experience of a possibly life-threatening injury and 
the cognitive changes that this may entail have repercussions, and may necessitate a 
different outlook on life. Not all goals or rehabilitation outcomes can be broken down 
and sometimes an overarching ‘systems’ goal like restoring a compelling sense of self 
needs addressing directly in its own right.  It cannot be assumed to always follow from 
a succession of lesser order goals.  
In the 1930’s Goldstein (1939/1995) identified the need for an holistic approach to 
recovery in the early days of brain injury rehabilitation. As discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis, Goldstein pioneered a systems approach to brain injury 
rehabilitation in his book ‘The Organism’. He rejected the reductionist approach to 
brain injuries, whereby it is assumed that effects of the injury can be predicted solely 
from knowledge of localisation of brain function and anatomical site of injury. The 
information must always be interpreted in ‘light of their functional significance for the 
whole’ (Goldstein, 1995, p. 264). Goldstein (1939/1995) preferred to talk in terms of 
the adaptive responses of the organism to injury and the manifest symptoms of the 
injury may just as well be attributable to the adaptations as to the initial losses. The 
catastrophic reaction that he described could be interpreted as an extreme 




a place in the world and any sense of meaning. Goldstein’s ambition was to unite the 
classical neuropathological approach to neurology with his holistic model to provide a 
deeper understanding of the impact of neurological injury and illness on individuals 
(Sacks, 1995). The trend towards increasing scrutiny of the effectiveness of 
rehabilitation strategies and measurement is set to continue. If the focus of 
measurement tools is solely on the easier to quantify targets of impairments, activities 
and participation then there is a risk that the things people value, the real outcomes 
that matter in rehabilitation – restoring a sense of who you are and a life that matters – 
can get missed.  Nietzcshe stated ‘if we possess our why  of life we can put up with 
almost any how’ (1889/1990, p.33). There needs to be a shift in emphasis in 
rehabilitation from the ‘how’ to the ‘why’. The development of BISOSS has begun the 
process of broadening the scope of measureable TBI rehabilitation outcomes to try to 
align the two seemingly competing requirements for outcome measurement and 





This study has demonstrated that reports of feeling changed as a person are common 
after TBI and can arise for a variety of reasons. These reasons can be grouped into 
three broad areas: egocentric, relational or sociocentric changes. Egocentric changes 
refer to internal changes within yourself: feeling in control, feeling that you 
understand yourself, a sense of being a coherent, whole person. Relational changes 
reflect changes in interpersonal relationships following TBI, in particular whether you 
feel understood, accepted and respected by those you love. Sociocentric changes refer 
to the wider community and interactions with society in general leading to a sense of 
belonging and having purpose and meaning in life. This conceptualisation of self-
identity change after TBI provides an opportunity to bring together within one unified 
framework the previously reported self-concept changes, changes in narrative identity 
and social identity perspectives. It is hoped that this may lead to new insights into this 
common sequelae of TBI with these varying perspectives being interpreted in an 
integrated holistic manner rather than being viewed independently. 
This project has also developed three validated subscales which provide interval level 
measurement with which to assess strength of sense of self, a powerful tool with 
which to further develop research in this area. Development of assessment tools has 
been cited as a key priority in research into identity change after TBI. It is now 
possible to evaluate the effect of interventions on identity reconstruction to see which 
approaches may offer most benefit. The successful application of Rasch analysis to 
this complex psychological construct by using the principles of scientific measurement 
espoused by Michell (1999) and Wilson (2005) should encourage research into 
development of robust measurement tools for the social sciences. 
There is increasing recognition of the need to incorporate patient reported outcomes 
into health care research with objective markers not always the optimal method of 
assessing outcomes of treatment.  As more people are living with chronic conditions 
broader concepts such as quality of life and wellbeing are being recognised as relevant 
markers for assessing the effectiveness of healthcare. Feeling changed as a person has 
been identified as a key concern among survivors of brain injury and BISOSS now 




Intuitively there would appear to be a link between a sense of identity change and 
quality of life or wellbeing but this can now be explored empirically. 
Arguably, change in self-identity is a pertinent issue for anyone who has experienced a 
catastrophic life event; not just a health crisis. One rationale for examining change in 
self-identity in TBI however is the particular nature of this injury. In addition to social 
and psychological changes, TBI may also result in functional change to areas of the 
brain responsible for producing self-identity as well as interpreting and responding to 
crises of identity. TBI can be thought of as representing the perfect storm of identity 
challenges and many of the themes reported here could also be applied to other 






Abrams, L. S., & Curran, L. (2011). Maternal identity negotiations among low-
income women with symptoms of postpartum depression. Qualitative Health 
Research, 21(3), 373–385. http://doi.org/10.1177/1049732310385123 
American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine. (1993). Definition of mild 
traumatic brain injury. Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation, 8(3), 86–87. 
http://doi.org/10.1097/00001199-199309000-00010 
Anderson, S. I., Housley, A. M., Jones, P. A., Slattery, J., & Miller, J. D. (1993). 
Glasgow outcome scale: An inter-rater reliability study. Brain Injury, 7(4), 
309–17. http://doi.org/10.3109/02699059309034957 
Andrich, D. (1978). A rating formulation for ordered response categories. 
Psychometrika, 43(4), 561–573. http://doi.org/10.1007/BF02293814 
Andrich, D. (2002). A framework relating outcomes based education and the 
taxonomy of educational objectives. Studies in Educational Evaluation, 
28(1), 35–59. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-491X(02)00011-1 
Andrich, D. (2011). Rating scales and Rasch measurement. Expert Reviews of 
Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research, 11(5), 571–585. 
http://doi.org/10.1586/erp.11.59 
Andrich, D., Sheridan, B., & Luo, G. (2008). RUMM 2030. Perth, Western 
Australia: RUMM Laboratory Pty Ltd. 
Andriessen, T. M. J. C., Horn, J., Franschman, G., van der Naalt, J., Haitsma, I., 
Jacobs, B., … Vos, P. E. (2011). Epidemiology, severity classification, and 
outcome of moderate and severe traumatic brain injury: A prospective 
multicenter study. Journal of Neurotrauma, 28(10), 2019–31. 
http://doi.org/10.1089/neu.2011.2034 
Antonovsky, A. (1993). The structure and properties of the sense of coherence 
scale. Social Science and Medicine, 36(6), 725–733. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(93)90033-Z 
Bach, L. J., & David, A. S. (2006). Self-awareness after acquired and traumatic 
brain injury. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 16(4), 397–414. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/09602010500412830 
Bagiella, E., Novack, T. A., Ansel, B., Diaz-Arrastia, R., Dikmen, S., Hart, T., & 
Temkin, N. (2010). Measuring Outcome in Traumatic Brain Injury 





Banja, J. D., & Johnston, M. V. (1994). Outcomes evaluation in TBI 
rehabilitation, part 3: Ethical perspectives and social policy. Archives of 
Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation, 75, SC-19-26. 
http://doi.org/10.1097/00001199-199406000-00013 
Barnes-Holmes, Y., Hayes, S. C., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Roche, B. (2001). 
Relational Frame Theory: A post-Skinnerian account of human language and 
cognition. Advances in Child Development and Behaviour, 28, 101–138. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2407(02)80063-5 
Beadle, E. J., Ownsworth, T. L., Fleming, J., & Shum, D. (2016). The impact of 
traumatic brain injury on self-identity: A systematic review of the evidence 
for self-concept changes. Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation, 31(2), 
E12–E25. http://doi.org/10.1097/HTR.0000000000000158 
Beck, A. T. (1979). An Overview. In A. T. Beck, A. J. Rush, B. F. Shaw, & G. 
Emery (Eds.), Cognitive therapy of depression. (pp. 1–34). New York, NY: 
Guilford Press. http://doi.org/10.1017/s0033291700055161 
Becker, H. S. (1963). Outsiders: Studies in social deviance. New York, NY: Free 
Press. http://doi.org/10.1093/sf/42.3.389 
Ben-Yishay, Y. (2000). Postacute neuropsychological rehabilitation: A holistic 
perspective. In A.-L. Christensen & B. P. Uzzell (Eds.), International 
Handbook of Neuropsychological Rehabilitation. (pp. 127–135). Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. http://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-
4757-5569-5 
Berg, J., Tagliaferri, F., & Servadei, F. (2005). Cost of trauma in Europe. 
European Journal of Neurology, 12(Suppl.), 85–90. 
Biderman, D., Daniels-Zide, E., Reyes, A., & Marks, B. (2006). Ego-identity: 
Can it be reconstituted after a brain injury? International Journal of 
Psychology, 41(5), 355–361. http://doi.org/10.1080/00207590500345963 
Bivona, U., Ciurli, P., Barba, C., Onder, G., Azicnuda, E., Silvestro, D., … 
Formisano, R. (2008). Executive function and metacognitive self-awareness 
after severe traumatic brain injury. Journal of the International 
Neuropsychological Society, 14(5), 862–868. 
Bond, T., & Fox, C. (2007). Applying the Rasch model: Fundemental 
measurement in the human sciences. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Inc. 
Bowling, A. (1997). Measuring health (2nd Editio). Open Univeristy Press. 
Bradley, K. D., Peabody, M. R., Akers, K. S., & Knuston, N. M. (2015). Rating 




middle category measurement flaw. Survey Practice, 8(2), 1–12. 
Brain Trauma Foundation. (2007). Guidelines for the Management of Severe 
Traumatic Brain Injury 3rd Edition. Journal of Neurosurgery, 24, 
Suppl(212), S1-106. http://doi.org/10.1089/neu.2007.9990 
Brenner, L. A., Homaifar, B. Y., Adler, L. E., Wolfman, J. H., & Kemp, J. 
(2009). Suicidality and veterans with a history of traumatic brain injury: 
Precipitating events, protective factors, and prevention strategies. 
Rehabilitation Psychology, 54(4), 390–397. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0017802 
Brown, D., Lyons, E., & Rose, D. (2006). Recovery from brain injury: Finding 
the missing bits of the puzzle. Brain Injury, 20(9), 937–946. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/02699050600909821 
Bruner, J. (2002). Making stories: Law, literature, life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Bury, M. (1982). Chronic illness as biographical disruption. Sociology of Health 
& Illness, 4(2), 167–183. 
Bury, M. (1988). Meanings at risk: The experience of arthritis. In R. Anderson & 
M. Bury (Eds.), Living with chronic illness (pp. 89–116). London: Unwin 
Hyman. 
Cacioppo, J. T., & Hawkley, L. T. (2009). Perceived social isolation and 
cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(10), 447–454. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2009.06.005.Perceived 
Caddell, L. S., & Clare, L. (2010). The impact of dementia on self and identity: A 
systematic review. Clinical Psychology Review, 30(1), 113–26. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2009.10.003 
Caddell, L. S., & Clare, L. (2013). Studying the self in people with dementia: 
How might we proceed? Dementia, 12(2), 192–209. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1471301211418486 
Cantor, J. B., Ashman, T. A., Schwartz, M. E., Gordon, W. A., Hibbard, M. R., 
Brown, M., … Cheng, Z. (2005). The role of self-discrepancy theory in 
understanding post-traumatic brain injury affective disorders: A pilot study. 
Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation, 20(6), 527–543. 
http://doi.org/10.1097/00001199-200511000-00005 
Cardol, M., De Jong, B. A., & Ward, C. D. (2002). On autonomy and 
participation in rehabilitation. Disability and Rehabilitation, 24(18), 970–4. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/09638280210151996 
Carlozzi, N. E., Tulsky, D. S., & Kisala, P. A. (2011). Traumatic brain injury 




of-life issues relevant to individuals with traumatic brain injury. Archives of 
Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation, 92(10), S52–S60. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.apmr.2010.12.046 
Carroll, E., & Coetzer, R. (2011). Identity, grief and self-awareness after 
traumatic brain injury. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 21(3), 289–305. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/09602011.2011.555972 
Carroll, L. J., Cassidy, J. D., Holm, L., Kraus, J., & Coronado, V. G. (2004). 
Methodological issues and research recommendations for mild traumatic 
bain injury: The WHO Collaborating Centre Task Force on mild Traumatic 
Brain Injury. Journal of Rehabilitation Medicine, 36(SUPPL. 43), 113–125. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/16501960410023877 
Caty, G. D., Arnould, C., Stoquart, G. G., Thonnard, J.-L., & Lejeune, T. M. 
(2008). ABILOCO: a Rasch-built 13-item questionnaire to assess 
locomotion ability in stroke patients. Archives of Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation, 89(2), 284–90. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.apmr.2007.08.155 
CDC. (2010). Traumatic brain injury & Concusssion. Retrieved from 
http://www.cdc.gov/traumaticbraininjury/severe.html 
CDC. (2016a). Rates of TBI-related Emergency Department Visits, 
Hospitalizations, and Deaths — United States, 2001–2010. Retrieved from 
http://www.cdc.gov/traumaticbraininjury/data/rates_hosp_byage.html 
CDC. (2016b). Rates of TBI-related Emergency Department Visits by Age Group 
— United States, 2001–2010. Retrieved from 
http://www.cdc.gov/traumaticbraininjury/data/rates_ed_byage.html 
Chamberlain, D. J. (2006). The experience of surviving traumatic brain injury. 
Journal of Advanced Nursing, 54(4), 407–417. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2648.2006.03840.x 
Charmaz, K. (1995). The body, identity and self: Adapting to impairment. The 
Sociological Quarterly, 36(4), 657–680. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-
8525.1995.tb00459.x 
Christchurch earthquake- quick facts. (2011). Retrieved from 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10708024 
Christiansen, C. H. (1999). Defining lives: Occupation as identity: An essay on 
competence, coherence, and the creation of meaning. American Journal of 
Occupational Therapy, 53(6), 547–558. http://doi.org/10.5014/ajot.53.6.547 
Christman, J. (2004). Narrative unity as a condition of personhood. 





Christodoulou, C., Junghaenel, D., DeWalt, D., Rothrock, N., & Stone, A. (2008). 
Cognitive Interviewing in the evaluation of fatigue items: Results from the 
Patient-Reported Outcomes Measurement Information System (PROMIS). 
Quality of Life Research, 17(10), 1239–1246. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11136-
008-9402-x.Cognitive 
Clifton, G. L., Hayes, R. L., Levin, H. S., Michel, M. E., & Choi, S. C. (1992). 
Outcome measures for clinical trials involving traumatically brain injured 
patients: Report of a conference. Neurosurgery, 31(5), 975–8. 
http://doi.org/10.1227/00006123-199211000-00028 
Cloute, K., Mitchell, A., & Yates, P. (2008). Traumatic brain injury and the 
construction of identity: A discursive approach. Neuropsychological 
Rehabilitation, 18(5–6), 651–670. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/09602010701306989 
Coetzer, R. (2008). Holistic neuro-rehabilitation in the community: Is identity a 
key issue? Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 18(5–6), 766–783. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/09602010701860266 
Coetzer, R., & Corney, M. J. (2001). Grief and self-awareness following brain 
injury and the effect of feedback as an intervention. Journal of Cognitive 
Rehabilitation, 19(4), 8–14. 
Collen, F. M., Wade, D. T., Robb, G. F., & Bradshaw, C. M. (1991). The 
Rivermead Mobility Index: a further development of the Rivermead Motor 
Assessment. Disability & Rehabilitation, 12(2), 50–54. 
http://doi.org/10.3109/03790799109166684 
Collicutt McGrath, J. (2008). Recovery from brain injury and positive 
rehabilitation practice. In S. Joseph & P. A. Linley (Eds.), Trauma, recovery, 
and growth: Positive psychological perspectives on post-traumatic stress. 
(pp. 259–274). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
Collicutt McGrath, J. (2011). Post-traumatic growth and spirituality after brain 
injury. Brain Impairment: Special Issue, 82(2), 82–92. 
Conneeley, A. L. (2002). Social integration following traumatic brain injury and 
rehabilitation. The British Journal of Occupational Therapy, 65(8), 356–
362. 
Conway, M. A. (2005). Memory and the self. Journal of Memory and Language, 
53(4), 594–628. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2005.08.005 
Cooley, C. H. (1902). Human Nature and the Social Order. New York, NY: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons. 




a predictor of psychological distress after severe acquired brain injury: An 
exploratory study. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 18(5–6), 607–626. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/09602010801948516 
Damasio, A. R. (2003). Feelings of emotion and the self. Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences, 1001(1), 253–261. 
http://doi.org/10.1196/annals.1279.014 
Damon, W., & Hart, D. (1982). The development of self-understanding from 
infancy through adolescence. Child Development, 53(4), 841–864. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/1129122 
Demertzi, A., Liew, C., Ledoux, D., Bruno, M.-A., Sharpe, M., Laureys, S., & 
Zeman, A. (2009). Dualism persists in the science of mind. Annals of the 
New York Academy of Sciences, 1157(1), 1–9. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-
6632.2008.04117.x 
DeWalt, D., Rothrock, N., Yount, S., & Stone, A. (2007). Evaluation of item 
candidates: The PROMIS qualitative item review. Medical Care, 45(5 Suppl 
1), S12–S21. 
http://doi.org/10.1097/01.mlr.0000254567.79743.e2.Evaluation 
Doering, B. K., Conrad, N., Rief, W., & Exner, C. (2011). Living with acquired 
brain injury : Self-concept as mediating variable in the adjustment process. 
Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 21(1), 42–63. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/09602011.2010.525947 
Douglas, J. M. (2016). Nobody wants to know you. In IBIA 11th World Congress 
on Brain Injury. 
Doward, L. C., & McKenna, S. P. (2004). Defining Patient-Reported Outcomes. 
Value in Health, 7(Suppl 1), S4-8. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1524-
4733.2004.7s102.x 
Driver, S., Rees, K., O’Connor, J., & Lox, C. (2006). Aquatics, health-promoting 
self-care behaviours and adults with brain injuries. Brain Injury, 20(2), 133–
141. http://doi.org/10.1080/02699050500443822 
Elder, H. (2012). I tuku iho, he tapu te upoko. Proceedings of International 
Indigenous Development Research Conference 2012. 
Ellis-Hill, C., Payne, S., & Ward, C. (2008). Using stroke to explore the Life 
Thread Model: An alternative approach to understanding rehabilitation 
following an acquired disability. Disability & Rehabilitation, 30(2), 150–
159. http://doi.org/10.1080/09638280701195462 
Embretson, S. E. (1996). Item response theory models and spurious interaction 




20(3), 201–212. http://doi.org/10.1177/014662169602000302 
Engel, G. (1977). The need for a new medical model: A challenge for 
biomedicine. Science, 196(4286), 129–136. 
Erikson, E. (1950). Childhood and society. New York, NY: WW Norton & 
Company. 
Erikson, E. (1968). Identity: youth and crisis. New York, NY: WW Norton & 
Company. 
Eriksson, M., & Lindström, B. (2005). Validity of Antonovsky’s sense of 
coherence scale: a systematic review. Journal of Epidemiology and 
Community Health, 59(6), 460–6. http://doi.org/10.1136/jech.2003.018085 
Fan, X. (1998). Item response theory and classical test theory: An empirical 
comparison of their item/person statistics. Educational and Psychological 
Measurement, 58(3), 357–381. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0013164498058003001 
Fayers, P. M., & Hand, D. J. (2002). Causal variables, indicator variables and 
measurement scales: an example from quality of life. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society), 165(2), 233–253. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-985X.02020 
Fayers, P. M., & Machin, D. (2007). Quality of Life (2nd ed.). Chichester, West 
Sussex,UK: Wiley & Sons. 
Feigin, V. L., Theadom, A., Barker-Collo, S., Starkey, N. J., McPherson, K., 
Kahan, M., … Ameratunga, S. (2013). Incidence of traumatic brain injury in 
New Zealand: A population-based study. Lancet Neurology, 12(1), 53–64. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S1474-4422(12)70262-4 
Fisher, W. J. (1992). Reliability, Separation, Strata Statistics. Rasch Measurement 
Transactions, 6(3), 238. 
Fitts, W., & Warren, W. (1996). Tennessee Self-Concept Scale: TSCS: 2. Los 
Angeles: Western Psychological Services. 
Fleminger, S., & Ponsford, J. L. (2005). Long term outcome after traumatic brain 
injury. British Medical Journal, 331, 1419–1420. 
http://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.331.7530.1419 
Fleminger, S., & Powell, J. (1999). Editorial. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 
9(3–4), 225–230. http://doi.org/10.1080/096020199389338 
Flury, J. M., & Ickes, W. (2007). Having a weak versus strong sense of self: The 





Foucault, M. (1973). The Birth of the Clinic: An archaelogy of medical 
perception. (A. Sheridan, Trans.). London: Tavistock. 
Frank, A. W. (2013). The Wounded Storyteller: Body, illness, and ethics (2nd 
ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Frankl, V. (1959). Man’s search for meaning. (I. Lasche, Ed.). London: Rider. 
Fries, J. F., Bruce, B., Bjorner, J., & Rose, M. (2006). More relevant, precise, and 
efficient items for assessment of physical function and disability: Moving 
beyond the classic instruments. Annals of the Rheumatic Diseases, 65 Suppl 
3(suppl_3), iii16-21. http://doi.org/10.1136/ard.2006.059279 
Gadow, S. (1980). Body and self: A dialectic. The Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy, 5(3), 172–85. http://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/5.3.172 
Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self: Implications for 
cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(1), 14–21. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(99)01417-5 
Garland, R. (1991). The mid-point on a rating scale: Is it desirable? Marketing 
Bulletin, 2, 66–70. 
Gascoigne, B. (2001). History of measurement. Retrieved February 7, 2016, from 
http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ac07 
Gazzaniga, M. (2005). The ethical brain. [Kindle Edition]. Retrieved from 
http//:www.amazon.co.uk. 
Gelech, J. M., & Desjardins, M. (2010). I am many: The reconstruction of self 
following acquired brain injury. Qualitative Health Research, 21(1), 62–74. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1049732310377454 
Gill, M. R., Reiley, D. G., & Green, S. M. (2004). Interrater reliability of 
Glasgow Coma Scale scores in the emergency department. Annals of 
Emergency Medicine, 43(2), 215–223. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0196-
0644(03)00814-X 
Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity. New 
York: Simon & Schuster. 
Goldstein, K. (1939). The Organism (1st ed.). New York, NY: Zone Books. 
Goldstein, K., & Gelb, A. (1918). Psychologische Analysen hirnpathologischer 
Fälle auf Grund von Untersuchungen Hirnverletzter. Zeitschrift Für Die 
Gesamte Neurologie Und Psychiatrie, 41(1), 1–142. 
Gordon, W. A., Zafonte, R., Cicerone, K., Cantor, J., Brown, M., Lombard, L., … 
Chandna, T. (2006). Traumatic brain injury rehabilitation: State of the 





Gracey, F., Evans, J. J., & Malley, D. (2009). Capturing process and outcome in 
complex rehabilitation interventions: A “Y-shaped” model. 
Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 19(6), 867–890. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/0960201090302776 
Gracey, F., & Ownsworth, T. L. (2008). Editorial. Neuropsychological 
Rehabilitation, 18(5–6), 522–526. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/09602010802141509 
Gracey, F., & Ownsworth, T. L. (2012). The experience of self in the world: The 
personal and social contexts of identity change after brain injury. In J. Jetten, 
C. Haslam, & S. A. Haslam (Eds.), The social cure: Identity, health and 
well-being. (pp. 273–295). Kindle Edition; downloaded from Amazon.co.uk. 
Gracey, F., Palmer, S., Rous, B., Psaila, K., Shaw, K., O’Dell, J., … Mohamed, 
S. (2008). “Feeling part of things”: Personal construction of self after brain 
injury. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 18(5–6), 627–650. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/09602010802041238 
Gutman, S. A., & Napier-Klemic, J. (1996). The experience of head injury on the 
impairment of gender identity and gender role. American Journal of 
Occupational Therapy, 50(7), 535–544. http://doi.org/10.5014/ajot.50.7.535 
Guttman, L. (1950). The basis for scalogram analysis. (S. A. Stouffer, 
Ed.)Measurement and prediction (Volume 4). Indianapolis, US: Bobbs-
Merrill. 
Hammell, K. W. (2006). Perspectives on Disability & Rehabilitation: Contesting 
Assumptions, Challenging Practice. Edinburgh: Elsevier Health Sciences. 
Hammell, K. W. (2007). Quality of life after spinal cord injury: A meta-synthesis 
of qualitative findings. Spinal Cord, 45(2), 124–39. 
http://doi.org/10.1038/sj.sc.3101992 
Hawthorne, G., Mouthaan, J., Forbes, D., & Novaco, R. (2006). Response 
categories and anger measurement: Do fewer categories result in poorer 
measurement? Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 41(2), 164–
172. http://doi.org/10.1007/s00127-005-0986-y 
Hays, R. D., Morales, L. S., & Reise, S. P. (2000). Item response theory and 
health outcomes measurement in the 21st century. Medical Care, 38, II28-
II42. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.bbi.2008.05.010 
Heller, W., Mukherjee, D., Levin, R. L. R., & Reis, J. P. J. (2006). Characters in 
contexts: Identity and personality processes that influences individual and 




Hobart, J. C., & Cano, S. (2009). Improving the evaluation of therapeutic 
interventions in multiple sclerosis: The role of new psychometric methods. 
Health Technology Assessment, 13(12), 1–177. 
http://doi.org/10.3310/hta13120 
Hobart, J. C., Riazi, A., Thompson, A. J., Styles, I. M., Ingram, W., Vickery, P. 
J., … Zajicek, J. P. (2006). Getting the measure of spasticity in multiple 
sclerosis: The Multiple Sclerosis Spasticity Scale (MSSS-88). Brain, 129(1), 
224–234. http://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awh675 
Hyder, A. A., Wunderlich, C. A., Puvanachandra, P., Gururaj, G., & Kobusingye, 
O. C. (2007). The impact of traumatic brain injuries: A global perspective. 
NeuroRehabilitation, 22(5), 341–353. 
Identity. (2015). Retrieved July 4, 2015, from 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/91004?redirectedFrom=identity#eid 
Jacobsson, L., & Lexell, J. (2013). Life satisfaction 6-15 years after a traumatic 
brain injury. Journal of Rehabilitation Medicine. 
http://doi.org/10.2340/16501977-1204 
James, W. (1890). Principles of Psychology: Briefer course. New York: Holt. 
Janoff-Bulman, R. (1992). Shattered Assumptions: Towards a new psychology of 
trauma. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. 
Jennett, B., & Bond, M. (1975). Assessment of outcome after severe brain 
damage. Lancet, 305(7905), 480–484. 
Jennett, B., Snoek, J., Bond, M. R., & Brooks, N. (1981). Disability after severe 
head injury: Observations on the use of the Glasgow Outcome Scale. 
Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 44(4), 285–93. 
http://doi.org/10.1136/jnnp.44.4.285 
Jennett, B., Teasdale, G. M., Braakman, R., Minderhoud, J., Heiden, J., & Kurze, 
T. (1979). Prognosis of patients with severe head injury. Neurosurgery, 4(4), 
283–289. http://doi.org/10.1227/00006123-197904000-00001 
Jetten, J., Haslam, S. A., & Haslam, C. (2012). The social cure: Identity, health 
and well-being. In J. Jetten, C. Haslam, & S. A. Haslam (Eds.), The social 
cure: Identity, health and well-being. Hove, Sussex: [Kindle Edition]. 
Retrieved from http//:www.amazon.co.uk. 
Johansson, U., & Tham, K. (2006). The meaning of work after traumatic brain 
injury. American Journal of Occupational Therapy, 60(1), 60–69. 
Jones, J. A., & Curtin, M. (2010). Traumatic brain injury, participation, and rural 





Jumisko, E., Lexell, J., & Söderberg, S. (2005). The meaning of living with 
traumatic brain injury in people with moderate or severe brain injury. 
Journal of Neuroscience Nursing, 37(1), 42–49. 
http://doi.org/10.1097/01376517-200502000-00007 
Keith, R. A., Granger, C. V, Hamilton, B. B., & Sherwin, F. S. (1987). The 
functional independence measure: A new tool for rehabilitation. Advances in 
Clinical Rehabilitation, 1, 6–18. 
Kersten, P., Lundgren Nilsson, Å., & Batcho, C. S. (2015). Rethinking 
measurement in rehabilitation. In K. M. McPherson, B. Gibson, & A. 
Leplege (Eds.), Rethinking Rehabilitation. Boca Raton, FL, US: CRC Press. 
King, N., & Tyerman, A. (2009). Psychological approaches to rehabilitation 
after brain injury. Hoboken, NJ, US: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Kleinman, A. (1988). The illness narratives: Suffering, healing and the human 
condition. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
Klinger, L. (2005). Occupational adaptation: Perspectives of people with 
traumatic brain injury. Journal of Occupational Science, 12(1), 9–16. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/14427591.2005.9686543 
Krefting, L. (1989). Reintegration into the community after head injury: The 
results of an ethnographic study. Occupational Therapy Journal of 
Research, 9(2), 67–83. 
Langlois, J. A., Rutland-Brown, W., & Wald, M. M. (2006). The epidemiology 
and impact of traumatic brain injury: A brief overview. The Journal of Head 
Trauma Rehabilitation, 21(5), 375–8. http://doi.org/10.1097/00001199-
200609000-00001 
Lawson, S., Delamere, F. M., & Hutchinson, S. L. (2008). A personal narrative of 
involvement in post-traumatic brain injury rehabilitation. What can we learn 
for therapeutic recreation practice? Therapeutic Recreation Journal, 42(4), 
236–250. 
Leary, M. R., & Tangney, J. P. (2012). Handbook of self and identity, second 
edition. New York: Guilford Press. 
Leder, D. (1990). The Absent Body. Chicago, IL: Univeristy of Chicago Press. 
Ledesma, R. D., & Valero-Mora, P. (2007). Determining the Number of Factors 
to Retain in EFA: an easy-to-use computer program for carrying out Parallel 
Analysis. Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation, 12(2), 1–11. 
Leibson, C. L., Brown, A. W., Hall Long, K., Ransom, J. E., Mandrekar, J., 
Osler, T. M., & Malec, J. F. (2012). Medical care costs associated with 




population-based study. Journal of Neurotrauma, 29(11), 2038–49. 
http://doi.org/10.1089/neu.2010.1713 
Leibson, C. L., Brown, A. W., Ransom, J. E., Diehl, N. N., Perkins, P. K., 
Mandrekar, J., & Malec, J. F. (2011). Incidence of traumatic brain injury 
across the full disease spectrum: a population-based medical record review 
study. Epidemiology, 22(6), 836–44. 
http://doi.org/10.1097/EDE.0b013e318231d535 
Leplege, A., Gzil, F., Cammelli, M., Lefeve, C., Pachoud, B., & Ville, I. (2007). 
Person-centredness: conceptual and historical perspectives. Disability and 
Rehabilitation, 29(20–21), 1555–65. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/09638280701618661 
Levack, W. M. M., Boland, P., Taylor, W. J., Siegert, R. J., Kayes, N. M., Fadyl, 
J. K., & McPherson, K. M. (2014). Establishing a person-centred framework 
of self-identity after traumatic brain injury: A grounded theory study to 
inform measure development. BMJ Open, 4(5), e004630. 
http://doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2013-004630 
Levack, W. M. M., Kayes, N. M., & Fadyl, J. K. (2010). Experience of recovery 
and outcome following traumatic brain injury: a metasynthesis of qualitative 
research. Disability & Rehabilitation, 32(12), 986–999. 
http://doi.org/10.3109/09638281003775394 
Levack, W. M. M., Siegert, R. J., & Pickering, N. (2014). Ethics and goal setting. 
In R. J. Siegert & W. M. M. Levack (Eds.), Rehabilitation goal setting: 
Theory, practice, & evidence. (pp. 67–87). London, England: Taylor & 
Francis Group. 
Levin, H., Gary Jr, H., & Eisenberg, H. (1990). Neurobehavioral outcome 1 year 
after severe head injury: Experience of the Traumatic Coma Data Bank. 
Journal of Neurosurgery, 73(5), 699–709. 
http://doi.org/10.3171/jns.1990.73.5.0699 
Levine, M. J., Van Horn, K. R., & Curtis, A. B. (1993). Developmental models of 
social cognition in assessing psychosocial adjustments in head injury. Brain 
Injury, 7(2), 153–167. http://doi.org/10.3109/02699059309008169 
Likert, R., Roslow, S., & Murphy, G. (1934). A simple and reliable method of 
scoring the Thurstone attitude scales. Journal of Social Psychology, 5(2), 
228–238. http://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.1934.9919450 
Linacre, J. M. (1994). Sample Size and Item Calibration [or Person Measure] 
Stability. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 7(4), 328. 
Linacre, J. M. (2002). Optimizing rating scale category effectiveness. Journal of 




Linville, P. W. (1987). Self-complexity as a cognitive buffer against stress-related 
illness and depression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52(4), 
663–76. http://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.52.4.663 
Locke, J. (1690). An essay concerning human understanding. Oxford. 
Lord, F. M., Novick, M. R., & Birnbaum, A. (1968). Statistical theories of mental 
test scores. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Maas, A. I. R., Harrison-Felix, C. L., Menon, D., Adelson, P. D., Balkin, T., 
Bullock, R., … Schwab, K. (2010). Common data elements for traumatic 
brain injury: recommendations from the interagency working group on 
demographics and clinical assessment. Archives of Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation, 91(11), 1641–9. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.apmr.2010.07.232 
Maas, A. I. R., Stocchetti, N., & Bullock, R. (2008). Moderate and severe 
traumatic brain injury in adults. Lancet Neurology, 7(8), 728–41. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S1474-4422(08)70164-9 
Mahoney, F., & Barthel, D. (1965). Functional Evaluation: The Barthel Index. 
Maryland State Medical Journal, 14, 61–5. 
Malec, J. F., Brown, A. W., Leibson, C. L., Flaada, J. T., Mandrekar, J. N., Diehl, 
N. N., & Perkins, P. K. (2007). The Mayo classification system for traumatic 
brain injury severity. Journal of Neurotrauma, 24(9), 1417–24. 
http://doi.org/10.1089/neu.2006.0245 
Man, D. W., Tam, A. S., & Li, E. P. (2003). Exploring self-concepts of persons 
with brain injury. Brain Injury, 17(9), 775–788. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/0269905031000088577 
Markus, H., & Nurius, P. (1986). Possible selves. American Psychologist, 41(9), 
954–969. http://doi.org/10.1037//0003-066X.41.9.954 
Marosszeky, N. E., Ryan, L., Shores, E. A., Batchelor, J., & Marosszeky, J. . 
(1998). The PTA protocol. Guidelines for using the Westmead Post-
Traumatic Amnesia (PTA) Scale. Sydney: Wild and Wooley. 
Marris, P. (1974). Loss and change. New York, NY: Pantheon. 
Massof, R. W. (2002). The measurement of vision disability. Optometry and 
Vision Science, 79(8), 516–52. http://doi.org/10.1097/00006324-200208000-
00015 
Masters, G. N. (1982). A Rasch model for partial credit scoring. Psychometrika, 
47(2), 149–174. http://doi.org/10.1007/BF02296272 
Matell, M. S., & Jacoby, J. (1971). Is there an optimal number of alternatives for 




Psychological Measurement, 31(3), 657–674. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/001316447103100307 
McAdams, D. P. (1999). Personal narratives and the life story. In L. Pervin & O. 
John (Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research (2nd ed., pp. 
478–500). New York: Guilford Press. 
McGarry, L., Thompson, D., Millham, F., Cowell, L., Snyder, P., Lenderking, 
W., & Weinstein, M. (2002). Outcomes and costs of acute treatment of 
traumatic brain injury. Journal of Trauma-Injury, Infection & Critical Care, 
53(6), 1152–59. http://doi.org/10.1097/00005373-200212000-00020 
McGrath, J. (2004). Beyond restoration to transformation: Positive outcomes in 
the rehabilitation of acquired brain injury. Clinical Rehabilitation, 18(7), 
767–775. http://doi.org/10.1191/0269215504cr802oa 
McHorney, C. A., & Tarlov, A. R. (1995). Individual-patient monitoring in 
clinical practice: are available health status survey adequate? Quality of Life 
Research, 4(4), 293–307. http://doi.org/10.1007/BF01593882 
McKinlay, A., Grace, R. C., Horwood, L. J., Fergusson, D. M., Ridder, E. M., & 
MacFarlane, M. R. (2008). Prevalence of traumatic brain injury among 
children, adolescents and young adults: prospective evidence from a birth 
cohort. Brain Injury, 22(2), 175–81. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/02699050801888824 
Mead, G. (1934). Mind, self, and society from the standpoint of a social 
behaviorist. (C. Morris, Ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Medved, M. I., & Brockmeier, J. (2008). Continuity amid chaos: Neurotrauma, 
loss of memory, and sense of self. Qualitative Health Research, 18(4), 469–
479. http://doi.org/10.1177/1049732308315731 
Meijer, R. R., & Sitsma, K. (2001). Person-fit statistic–what is their purpose? 
Rasch Measurement Transactions, 823. 
Melnyk, A. (2012). Materialism. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive 
Science, 3(3), 281–292. http://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1174 
Menon, D. K., Schwab, K., Wright, D. W., & Maas, A. I. (2010). Position 
statement: definition of traumatic brain injury. Archives of Physical 
Medicine and Rehabilitation, 91(11), 1637–40. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.apmr.2010.05.017 
Michell, J. (1997). Quantitative science and the definition of measurement in 
psychology. British Journal of Psychology, 88, 355–383. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8295.1997.tb02641.x 




D. L., … de Vet, H. C. W. (2009). COSMIN checklist manual. Amsterdam: 
VU University Medical Centre. 
Morris, S. D. (2004). Rebuilding identity through narrative following traumatic 
brain injury. Journal of Cognitive Rehabilitation, 22(2), 15–21. 
Morris, S., Ridley, S., Lecky, F. E., Munro, V., & Christensen, M. C. (2008). 
Determinants of hospital costs associated with traumatic brain injury in 
England and Wales. Anaesthesia, 63(5), 499–508. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2044.2007.05432.x 
Morse, J. M. (1995). Exploring the theoretical basis of nursing using advanced 
techniques of concept analysis. Advances in Nursing Science, 17(3), 31–46. 
Morse, J. M. (2000). Exploring pragmatic utility: concept analysis by critically 
appraising the literature. In B. L. Rodgers & K. A. Knafl (Eds.), Concept 
development in nursing: Foundations, techniques and applications (2nd ed., 
pp. 333–352). Philadelphia: W B Saunders Co. 
Morse, J. M., Hupcey, J. E., Mitcham, C., & Lenz, E. (1996). Concept analysis in 
nursing research: A critical appraisal. Scholarly Inquiry for Nursing 
Practice, 10(3), 253–277. 
Morse, J. M., Mitcham, C., Hupcey, J. E., & Tasón, M. C. (1996). Criteria for 
concept evaluation. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 24(2), 385–390. 
Muenchberger, H., Kendall, E., & Neal, R. (2008). Identity transition following 
traumatic brain injury: A dynamic process of contraction, expansion and 
tentative balance. Brain Injury, 22(12), 979–992. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/02699050802530532 
Murphy, R. F., Scheer, J., Murphy, Y., & Mack, R. (1988). Physical disability 
and social liminality: A study in the rituals of adversity. Social Science & 
Medicine, 26(2), 235–42. http://doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(88)90244-4 
Myles, S. M. (2004). Understanding and treating loss of sense of self following 
brain injury: A behavior analytic approach. International Journal of 
Psychology and Psychological Therapy, 4(3), 487–504. 
Nakase-Richardson, R., Yablon, S. a, & Sherer, M. (2007). Prospective 
comparison of acute confusion severity with duration of post-traumatic 
amnesia in predicting employment outcome after traumatic brain injury. 
Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 78(8), 872–6. 
http://doi.org/10.1136/jnnp.2006.104190 
NHS England. (2013). NHS standard contract for specialised rehabilitation for 
patients with highly complex needs (all ages). 




England: Penguin Books. 
Nochi, M. (1997). Dealing with the “Void”: Traumatic brain injury as a story. 
Disability & Society, 12(4), 533–555. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/09687599727119 
Nochi, M. (1998a). “Loss of self” in the narratives of people with traumatic brain 
injuries: A qualitative analysis. Social Science & Medicine, 46(7), 869–878. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S0277-9536(97)00211-6 
Nochi, M. (1998b). Struggling with the labeled self: People with traumatic brain 
injuries in social settings. Qualitative Health Research, 8(5), 665–681. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/104973239800800507 
Nochi, M. (2000). Reconstructing self-narratives in coping with traumatic brain 
injury. Social Science & Medicine, 51(12), 1795–1804. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S0277-9536(00)00111-8 
Noggle, R. (1999). Integrity, the self, and desire-based accounts of the good. 
Philosophical Studies, 96, 303–331. 
Office for National Statistics. (2016). Census. Retrieved from 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/census 
Oke, M. (2008). Remaking self after domestic violence: Mongolian and 
Australian women’s narratives of recovery. Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Family Therapy, 29(3), 148–155. 
http://doi.org/10.1375/anft.29.3.148 
Ono, J., Yamaura, A., & Kubota, M. (2001). Outcome prediction in severe head 
injury: Analyses of clinical prognostic factors. Journal of Clinical 
Neuroscience, 8(2), 120–123. http://doi.org/10.1054/jocn.2000.0732 
Oppenheim, A. (2000). Questionnaire design, interviewing and attitude 
measurement. (2nd ed.). London, England: Continuum International 
Publishing Group. 
Ownsworth, T., & Haslam, C. (2014). Impact of rehabilitation on self-concept 
following traumatic brain injury: An exploratory systematic review of 
intervention methodology and efficacy. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 
1–35. http://doi.org/10.1080/09602011.2014.977924 
Ownsworth, T. L. (2014). Self-identity after Brain Injury. Hove, Sussex: 
Psychology Press (UK). 
Ownsworth, T. L., & Fleming, J. M. (2011). Growth through loss after brain 





Oyserman, D., & Lee, S. W. S. (2008). Does culture influence what and how we 
think? Effects of priming individualism and collectivism. Psychological 
Bulletin, 134(2), 311–42. http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.134.2.311 
Padilla, R. (2003). Clara : A phenomenology of disability. The American Journal 
of Occupational Therapy, 57(4), 413–423. 
http://doi.org/10.5014/ajot.57.4.413 
Pallant, J. F., & Tennant, A. (2007). An introduction to the Rasch measurement 
model: An example using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
(HADS). British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 46(1), 1–18. 
http://doi.org/10.1348/014466506X96931 
Pappadis, M. R. (2015). Reconstruction of self-identity and its impact on 
psychosocial adjustment to traumatic brain injury. In Society for Social Work 
and Research 19th Annual Conference: The Social and Behavioral 
Importance of Increased Longevity. 
Parr, S. (2007). Living with severe aphasia: Tracking social exclusion. 
Aphasiology, 21(1), 98–123. http://doi.org/10.1080/02687030600798337 
Paterson, J., & Stewart, J. (2002). Adults with acquired brain injury: perceptions 
of their social world. Rehabilitation Nursing, 27(1), 13–18. 
http://doi.org/10.1002/j.2048-7940.2002.tb01973.x 
Patterson, F. L., & Staton, A. R. (2009). Adult-acquired traumatic brain injury: 
Existential implications and clinical considerations. Journal of Mental 
Health Counseling, 31(2), 149–163. 
http://doi.org/10.17744/mehc.31.2.1p42572p01435173 
Perna, R. B., & Errico, A. E. (2004). Neurological substrates of personal identity: 
Implications for neurorehabilitation. Journal of Cognitive Rehabilitation, 
22(1), 10–12. 
Persinger, M. A. (1993). Personality changes following brain injury as a grief 
response to the loss of sense of self: phenomenological themes as indices of 
local lability and neurocognitive structuring as psychotherapy. Psychological 
Reports, 72, 1059–1068. http://doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1993.72.3c.1059 
personal identity. (2013). In OED Online. 
Piolino, P., Desgranges, B., Manning, L., North, P., Jokic, C., & Eustache, F. 
(2006). Autobiographical memory, the sense of recollection and executive 
functions after severe traumatic brain injury. Cortex, 42(2), 176–195. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S0010-9452(08)70474-X 
Ponsford, J., Draper, K., & Schönberger, M. (2008). Functional outcome 10 years 




severity, and cognitive and emotional status. Journal of the International 
Neuropsychological Society : JINS, 14(2), 233–42. 
http://doi.org/10.1017/S1355617708080272 
Ponsford, J., Kelly, A., & Couchman, G. (2014). Self-concept and self-esteem 
after acquired brain injury: A control group comparison. Brain Injury, 28(2), 
146–54. http://doi.org/10.3109/02699052.2013.859733 
Price-Lackey, P., & Cashman, J. (1996). Jenny’s story: Reinventing oneself 
through occupation and narrative configuration. American Journal of 
Occupational Therapy, 50(4), 306–314. http://doi.org/10.5014/ajot.50.4.306 
Prigatano, G. P. (1989). Work, love and play after traumatic brain injury. Bulletin 
of the Menninger Clinic, 53(5), 414–431. 
Prigatano, G. P. (1999). Principles of Neuropsychological Rehabilitation. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Prigatano, G. P., Fordyce, D. J., Zeiner, H. K., Roueche, J. R., Pepping, M., & 
Wood, B. C. (1986). Neuropsychological rehabilitation after brain injury. 
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
Prigatano, G. P., & Schacter, D. L. (1991). Awareness of deficit after brain 
injury: Clinical and theoretical issues. (G. Prigatano & D. Schacter, Eds.). 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
PROMIS. (2016). PROMIS. Retrieved from 
http://www.healthmeasures.net/explore-measurement-systems/promis 
Psylab Group. (2012). Introductory Rasch Analysis- course manual. 
Rasch, G. (1960). Probabilistic models for some intelligence and attainment tests. 
Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institution for Educational Research. 
Rathbone, C. J., Moulin, C. J., & Conway, M. A. (2009). Autobiographical 
memory and amnesia: Using conceptual knowledge to ground the self. 
Neurocase, 15(5), 405–418. http://doi.org/10.1080/13554790902849164 
Rehabilitation. (2015). Retrieved August 4, 2015, from 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/161448?redirectedFrom=rehabilitation#eid 
Reise, S. P., & Henson, J. M. (2003). A discussion of modern versus traditional 
psychometrics as applied to personality assessment scales. Journal of 
Personality Assessment, 81(2), 93–103. 
http://doi.org/10.1207/S15327752JPA8102_01 
Rickels, E., von Wild, K., & Wenzlaff, P. (2010). Head injury in Germany: A 
population-based prospective study on epidemiology, causes, treatment and 




Injury, 24(12), 1491–504. http://doi.org/10.3109/02699052.2010.498006 
Ricoeur, P. (1995). Oneself as Another. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Rimel, R., Giordani, B., Barth, J., & Riddoch, M. J. (1982). Moderate head 
injury: Completing the clinical spectrum of brain trauma. Neurosurgery, 
11(3), 345–352. http://doi.org/10.1227/00006123-198209000-00002 
Roozenbeek, B., Maas, A. I. R., & Menon, D. K. (2013). Changing patterns in the 
epidemiology of traumatic brain injury. Nature Reviews. Neurology, 9(4), 
231–6. http://doi.org/10.1038/nrneurol.2013.22 
Roscigno, C. I., & Van Liew, K. (2008). Pushed to the margins and pushing back: 
A case study of one adult’s reflections on social interactions after a traumatic 
brain injury sustained as an adolescent. Journal of Neuroscience Nursing, 
40(4), 212–221. http://doi.org/10.1097/01376517-200808000-00005 
Royal College of Physicians. (2010). Medical rehabilitation in 2011 and beyond. 
Report of a working party. London, England. 
Rubin, D., Wetzler, S., & Nebes, R. (1988). Autobiographical memory across the 
adult lifespan. In D. Rubin (Ed.), Autobiographical Memory (pp. 202–221). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
RUMM Laboratory. (2016). Local dependence, subtests and threshold order. 
Rusnak, M. (2013). Traumatic brain injury: Giving voice to a silent epidemic. 
Nature Reviews. Neurology, 9(4), 186–7. 
http://doi.org/10.1038/nrneurol.2013.38 
Russell, D. W. (1996). UCLA Loneliness Scale (Version 3): Reliability, Validity 
and Factor Structure. Journal of Personality Assessment, 66(1), 20–40. 
http://doi.org/10.1207/s15327752jpa6601 
Ryan, R., & Deci, E. (2012). Multiple identities within a single self. In M. Leary 
& J. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of Self and Identity (2nd ed., pp. 225–246). 
New York: The Guilford Press. 
Sackett, D. L., Rosenberg, W. M., Gray, J. A. M., Haynes, R. B., & Richardson, 
W. S. (1996). Evidence based medicine: What it is and what it isn’t. British 
Medical Journal, 312, 71–72. 
Sacks, O. (1995). Foreword. In The Organism (1st paperb). New York, NY: Zone 
Books. 
Salter, K., Hellings, C., Foley, N., & Teasell, R. (2008). The experience of living 
with stroke: A qualitative meta-synthesis. Journal of Rehabilitation 
Medicine, 40(8), 595–602. http://doi.org/10.2340/16501977-0238 





Schechtman, M. (2010). Philosophical reflections on narrative and deep brain 
stimulation. The Journal of Clinical Ethics, 21(2), 133–139. 
Schmidt, J., Lannin, N., Fleming, J., & Ownsworth, T. L. (2011). Feedback 
interventions for impaired self-awareness following brain injury: A 
systematic review. Journal of Rehabilitation Medicine, 43(8), 673–680. 
http://doi.org/10.2340/16501977-0846 
Schnyder, U., Moergeli, H., Klaghofer, R., & Buddeberg, C. (2001). Incidence 
and prediction of posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms in severely injured 
accident victims. American Journal of Psychiatry, 158(4), 594–599. 
http://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.158.4.594 
Schootman, M., Buchman, T. G., & Lewis, L. M. (2003). National estimates of 
hospitalization charges for the acute care of traumatic brain injuries. Brain 
Injury, 17(11), 983–990. http://doi.org/10.1080/0269905031000110427 
Schwartz, S., Baldo, J., Graves, R. E., & Brugger, P. (2003). Pervasive influence 
of semantics in letter and category fluency: A multidimensional approach. 
Brain and Language, 87(3), 400–411. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0093-
934X(03)00141-X 
Schwarz, N. (2007). Retrospective and concurrent self-reports: The rationale for 
real-time data capture. In A. Stone, S. Shiffman, A. Atienza, & L. Nebeling 
(Eds.), The science of real-time data capture: Self-reports in health 
research. (pp. 11–27). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Sherer, M., Struchen, M. A., Yablon, S. A., Wang, Y., & Nick, T. G. (2008). 
Comparison of indices of traumatic brain injury severity: Glasgow Coma 
Scale, length of coma and post-traumatic amnesia. Journal of Neurology, 
Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 79(6), 678–85. 
http://doi.org/10.1136/jnnp.2006.111187 
Siegert, R. J., Tennant, A., & Turner-Stokes, L. (2010). Rasch analysis of the 
Beck Depression Inventory-II in a neurological rehabilitation sample. 
Disability and Rehabilitation, 32(1), 8–17. 
http://doi.org/10.3109/09638280902971398 
Sim, J., & Wright, C. (2000). Research in health care: Concepts, designs and 
methods. Cheltenham, UK: Stanley Thornes. 
Skinner, A., & Turner-Stokes, L. (2006). The use of standardized outcome 
measures in rehabilitation centres in the UK. Clinical Rehabilitation, 20(7), 
609–15. http://doi.org/10.1191/0269215506cr981oa 




of a creative intervention. Journal of Social Work Practice, 21(3), 297–309. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/02650530701553591 
Smith, C. (2008). Performing my recovery: A play of Chaos, Restitution, and 
Quest after traumatic brain injury. Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 9(2). 
Smith Jr, E. V. (2002). Detecting and Evaluating the Impact of 
Multidimensionality using Item Fit Statistics and Principal Component 
Analysis of Residuals. Journal of Applied Measurement, 3(2), 205–231. 
Social Care Institute for Excellence. (2016). Mental Capacity Act Resource. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.scie.org.uk/publications/ataglance/ataglance05.asp 
Soeker, M. S. (2011). Occupational adaptation: A return to work perspective of 
persons with mild to moderate brain injury in South Africa. Journal of 
Occupational Science, 18(1), 81–91. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/14427591.2011.554155 
Statistics New Zealand. (2016). 2006 Census questionnaires. Retrieved from 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/about-2006-census/2006-census-
questionnaires.aspx 
Stein, S. C., Georgoff, P., Meghan, S., Mizra, K., & Sonnad, S. S. (2010). 150 
years of treating severe traumatic brain injury: A systematic review of 
progress in mortality. Journal of Neurotrauma, 27(7), 1343–53. 
http://doi.org/10.1089/neu.2009.1206 
Steinbrook, R. (2009). Health care and the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act. The New England Journal of Medicine, 360(11), 1057–1060. 
http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp1415160 
Sternberg, R. J. (1986). A triangular theory of love. Psychological Review, 93(2), 
119–135. http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.93.2.119 
Stevens, S. S. (1946). On the theory of scales of measurement. Science, 
103(2684), 677–80. 
Stevens, S. S., & Davis, H. (1938). Hearing: Its psychology and physiology. New 
York, NY, US: Wiley. 
Strawson, G. (2004). Against narrativity. Ratio, 17(4), 428–452. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2004.00264.x 
Streiner, D. (2003). Starting at the Beginning: An Introduction to Coefficient 
Alpha and Internal Consistency. Journal of Personality Assessment, 80(1), 
99–103. http://doi.org/10.1207/S15327752JPA8001_18 




to their development and use. (4th ed.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press. 
Stuss, D. T., Binns, M. A., Carruth, F. G., Levine, B., Brandys, C. E., Moulton, 
R. J., … Schwartz, M. L. (1999). The acute period of recovery from 
traumatic brain injury: posttraumatic amnesia or posttraumatic confusional 
state? Journal of Neurosurgery, 90(4), 635–643. 
http://doi.org/10.3171/jns.1999.90.4.0635 
Svensson, E. (2001). Guidelines to statistical evaluation of data from rating scales 
and questionnaires. Journal of Rehabilitation Medicine, 33(1), 47–8. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/165019701300006542 
Tagliaferri, F., Compagnone, C., Korsic, M., Servadei, F., & Kraus, J. (2006). A 
systematic review of brain injury epidemiology in Europe. Acta 
Neurochirurgica, 148(3), 255–68. http://doi.org/10.1007/s00701-005-0651-y 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In 
W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup 
relations (pp. 33–47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. 
Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity. 
Cambridge, MA, US: Harvard University Press. 
Teasdale, G. M., & Jennett, B. (1974). Assessment of coma and impaired 
consciousness. The Lancet, 304(7872), 81–84. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-
6736(74)91639-0 
Tedeschi, R., & Calhoun, L. (1996). The Posttraumatic Growth Inventory: 
Measuring the positive legacy of trauma. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 9(3), 
455–471. http://doi.org/10.1002/jts.2490090305 
Tennant, A., & Conaghan, P. G. (2007). The Rasch measurement model in 
rheumatology: what is it and why use it? When should it be applied, and 
what should one look for in a Rasch paper? Arthritis and Rheumatism, 57(8), 
1358–62. http://doi.org/10.1002/art.23108 
Tennant, A., McKenna, S. P., & Hagell, P. (2004). Application of Rasch analysis 
in the development and application of quality of life instruments. Value in 
Health : The Journal of the International Society for Pharmacoeconomics 
and Outcomes Research, 7 Suppl 1, S22-6. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1524-
4733.2004.7s106.x 
Tennant, A., & Pallant, J. F. (2006). Unidimensionality matters. Rasch 
Measurement Transactions, 20, 1048–1051. 
Terwee, C. B., Bot, S. D. M., de Boer, M. R., van der Windt, D. A. W. M., Knol, 




for measurement properties of health status questionnaires. Journal of 
Clinical Epidemiology, 60(1), 34–42. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclinepi.2006.03.012 
Thomas, E. J., Levack, W. M. M., & Taylor, W. J. (2014). Self-reflective 
meaning-making in troubled times: A concept analysis of change in self-
identity after traumatic brain injury. Qualitative Health Research 24(8), 
1033-1047 
Thorndike, E. L. (1904). Theory of mental and social measurements. New York, 
NY: Science Press. 
Thurstone, L. L. (1927). A law of comparative judgement. Psychological Review, 
34, 273–286. 
Thurstone, L. L. (1928). Attitudes can be measured. American Journal of 
Sociology, 33(4), 529–554. 
Thurstone, L. L. (1931). The measurement of social attitudes. The Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 26(3), 249–269. 
Tulving, E. (1985). How many memory systems are there? American 
Psychologist, 40(4), 385–398. http://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.40.4.385 
Turner-Stokes, L. (1999). Outcome measurement in brain injury rehabilitation--
towards a common language. Clinical Rehabilitation, 13, 273–275. 
Turner-Stokes, L. (2007). Politics, policy and payment--facilitators or barriers to 
person-centred rehabilitation? Disability and Rehabilitation, 29(20–21), 
1575–1582. http://doi.org/10.1080/09638280701618851 
Turner-Stokes, L. (2009). Goal attainment scaling (GAS) in rehabilitation: a 
practical guide. Clinical Rehabilitation, 23(4), 362–70. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0269215508101742 
Turner-Stokes, L. (2014). Specialist rehabilitation weighted payment model 
explained. 
Turner-Stokes, L., Nyein, K., Turner-Stokes, T., & Gatehouse, C. (1999). The 
UK FIM+FAM: Development and evaluation. Clinical Rehabilitation, 13(4), 
277–287. http://doi.org/10.1191/026921599676896799 
Turner-Stokes, L., Sutch, S., & Dredge, R. (2011). Healthcare tariffs for specialist 
inpatient neurorehabilitation services: rationale and development of a UK 
casemix and costing methodology. Clinical Rehabilitation, 26, 264–279. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0269215511417467 
Turner, J. C. (1985). Social categorization and the self-concept: A social 




and Research, 2, 77–122. 
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. 
(1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Turner, V. (1969). Liminality and communitas. In V. Turner (Ed.), The ritual 
process: Structure and anti-structure (pp. 94–130). Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
Tyerman, A., & Humphrey, M. (1984). Changes in self-concept following severe 
head injury. International Journal of Rehabilitation Research, 7(1), 11–23. 
http://doi.org/10.1097/00004356-198403000-00002 
Tyson, S., Greenhalgh, J., Long, A. F., & Flynn, R. (2010). The use of 
measurement tools in clinical practice: An observational study of 
neurorehabilitation. Clinical Rehabilitation, 24(1), 74–81. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0269215509341527 
Vickery, C. D., Gontkovsky, S. T., & Caroselli, J. S. (2005). Self-concept and 
quality of life following aquired brain injury: A pilot investigation. Brain 
Injury, 19(9), 657–665. http://doi.org/10.1080/02699050400005218 
Wade, D. T., & Collin, C. (1988). The Barthel ADL Index : A standard measure 
of physical disability? Disability & Rehabilitation, 10(2), 64–67. 
Wechsler, D. (1958). Measurement and appraisal of adult intelligence (4th ed.). 
Baltimore, MD, US: Williams & Wilkins Co. http://doi.org/10.1037/11167-
000 
WHO. (2006). Neurological Disorders: Public Health Challenges. 
WHO. (2011). World report on disability. 
Williams, D., Levin, H., & Eisenberg, H. (1990). Mild head injury classification. 
Neurosurgery, 27(3), 422–428. http://doi.org/10.1227/00006123-
199009000-00014 
Wilson, J. T., Pettigrew, L. E., & Teasdale, G. M. (1998). Structured interviews 
for the Glasgow Outcome Scale and the extended Glasgow Outcome Scale: 
guidelines for their use. Journal of Neurotrauma, 15(8), 573–85. 
http://doi.org/10.1089/neu.1998.15.573 
Wilson, M. (2005). Constructing measures: An item response modelling 
approach. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Winqvist, S., Lehtilahti, M., Jokelainen, J., Luukinen, H., & Hillbom, M. (2007). 
Traumatic brain injuries in children and young adults: A birth cohort study 





Witt, K., Kuhn, J., Timmermann, L., Zurowski, M., & Woopen, C. (2011). Deep 
brain stimulation and the search for identity. Neuroethics, 6(3), 1–13. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-011-9100-1 
Woodward, C. (1988). Questionnaire construction and question writing for 
research in medical education. Medical Education, 22(4), 345–363. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2923.1988.tb00764.x 
Wright, B., & Stone, M. (1999). 1 . The idea of measurement. In Measurement 
Essentials, 2nd Edition (pp. 1–5). 
Wright, I. C., Rabe-Hesketh, S., Woodruff, P. W., David, A. S., Murray, R. M., & 
Bullmore, E. T. (2000). Meta-analysis of regional brain volumes in 
schizophrenia. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 157(1), 16–25. 
http://doi.org/10.1176/ajp.157.1.16 
Yalom, I. D. (1980). Existential psychotherapy. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
Yeates, G. N., Gracey, F., & Collicutt McGrath, J. (2008). A biopsychosocial 
deconstruction of “personality change” following acquired brain injury. 
Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 18(5–6), 566–589. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/09602010802151532 
Ylvisaker, M., & Feeney, T. (2000). Reconstruction of identity after brain injury. 
Brain Impairment, 1(1), 12–28. http://doi.org/10.1375/brim.1.1.12 
Ylvisaker, M., McPherson, K., Kayes, N., & Pellett, E. (2008). Metaphoric 
identity mapping: Facilitating goal setting and engagement in rehabilitation 
after traumatic brain injury. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 18(5–6), 
713–741. http://doi.org/10.1080/09602010802201832 
Zitzelsberger, H. (2005). (In)visibility: accounts of embodiment of women with 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Do I have to take part? 
No.	Your	participation	is	entirely	voluntary	(your	choice).		You	do	not	have	to	take	part	in	
this	study.		
• Your decision to take part or not take part in this study will not affect in any way 
the care or treatment that you might be receiving. 
• If you do agree to take part, you are free to withdraw from the study at any time, 
without having to give a reason.  Withdrawing at any time will in no way affect 
your future health care.   
To	help	you	make	your	decision	please	read	this	information	brochure.		You	may	take	as	
much	time	as	you	like	to	consider	whether	or	not	to	take	part.		


































Who can be in the study? 
You	can	be	involved	in	this	study	if:	
• You have experienced a TBI when over 18 years of age, and 
• It was at least 6 months ago and 




How many people will be testing this new questionnaire? 
This	questionnaire	has	already	been	tested	on	9	people	with	TBI	and	has	been	changed	in	
the	light	of	their	comments.	We	now	want	to	test	the	new	version	on	a	further	4-6	people.	






• How you feel about yourself 
























What is the time-span for the study? 
The	study	is	expected	to	run	from	April	2013	to	April	2014,	with	results	available	early	2015.	









































































Do I have to take part? 
No.	Your	participation	is	entirely	voluntary	(your	choice).		You	do	not	have	to	take	part	in	
this	study.	
• Your decision to take part or not take part in this study will not affect in any way 
the care or treatment that you might be receiving. 
• If you do agree to take part, you are free to withdraw from the study at any time, 
without having to give a reason.  Withdrawing at any time will in no way affect 
your future health care.   
To	help	you	make	your	decision	please	read	this	information	sheet.		You	may	take	as	much	
time	as	you	like	to	consider	whether	or	not	to	take	part.		


































Who can be in the study? 
You	can	be	involved	in	this	study	if:	
• You have experienced a TBI when over 18 years of age, and 
• It was at least 6 months ago and 









• How you feel about yourself 
• How others treat you 






















What is the time-span for the study? 
The	study	is	expected	to	run	from	April	2013	to	April	2014,	with	results	made	available	in	
early	2015.	











The interview will not be recorded and all information that you provide will remain 
strictly confidential. No material that could personally identify you will be used in 
any reports from this study.  However the researchers have an obligation to 
contact your GP or an emergency health service if you disclose any information 




















Phone:	 	 	 04	385	5541	[+6569]	




































































• You have experienced a TBI when over 18 years of age, and 
• It was at least 6 months ago and 





• Your decision to take part or not take part in this study will not affect in any way 
the care or treatment that you might be receiving. 
• If you do agree to take part, you are free to withdraw from the study at any time, 
without having to give a reason.  Withdrawing at any time will in no way affect 









• How you feel about yourself 
• How others treat you 



























































































Centre Number:  
 
Study Number: P140220 
 
Patient Identification Number for this trial:  
 
CONSENT FORM 
Developing a measure of sense of self following Traumatic Brain Injury  
 
Name of Researcher: Dr Emily Thomas 
 
 
Please initial box  
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated February 2014  
   (version 1.0) for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information,  
   ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.                                                                                             
      
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time   
    without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being affected.  
 
3. I understand that relevant sections of my medical notes and data collected during the study,  
    may be looked at by individuals from regulatory authorities or from the  
    NHS Trust, where it is relevant to my taking part in this research. I give permission for these  
    individuals to have access to my records. 
 
4. I understand that my anonymised responses will be shared with other researchers collaborating on 
this project and the pooled results may be published in journal articles or presented at conferences. 
  
5 I agree to my GP being informed if I become distressed and the research team is concerned for my 
wellbeing 
 




_______________   ________________   _________________  
Name of Patient   Date     Signature  
	
_________________   ________________   ___________________  
Name of Person   Date     Signature  













Ethical approval, NZ 
354	
	
Ethical approval, NZ 
355	
	
Ethical approval, UK 
356	
	
Ethical approval, UK 
357	
	
Ethical approval, UK 
358	
	













Demographic	details:	 	 	 	 	 	 ID	
NO:	

























































































Between	1		and	3	days	 	 • 	
Between	3	and	7	days	 • 	
More	than	7	days	 • 	








Sense of Coherence -13 
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Sense of Coherence -13 
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Sense of Coherence -13 
368	
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Appendix	F:	Search	strategy	for	Chapter	4	Concept	Analysis
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	Search	strategies:	
All	searches	run	March	2012	
	
Database:	Ovid	MEDLINE®	1946	to	Present	with	Daily	Update		
1.	exp	Self	Concept/	
2.	exp	"Identification	(Psychology)"/	
3.	exp	Social	Identification/	
4.	exp	Personhood/	
5.	identity.ti,ab.	
6.	(sense	adj3	self).ti,ab.	
7.	(experience	adj3	self).ti,ab.	
8.	(loss	adj5	self).ti,ab.	
9.	(coherence	adj5	self).ti,ab.	
10.	1	or	2	or	3	or	4	or	5	or	6	or	7	or	8	or	9	
11.	limit	10	to	(english	language	and	humans	and	"all	adult	(19	plus	years)"	and	
english)	
12.	exp	Brain	Injuries/	
13.	exp	Craniocerebral	Trauma/	
14.	Brain	Damage,	Chronic/	
15.	(head	or	brain).mp.	and	(damage	or	injur*	or	trauma)	(ti,ab)		
16.	12	or	13	or	14	or	15	
17.	limit	16	to	(english	language	and	humans	and	"all	adult	(19	plus	years)"	and	
english)	
18.	10	and	17	
		
Database:	Ovid	PsycINFO	1967-present	
1.	exp	Self	Concept/	
2.	exp	Identity	Crisis/	or	exp	Professional	Identity/	or	exp	Ego	Identity/	or	exp	
Gender	Identity/	or	exp	Identity	Formation/	or	exp	Social	Identity/	or	exp	Ethnic	
Identity/	or	exp	Group	Identity/	
3.	exp	Individuality/	
4.	(sense	adj3	self).ti,ab.	
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5.	(experience	adj3	self).ti,ab.	
6.	(loss	adj5	self).ti,ab.	
7.	(coherence	adj5	self).ti,ab.	
8.	identity.ti,ab.	
9.	1	or	2	or	3	or	4	or	5	or	6	or	7	or	8	
10.	limit	9	to	(human	and	english	language)	
11.	exp	Head	Injuries/	
12.	exp	Traumatic	Brain	Injury/	
13.	(head	or	brain).mp.	and	(damage	or	injur*	or	trauma)	(ti,ab)		
14.	exp	Brain	Damage/	
15.	11	or	12	or	13	or	14	
16.	9	and	15	
17.	limit	16	to	(human	and	english	language)	
(	this	search	was	initially	run	with	an	adult	limiter	but	was	found	to	have	excluded	
several	relevant,	adult-based	studies	and	so	this	was	removed)	
Database:	Ovid:	AMED	1985-present	
1.	exp	Self	concept/	
2.	(sense	adj3	self).ti,ab.	
3.	(experience	adj3	self).ti,ab.	
4.	(loss	adj5	self).ti,ab.	
5.	(coherence	adj5	self).ti,ab.	
6.	identity.ti,ab.	
7.	1	or	2	or	3	or	4	or	5	or	6	
8.	limit	7	to	english	
9.	exp	Head	injuries/	
10.	(head	or	brain).mp.	and	(damage	or	injur*	or	trauma)	(ti,ab)		
11.	9	or	10	
12.	limit	11	to	english	
13.	8	and	12	
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Database:	EBSCOHost:	CINAHL	1981-present	
1. (MH	“Self	concept+”)	
2. (MH	“Social	identity”)	
3. (MH	“Identity	crisis”)	
4. “identity”	
5. sense	N3	self	
6. experience	N3	self	
7. loss	N5	self	
8. coherence	N5	self	
9. 1	OR	2	OR	3	OR	4	OR	5	OR	6	OR	7	OR	8	
10. (MH	“Head	Injuries+”)	
11. (head	OR	brain)	AND	(damage	OR	injur*	OR	trauma)		
12. 10	OR	11	
